PaperPaperDisc.90Reflections on Little RockHan Il Chang, New York UniversityOverview: After examining the preexisting debate on whetherArendt was an elitist or a populist, I will show its limit and newapproach.The Question of Life in the <strong>Political</strong> Theory of GiorgioAgambenDiego H. Rossello, Northwestern UniversityOverview: The paper focuses on the question of life in thepolitical theory of Giorgio Agamben. Following Arendt'sinsights on necessity and politics, I will argue that Agamben'snotion of life prevents, rather than enables, the return of thepolitical.James Glass, University of Maryland29-301 POSTER SESSION: POLITICALPHILOSOPHY: APPROACHES ANDTHEMESPresenter Contemporary Conceptions of Territory in <strong>Political</strong>PhilosophyRoom TBA, Board 5, Thur 10:30 amBarton T. Edgerton, London School of EconomicsOverview: This paper discusses two prevailing interpretations ofterritory, territory as jurisdiction and territory as property, andidentifies the need for a theory of territory in contemporarypolitical philosophyPresenter Choice over Principles of Distributive Justice under the Veilof IgnoranceRoom TBA, Board 6, Thur 10:30 amJuan Gabriel Gomez Albarello, Washington University, St.LouisOverview: I model the choice over principles of distributivejustice under the veil of ignorance as coordination game. I showthat the mechanism at work regarding choosing over alternativeprinciples is the assessment of claims to validity.Presenter Conventional Stability: Spontaneous Order vs. CollectiveResolutionRoom TBA, Board 7, Thur 10:30 amTerrence Watson, Bowling Green State UniversityPeter Jaworski, Bowling Green State UniversityOverview: We argue that the norms that emerge spontaneouslyfrom the undirected behavior of individuals provide for morestable and effective coordination than those that are enforced bycollective agencies, especially political institutions.Presenter The Relation Between Legality and Morality in the SocialRoomContracts of Kant and FichteTBA, Board 8, Thur 10:30 amMurray W. Skees, University of KentuckyOverview: <strong>Political</strong> authority is regarded as the right to set forthlaws and enforce them with the use of coercion. These laws arebinding commands given by the sovereign. However, theuniversal principle of freedom states human beings areautonomous.Presenter When and Why Constitutions Work?RoomTBA, Board 9, Thur 10:30 amAndrea Pozas-Loyo, New York UniversityOverview: When and why do constitutions work? I propose adistinction between Multilateral and Unilateral Constitutionsand argue that it not only clarifies theoretical questions onconstitutional efficacy, but provides sounder grounds forempirical research.30-1 FORMAL THEORIES OF BUREAUCRACYAND DELEGATIONRoomChairPaperTBA, Thur 10:30 amAlan E. Wiseman, The Ohio State UniversityOversight and Agency in Legislative-BureaucraticInteractionSean Gailmard, Northwestern UniversityJeffrey Milyo, University of MissouriOverview: We examine oversight as a tool for addressingagency problems in legislative-bureaucratic interaction. Wemodel oversight as a quick-response tool unilaterally controlledPaperPaperPaperDisc.by the legislature, and empirically explore several implicationsof this view.Commitment and Inefficiency in DelegationSteven Callander, Northwestern UniversityOverview: I propose a model of delegation that differsconceptually from the standard approach, focusing directly onthe nature of expertise. I find that delegation can be successfullydeployed, even absent commitment, but is often of a differentform.Bureaucratic Oversight and Suboptimal ResourceAllocationEthan Bueno de Mesquita, Washington University, St. LouisMatthew Stephenson, Harvard Law SchoolOverview: In our model, oversight distorts agency effort towardthe observable. Agencies have no incentive to hide expendituresso unobservability must come from technological constraints.Dynamic Leadership under Uncertainty: Innovation andPublic WelfareMarcus Alexander, Harvard UniversityOverview: Focusing on the FDA, we argue that leaders are mostsuccessful when they adopt