islamic-jihad-legacy-of-forced-conversion-imperialism-slavery

Islamic Imperialism in India‘Police officer would not listen, the Control Office would not control, the Government Houseswould not listen, Sir, in these circumstances the Great Killing went on and it is undisputed thatthis would never have happened if the police and the military had taken strong measures onFriday, the 16 th , when the trouble began. It would have been nipped in the bud that very day, and,therefore, the conclusion is inevitable that although the police may not be responsible for theorigin of disturbances, they are directly responsible for the great loss of human life, and if animpartial enquiry is held and these officers can be spotted, my opinion is that they deserve to behanged, drawn and quartered publicly, on charges of murder and abetment of murder…’In violence during the Partition in the districts of today’s Pakistan, notes Gurbachan Singh Talib:‘… police and military—which, by now, were entirely composed of Muslims on the Pakistanside, due to the partition of personnel and assets between India and Pakistan—gave not onlyactive assistance and encouragement to the rampaging Muslim mobs, but often-times led them,directed their operations, and finished off the job of murder where the mobs could not succeedsingle-handed. By August, the non-Muslim populations of Lahore had been reduced to only afraction of their former numbers. But still more than 100,000 Hindus and Sikhs remained inLahore.’ 586According to a Civil and Military Gazette report, the Sikhs, in particular, had refused to leave Lahore sayingthat Lahore was their home. This refusal proved calamitous for them as ‘the destruction, devastation, andmassacre soon rained on the Hindus and Sikhs and nine thousand of their corpses were left to rot on thestreets of Lahore causing a terrible stench.’ 587 According to Talib, on 10 August 1947, almost all Hindu andSikh localities were set alight. Fires were raging in Chune Mandi, Bazaz Hatta, Sua Bazar, Lohari Gate,Mohalla Sathan and Mozang. Everywhere, police led the attacks in non-Muslim areas. Describing the terriblemassacre in Lahore in early August 1947, the special correspondent of The Hindustan Times reported:‘‘Seventy per cent of the casualties of the last three weeks in West Punjab were inflicted by the communallymaddened troops and policemen. The victims of their bullets numbered thousands. The massacre atSheikhupura, which was their handiwork, puts into shade the slaughter at Jalianwala Bagh.’’ 588In fact, from the very beginning, police abetted and even participated in the violence and vandalismagainst Hindus and Sikhs on the Pakistan side. On 5 March 1947, a Muslim mob, assisted by NationalGuards, started looting non-Muslim shops at Rang Mahal in Lahore. When the Hindus and Sikhs offeredresistance, the Muslim Sub-Inspector arrived with a police-force and opened fire on the defenders. When ayoung Hindu man argued with the Sub-Inspector, the latter shot him dead. 589 When Muslims unleashedviolence in Amritsar on 6 March 1946, the Hindu policemen were replaced by Muslim ones in the violencestrickenarea; on their complicity to the violence records Khosla, ‘Muslim Magistrates assisted by Muslimpolice officials… lent their support and connivance to the miscreants.’ Similarly, in the violence inRawalpindi, the Magistrate and the police offered indifference and abetment. When a senior Sikh Advocateasked the Magistrate for police assistance, records Justice Khosla, ‘the Additional District Magistrate accusedhim of spreading rumors and added that he was endangering his own life.’ 590 Such was the response of theauthority and law enforcement agencies in the pre-Partition violence in Muslim-dominated areas. In thecourse of the Partition in August 1947, the participation of the police and government authority in the586. Talib, op cit587. Ibid588. The Jalianwala Bagh massacre in Punjab was the worst violence committed by the British in the course ofIndependence movement of India. It caused 379 deaths according to British records, while up to 1,000 in Indianclaims.589. Khosla, p. 101–02590. Ibid, p. 103,106182