2006 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association

PaperDisc.assesses the impact of conflict on pricing associated with crudeoil markets using a GARCH model during the period between1975-2005.Political Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment inDeveloping Countries: Does Policy Stability Mean More toInvestors than Democracy or Property Rights?Tyson Roberts, University of California, Los AngelesOverview: Democracy, property rights, and crediblecommitment (via veto players) to stable, FDI-friendly policiesall have a positive effect on foreign direct investment (FDI).The policy stability finding has the largest magnitude and ismost robust.Michael G. Hall, University of Northern Iowa12-201 INFORMAL ROUNDTABLE: ECONOMICOPENNESS AND ADMINISTRATIVEADJUSTMENTRoom TBA, Fri 3:45 pmPresenter Subjecting Government Procurement to InternationalCompetition: U.S. StatesDong-hun Kim, University of IowaOverview: This paper investigates discriminatory governmentprocurement as an NTB. I explore, in particular, the sources thatwould affect the propensity of a U.S. state government to jointhe GPA that prohibits discriminatory practices.12-202 INFORMAL ROUNDTABLE: TRADE ANDPROTECTIONISMRoom TBA, Fri 3:45 pmPresenter Inter-Sectoral Goods Market Relations, Inward FDI and USTrade Politics (i.e. Relations -> Relationships)Hak-Seon Lee, University of North Carolina, Chapel HillOverview: This research introduces inter-sectoral goods marketrelationships as a main explanatory variable to investigate howcross-border capital mobility in other sectors would affect agiven sector's trade policy preference in US trade politics.Presenter Electoral Equilibrium and Industrial ProtectionJong Hee Park, Washington University, St. LouisOverview: Candidates' equilibrium policy positions in electionsvary depending on the number of competitors and electoralrules. This prediction is employed to explain cross-nationalvariations in trade policy outcomes in this paper.13-7 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ANDDOMESTIC POLITICSRoomChairPaperPaperPaperTBA, Fri 3:45 pmJ. Michael Greig, University of North TexasInternational Organizations and the Quality of DomesticGovernancePeter M. Holm, University of Wisconsin, MadisonOverview: Increased participation in international organizationshas an independent positive effect on future domesticgovernance quality. Both sociological and rationalinstitutionalist mechanisms underpin the finding.Committed to Peace? Credible Commitment and UN/NATOPeace OperationsPatrick Johnston, Northwestern UniversityChris Swarat, Northwestern UniversityOverview: In the aftermath of conflict, why in some cases dothe United Nations and NATO launch large peace buildingmissions in which the interveners exert a high degree ofadministrative control while in others they choose smallermonitoring missions?Global Social Movement in Tobacco Control and theNegotiation of the FCTCHadii Mamudu, University of California, San FranciscoOverview: Member states of the World Health Organizationnegotiated the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control(FCTC) between 1999 and 2003. This paper analyzes non-stateactors’ involvement in the FCTC negotiation process usingsocial movements’ theory.PaperPaperDisc.The International Court of Justice, Legal Systems, and theRule of LawEmilia J. Powell, Florida State UniversityOverview: Why do some states recognize the jurisdiction of theInternational Court of Justice while others do not? I develop aninstitutionalist theory linking a state’s domestic legal institutionsto its preference for membership in the ICJ.International Organizations and Domestic Politics:Examining the Decision to Consult Security InstitutionsTerrence L. Chapman, Emory UniversityOverview: This paper tests a formal model that examines howIOs may facilitate coalition-building by providing informationto the domestic audiences of potential allies.J. Michael Greig, University of North Texas14-7 DEMOCRACY AND TERRORISMRoomChairPaperPaperDisc.TBA, Fri 3:45 pmJarold Duquette, Central Connecticut State UniversityIs Democracy a Magnet for Terrorism? Understanding aComplex RelationshipSara E. Jackson, Emory UniversityDan Reiter, Emory UniversityOverview: Building on recent scholarship, this paper addressesa number of conceptual and methodological issues that havehindered our ability to clearly identify the link betweendemocracy and terrorism.The Inadvertent Effects of Democracy on Terrorist GroupEmergenceErica Chenoweth, University Of ColoradoOverview: Using a time-series method, I argue that theproliferation of terrorist groups in democracies can be explainedby inter-group dynamics, with terrorist groups of variousideologies competing with one another for limited agenda space.Amanda M. Rosen, The Ohio State UniversityMariya Y. Omelicheva, Purdue University15-8 SEPARATISM AND CONFLICTRoomChairPaperPaperPaperDisc.TBA, Fri 3:45 pmKrista Weigand, Georgia Southern UniversityDemocratic Institution Building and Sub-NationalSeparatism in Former Communist Countries: Chechnyaand CrimeaIrina S. Khmelko, Georgia Southern UniversityOverview: The fall of the Communist regime was followed by anumber of conflicts between national states and their subnationalterritories that provided major challenges for newgovernments and the process of democratic institution buildingin the region.State Design and Secessionist Mobilization: Resolving theParadox of FederalismLawrence M. Anderson, University of Wisconsin, WhitewaterOverview: Federalism has been shown to both calm andfacilitate secessionism. This paper resolves the paradox offederalism by demonstrating the federations have diverse forms,origins, and group structures.Economic Indicators and Ethnonational Violence: The Casefor Secessionist and Non-Secessionist GroupsTova C. Norlen, Johns Hopkins UniversityKrister Sandberg, International Institute for Applied SystemsAnalysisOverview: Do secessionist/non-secessionist groups turn toviolence for different reasons? Ethno-territorial conflicts aresaid to be more conflictual than non-territorial ethnic conflictsand to last longer.Krista Weigand, Georgia Southern University176