flexible policy choices, easilyamendable to accumulation of new information and possibleradical changes in the nature of the policy problem leaders needto solve.Alan E. Wiseman, The Ohio State University30-3 FORMAL THEORIES OF ELECTIONS:CHALLENGERS AND PRIMARIESRoomChairPaperPaperPaperPaperDisc.TBA, Thur 10:30 amHans Noel, Princeton UniversityChallenger Entry and Voter LearningGregory A. Huber, Yale UniversitySanford C. Gordon, New York UniversityDimitri Landa, New York UniversityOverview: We develop a model of the interaction betweenchallengers and voters, in which the very fact of a costlychallenge provides information to voters about the quality ofboth the challenger and the incumbent.Modelling Challenger EntryJay Goodliffe, Brigham Young UniversityOverview: I present a theoretical model where multiplepotential challengers make interdependent decisions aboutrunning against the incumbent, and test this model empiricallyusing U.S. House data from 1982-2004.Effects of Primary Elections on Candidate Strategies andChances of SuccessJames F. Adams, University of California, DavisSamuel Merrill, Wilkes UniversityOverview: We model policy and valence issues for officeseekingcandidates facing both a primary and general election.We determine a unique equilibrium for optimal strategies andfind that generally the weaker party benefits by holding aprimary.Effects of Primary Elections on Candidate Strategies andPolicy OutcomesGilles Serra, Harvard UniversityOverview: This is a model of primary elections that derives adivergence result which is then extended to elections withuncontested seats, front-loading and a vice-presidency. It alsocontrasts the effect of policy-motivated versus office-motivatedcandidatesHans Noel, Princeton UniversityJon X. Eguia, California Institute of Technology31-2 ADVANCES IN ON-LINE SURVEYMETHODOLOGY: LEVERAGING THEINTERNET'S UNIQUE CAPABILITIESRoomChairPaperTBA, Thur 10:30 amLynn Vavreck, University of California, Los AngelesMiller and Stokes Revisited: Studying Representation Usingan Internet PanelDoug Rivers, Stanford University
PaperDisc.Overview: Miller and Stokes' landmark study of representationin Congress is revisited using the techniques of the twenty-firstcentury: ideal point estimates based upon a large Internet panel.When Do Party Cues Matter?Matthew S. Levendusky, Stanford UniversityOverview: It's well established that party cues help voters, butmuch less is known about the conditions under which they areeffective. I show that two factors—sophistication and elitepolarization—affect how useful such cues are to citizens.Jeff Lewis, University of California, Los Angeles32-2 CORPORATE LOBBYING AND POLITICALACTIONRoomChairPaperPaperPaperPaperPaperDisc.TBA, Thur 10:30 amSilja Haeusermann, University of ZurichCorporate Lobbying as a Two Sage Rent Seeking Game:Cooperation and CompetitionScott Ainsworth, University of GeorgiaKen Godwin, University of North Carolina, CharlotteOverview: A two-stage model of rent seeking is developed toderive testable hypotheses related to several important questionsconcerning corporate lobbying, coalitional lobbying, issueagendas, and policy development. The model reflects standardportrayalsThe Adaptation of Complex <strong>Association</strong>al Systems:Coordination and Lobbying Strategies of Business<strong>Association</strong>s in the Context of Modernization, Globalization,and EuropeanizationVolker Schneider, Harvard UniversityAchim Lang, University of Constance, GermanyJohannes M. Bauer, Michigan State UniversityOverview: This paper explores the role and effects of businessassociations in the chemical and information industries in fiveOECD countries on public policy decisions using a unique dataset of the cooperative and competitive relations amongassociations.The Determinants of Business Lobbying of the EuropeanParliamentPatrick Bernhagen, University of AberdeenNeil J. Mitchell, University of AberdeenOverview: We test a model of business political action at theEuropean Union level, using data on Forbes Global 2000companies. Initial results suggest that