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2006 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association

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Friday, April 21 – 1:45 pm – 3:30 pm1-102 ROUNDTABLE: NEW DIRECTIONS AT THEPOLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLYRoomChairPanelistTBA, Fri 1:45 pmAmy Mazur, Washington State UniversityCornell W. Clayton, Washington State UniversityIan Shapiro, Yale UniversityRogers Smith, University of PennsylvaniaPeregrine Schwartz-Shea, University of UtahDaniel Diermeier, Northwestern UniversityOverview: Amy Mazur and Cornell Clayton, incoming editorsof the <strong>Political</strong> Research Quarterly, chair a roundtablediscussion with an esteemed panel of colleagues concerningnew directions at the journal.2-6 AMBITION, STRATEGY AND ROLL CALLVOTES -- MP BEHAVIORRoomChairPaperPaperPaperPaperDisc.TBA, Fri 1:45 pmGuy D. Whitten, Texas A&M UniversityA Spatial Analysis of the XIII Italian ParliamentRiccardo Pelizzo, Singapore Management UniversityMassimiliano Landi, Singapore Management UniversityOverview: We present a spatial map of Italian politics byapplying the Poole and Rosenthal methodology to roll calls inthe Italian House during the XIII Legislature. We then analyzemeasures of cohesion and the concentration of coordinateswithin each party.<strong>Political</strong> Ambition in the European ParliamentStephen Meserve, University of Illinois, Urbana-ChampaignDan Pemstein, University of Illinois, Urbana-ChampaignWilliam Bernhard, University of Illinois, Urbana-ChampaignOverview: MEPs planning a return to domestic politics haveincentives to preserve nation-state prerogatives and providebenefits to national constituents. We test the argument usingroll-call votes in the European Parliament during the 1990s.Constituency Service, Parliamentary Dissent, and thePersonal Vote in Britain and New ZealandChristopher J. Kam, University of British ColumbiaOverview: I show how British and New Zealand MPs usedissent from the party line, to complement their consistuencyservice efforts. Dissent boosts the MP's profile, attracts nonpartisanvoters, and offers efficiency advantages overconstituency service.The Chamber of Secrets: Party-Switching in the ItalianChamber of DeputiesMelanie R. Castleberg, Texas Tech UniversityOverview: In mixed-member electoral systems, SMD deputiesshould switch parties more than PR deputies who feel electoralties to their parties. I test this proposition in the Italian Chamberof Deputies.Guy D. Whitten, Texas A&M University2-7 POLITICAL CHANGE -- PARTISANS ANDCLEAVAGESRoomChairPaperPaperTBA, Fri 1:45 pmMichael P. Bobic, Emmanuel CollegeTrends in Party Membership and MembershipParticipationSusan E. Scarrow, University of HoustonOverview: This paper uses cross-national survey evidence toexamine changing levels of paticipation within political partiesin established and new European democracies. Have activitypatterns changed as memberships have shrunk?The Salience of Cultural Issues in Politics and its Influenceon Class VotingJeroen van der Waal, Erasmus UniversityPeter Achterberg, Erasmus UniversityOverview: In this paper we investigate the salience of culturalissues in the political culture of 14 Western countries, and theconsequences of this salience for the traditional class-partyalignments.PaperPaperDisc.Party System Fragmentation and Declining Social Cleavagesin Western EuropeRobin E. Best, Binghamton UniversityOverview: Party system fragmentation has increased in virtuallyall Western democracies in the post-WWII era. I explore therelationship between this fragmentation and the decliningelectoral relevance of social cleavages.Understanding the Dynamics of Changes in PartyIdentification in FranceJean-Gabriel Jolivet, Purdue UniversityOverview: If political institutions shape the foundations ofpublic opinion, changes in institutions should affect the basicparty dispositions of younger cohorts of voters who come of ageof voting while not affecting the older generations in a similarway.Michael P. Bobic, Emmanuel College3-13 VOTING, POCKETBOOKS AND TRUST:NEW SURVEY EVIDENCE ON CITIZENMOTIVATIONSRoomChairPaperPaperPaperPaperDisc.TBA, Fri 1:45 pmYing Lin, University of WashingtonDo Economic Differences or Institutions Explain Variancein the Economic Vote Among Countries?Ulises Beltran, Centro de Investigacion y DocenciaEconomicasOverview: This paper explores variance in the individualeconomic vote explained by economic size of institutions.Declining Satisfaction with Democracy in Mexico:Economics or Politics?David Crow, University of Texas, AustinOverview: Does Mexicans’ declining satisfaction withdemocracy owe more to negative economic or politicalevaluations? Analyzing a two-wave panel with dynamicloglinear latent class models, I conclude democraticperformance outweighs the economy.The Role of Perceptions of the Economy on <strong>Political</strong>EvaluationsDavid R. Dreyer, Michigan State UniversityOverview: This paper will test whether perceptions of theeconomy are important in a least likely scenario in whicheconomic security is low.Why Do We Trust Institutions? The Bolivian CaseVivian Schwarz-Blum, Vanderbilt UniversityOverview: What are the factors that determine if and how muchcitizens trust their political institutions? The study uses datafrom the Bolivia 2004 LAPOP survey to explore what isdetermining Bolivian citizens' levels of trust in their politicalinstitutions.William Mishler, University of Arizona3-102 ROUNDTABLE: ARTICULATION OFINTERESTS BY NGOS AND LOBBYGROUPSRoomPanelistPanelistTBA, Fri 1:45 pmSituating the NGO Sector Within <strong>Political</strong> <strong>Science</strong>: AComparative Case StudyShanna R. Dietz, Indiana University, BloomingtonMegan J. Hershey, Indiana University, BloomingtonOverview: Employing a comparative case study methodology,this paper seeks to explore the significance of the burgeoningNGO sector on global society and to situate this phenomenonwithin the discipline of political science.Determinants of Lobbying Strategies on Economic Issues:An Empirical Analysis of Brazil and IndiaVineeta Yadav, Yale UniversityOverview: Lobbies affect the information asymmetry betweenparties and members. This strengthens parties in systems whereinstitutions allow them to identify, reward, and punishmembers; and weakens them otherwise. I use survey data onlobbies from Brazil & India157

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