PaperDisc.chapter in Foucault's intellectual odyssey, one surrounded bycontroversy.Reading Foucault and the Iranian RevolutionMahnaz Yousefzadeh, New York UniversityOverview: This paper will look at various readings,misreading, connections and disconnections that runthroughout Afary and Anderson's Foucault and the IranianRevolution, which contains the correspondences, and theauthors commentary on these texts.Saoud El Mawla, Earlham CollegeKevin B. Anderson, Purdue UniversityJanet Afary, Purdue University29-3 CONFLICT, WAR, AND DEMOCRACYRoomChairPaperPaperPaperPaperPaperDisc.TBA, Fri 1:45 pmJames R. Muir, University of WinnipegRuminations of War: Thinking About Through WarLiteratureWayne S. LeCheminant, Loyola Marymount UniversityOverview: This paper presents a discussion about the ways inwhich war is thought about, discussed and framed in warliterature.Just War Theory and the International Community: A 21stCentury Standard?Steven P. Millies, University of South Carolina, AikenOverview: This paper explores the questions asked by historicjust war theory and seeks to discern how internationalinstitutions such as the United Nations or the Organization ofAmerican States serve to answer them today.Democracy and Disengagement: Israel's Debate over theGaza WithdrawalSteven V. Mazie, Bard High School Early CollegeOverview: I analyze an extraordinary public debate over thenature of democracy that erupted in the wake of Israel's decisionto withdraw from the Gaza Strip in August 2005.Not Out of Sight But Out of Mind: The Hidden Hazards ofOpen SecretsThomas C. Ellington, Wesleyan CollegeOverview: Official secrecy presents significant problems foraccountability, legitimacy and trust. Even if information ispublicly available, treating it as if it were secret tends forforeclose public debate and create an unjustifiable aura ofmystery.Individuals, Collective Agents, and Freedom from Povertyas a Human RightJennifer C. Rubenstein, Princeton UniversityOverview: Recent research suggests that it is more expensive tosave lives in war-zones than in more peaceful contexts. Underwhat conditions are agents justified in sacrificing costeffectivenessin order to aid victims of intentional, violent,harm?Troy A. Kozma, Wilfrid Laurier UniversityGerald Doppelt, University of California, San Diego30-9 FORMAL THEORIES OF ALTRUISM ANDFAIRNESSRoomChairPaperPaperTBA, Fri 1:45 pmScott E. Page, University of Michigan, Ann ArborFunctional Unpleasantness: The Evolutionary Logic of aRighteous ResentmentWilliam B. Heller, Binghamton UniversityKatri K. Sieberg, Binghamton UniversityOverview: Observed results of divide-the-dollar ultimatumgames, where participants turn down profitable but "unfair"divisions, do not jibe with accepted assumptions of rationality.Why We Care About Others: Deriving Social UtilityFunctionOleg Smirnov, University of MiamiOverview: According to the concept of a social utility function,an individual receives positive utility from payoffs to others. Icreate a formal evolutionary model, in which a formula forsocial utility function is not assumed but found endogeneously.PaperDisc.Altruism and VotingChris Dawes, University of California, DavisOverview: This paper tests the link between utilitarianpreferences and voting. We find that utilitarian preferences dosignificantly explain voting. We fail to find evidence of asignificant positive relationship between Rawlsian preferencesand turnout.Scott E. Page, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor31-4 ADVANCED MODELS OF VOTING (Cosponsoredwith Voting Behavior, see 19-20)RoomChairPaperPaperPaperPaperDisc.TBA, Fri 1:45 pmTBADetecting Attempted Election TheftWalter R. Mebane, Cornell UniversityOverview: I consider statistical methods to detect election fraudusing, alternately, precinct level data and ballot image data withinformation about the machine on which each ballot was cast. Iillustrate the methods using data from recent America electionsRegression Discontinuity in the Context of VoterMobilizationDavid Nickerson, University of Notre DameOverview: TBAExplaining (in)Complete Preference Rankings versusExplaining Stated Party Choice: The Role of ExpectationsSusumu Shikano, University of MannheimPaul Thurner, University of MannheimMichael Herrmann, University of MannheimOverview: We identify incongruities between stated partypreference and stated vote choice and show that they aresignificantly induced by expectations. We apply so-calledexploded logit models for the explanation of (in)completepreference rankings.Analysis of Voteshares Across Party SystemsJames Honaker, University of California, Los AngelesOverview: Three problems complicate the analysis ofvoteshares; the same parties do not contest elections 1) acrossdistricts, 2) across time, or 3) across countries. Adding a modelof the policy space to estimate substitution effects presents asolution.Jonathan Wand, Stanford University32-201 INFORMAL ROUNDTABLE: PARTIES ANDTHE WELFARE STATERoom TBA, Fri 1:45 pmPresenter Globalization, Party Positions, and the Welfare StateChad Haddal, Washington University, St. LouisOverview: I outline the mechanism by which activists and partyleaders will over time push party ideal points to reflect theinterests of abundant factor coalitions or scarce factors ofproduction in advanced industrial countries.32-202 INFORMAL ROUNDTABLE:INTELLECTUALS, IDEAS, AND PARTIES INAMERICAN POLITICSRoom TBA, Fri 1:45 pmPresenter The Coalition Merchants: How Ideologues Shape Parties inAmerican PoliticsHans Noel, Princeton UniversityOverview: This paper argues that ideologies are central inshaping party coalitions. I compare ideological measures ofpolitical thinkers and of legislators and show that intellectualsoften organize issues into a political dimension before partiesdo.166
33-5 PRESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT OF THEBUREAUCRACYRoomChairPaperPaperPaperDisc.TBA, Fri 1:45 pmKaren M. Hult, Virginia Polytechnic Institute/State UniversityExecutive Politics and Smoking in Federal BuildingsDaniel M. Cook, University of California, San FranciscoLisa A. Bero, University of California, San FranciscoOverview: The tobacco document archive provides uniqueinsight into the development of an executive order, which in thiscase included interagency politics and considerable input frominterest groupsPresidential Transitions: The Shaping and Reshaping of theFederal Regulatory AgendaAnne M. Joseph, University of California, BerkeleyOverview: This project examines how changes in presidentialadministrations shift regulatory agendas of agencies, engagingdebates concerning which institutions hold the most power overadministrative agencies.Implementing EMS in the Bureaucracy: The Case ofExecutive Order 13148Justin A. Tucker, University of KansasOverview: This paper investigates the adoption andimplementation of environmental management systems in thebureaucracy as mandated by Executive Order 13148.Convergence on one EMS type is discussed in context oforganizational and external pressure.Constantine J. Spiliotes, Saint Anselm College34-8 EXAMINING PARTISANSHIP INLEGISLATURESRoomChairPaperPaperPaperPaperPaperDisc.TBA, Fri 1:45 pmRichard L. Hall, University of Michigan, Ann ArborInstitutional and Environmental Influences on LegislativeOutcomesJennifer H. Clark, Indiana University, BloomingtonOverview: Using legislative bill histories from the U.S.Congress as well as state legislative chambers, this researchinvestigates the institutional and environmental factors thatshape who wins and who loses in legislatures.Testing for the Effect of Party in the Senate: the Jeffords'SwitchCary R. Covington, University of IowaOverview: I use Senator Jeffords' party switch in 2001 toconstruct a natural experiment that tests for the effects of partyinstitutional control on the legislative process and outcomes.Explaining Parliamentary Dimensionality throughInstitutionsMartin Hansen, Aarhus University, DenmarkOverview: The dimensionality of the parliaments of Denmark,Norway and Ireland from 1945-2005 are estimated using aBayesian approach for ideal point estimation. The level ofdimensionality is explained by the influences of theparliamentary institutions.Predicting Individual Party Switchers in the US CongressDylan Rickards, Louisiana State UniversityOverview: I argue we should be able to predict when membersof Congress are going to switch parties by looking at thepotential motivations for the switch. Measures of electoral risk,ideology and advancement potential are all used to predict thisbehavior.Agenda Setting, Clout and Logrolls in the U.S. HouseHenry A. Kim, University of California, San DiegoOverview: Congressional parties primarily seek to facilitatebargaining among their members. Majority party advantage liesin greater opportunities for deal-making among its membersrelative to the minority provided by the institutions of the USHouse.Matthew N. Green, Catholic University of America34-17 AGENDA CHANGE ACROSS TIMERoomChairPaperPaperPaperDisc.TBA, Fri 1:45 pmScott Ainsworth, University of GeorgiaMatters of Life and Death: The Durability of Discretionary<strong>Program</strong>s in the Post-War EraWilliam G. Howell, Harvard UniversityChristopher Berry, University of ChicagoBarry Burden, Harvard UniversityOverview: Using a comprehensive dataset of federaldiscretionary programs, this paper tests a simple theory thatidentifies the conditions under which a sitting Congress is mostlikely to kill a program that its members have inherited fromprior Congresses.Agenda Change and Party Polarization in the U.S. Senate,1976-2003Frances E. Lee, University of MarylandOverview: Has a changing policy agenda contributed to thedramatic rise in partisanship in Congress? A new measure ofsubstantive agenda content is used to model the effect of agendachange on congressional polarization.Legislative Rhetoric and Policy AgendasBurt L. Monroe, Michigan State UniversityKevin Quinn, Harvard UniversityMichael Colaresi, Michigan State UniversityDragomir Radev, University of Michigan, Ann ArborSteven Abney, University of Michigan, Ann ArborMichael Crespin, Michigan State UniversityJacob Balazer, University of Michigan, Ann ArborOverview: We extend the analysis of American policy agendas(Baumgartner and Jones) through the development andapplication of a new method (dynamic latent Dirichletallocation) and new (massive) data on Congressional rhetoric.Glen S. Krutz, University of Oklahoma35-1 LEGISLATIVE RESPONSIVENESS IN THEHOUSE AND SENATERoomChairPaperPaperPaperPaperPaperTBA, Fri 1:45 pmBrad T. Gomez, University of South CarolinaCompetition, Representation and SubconstituenciesBenjamin G. Bishin, University of MiamiOverview: Research shows that increased competition does notenhance legislative responsiveness. This paper examineswhether competition enhances responsives to subconstituencieswithin the district or state.Read My Lips: Senatorial Promises and PerformanceKristin L. Campbell, McKendree CollegeOverview: This paper will examine the promises made by 27successful Senate candidates across three elections (1998, 2000,and 2002) in an effort to understand the conditions under whichcandidates are likely to attempt to fulfill their campaignpromises.Read My Lips: Senatorial Promises and PerformanceKristin L. Campbell, McKendree CollegeOverview: TBACampaign Promises and Environmental Policy Choices inthe US SenateEvan J. Ringquist, Indiana University, BloomingtonMilena Neshkova, Indiana University, BloomingtonOverview: This paper examines the relationship between thecampaign promises of U.S. Senators and their post electionpolicy choices, and whether campaign promises provide uniqueinformation to prospective voters in Senate elections.Electoral Signals and Strategic Legislative Voting in Multi-Level SystemJeongHun Han, University of RochesterOverview: The paper presents a theoretical model ofrepresentatives strategic voting behavior under a multi-levelparty system in response to electoral signals.167
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