standard predictors offirm-level political activity such as firm size perform equallywell in EuropeEvaluating the Hidden Power of Conglomerates: Lobbyingthe U.S. CongressHolly Brasher, University of Alabama, BirminghamOverview: An evaluation of corporate lobbying behavior ofdiverse types of firms as measured by revenue, sales, andgeographic dispersion. This paper evaluates both contractlobbying and in-house lobbying efforts.In a Bind: Business Plans, Market Position and CorporateLobbying StrategiesMarcus B. Osborn, R&R Partners/Arizona State UniversityMichelle B. Chin, Arizona State UniversityOverview: When will firms try to influence the politicalenvironment and when will they modify business models inanticipation of a policy shift? By understanding firm marketposition and issue characteristics an understanding firmstrategies can be developed.Richard Jankowski, SUNY, Fredonia33-2 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THEPRESIDENCYRoomChairPaperTBA, Thur 10:30 amSean J. Savage, Saint Mary's College, Notre DameAmerican <strong>Political</strong> Development and Presidential InauguralAddressesMichael E. Bailey, Berry CollegeOverview: Presidential inaugural addresses aim to unite asprawling and diverse people by articulating their commonpolitical principles. How well do inaugural addresses revealPaperPaperDisc.changes in American political development as politicalprinciples have changed?Presidential Values: Do They Differ Pre- and Post-Institutionalization?Anna Marie Schuh, Roosevelt UniversityGeralyn Miller, Indiana University-Purdue University, FortWayneOverview: This paper explores the differences between the postandpre-institutionalized of the American presidency byreviewing the values espoused in presidential speeches and thevalues enacted in presidential executive orders.Hiding in Plain View: Bill Clinton's Social ContractarianismDavid J. Siemers, University of Wisconsin, OshkoshOverview: Clinton sounded contractarian themes at criticaljunctures during his presidency. I argue that hiscontractarianism is worth a serious second look because of itsunusual sensitivity to periodicity and to the incentives thatpublic policies create.Shirley Anne Warshaw, Gettysburg CollegeSean J. Savage, Saint Mary's College, Notre Dame33-301 POSTER SESSION: PRESIDENCYRESEARCHPresenter <strong>Political</strong> Motivations, Information Gains, and PresidentialPollingRoom TBA, Board 10, Thur 10:30 amJames N. Druckman, Northwestern UniversityLawrence Jacobs, University of MinnesotaOverview: We present a theory of how politicians collect anduse public opinion data. We test expectations with uniqueprivate data from Nixon and Reagan.Presenter Promoting the President's Foreign Policy Agenda: ExecutiveAgreements as Presidential Policy VehiclesRoom TBA, Board 11, Thur 10:30 amKiki Caruson, University of South FloridaVictoria A. Farrar-Myers, University of Texas, ArlingtonOverview: The paper demonstrates, quantitatively, howpresidents during the post-1977 period have used executiveagreements as a tool of foreign policy and as a means topromote their foreign policy priorities.Presenter Forecasting the Runner-Up: Vice Presidential Selection inthe Modern EraRoom TBA, Board 12, Thur 10:30 amBrian J. Brox, Tulane UniversityOverview: This paper looks at the process by which presidentialcandidates choose running mates with an eye toward developinga predictive model that will forecast future vice-presidentialselections.Presenter Presidential Policy Priorities and Subcabinet AppointmentsRoom TBA, Board 13, Thur 10:30 amKevin Parsneau, University of MinnesotaOverview: This study uses a database of subcabinetappointments between 1961 and 2000 to examine howpresidential priorities affect the expertise and loyalty of hissubcabinet appointees to different cabinet departments.Presenter A Unified Explanation of Presidential Activities in the PolicyProcessRoom TBA, Board 14, Thur 10:30 amJonghoon Eun, University of Texas, AustinOverview: I present a unified explanation of presidentialactivity in the policy process by examining all significant billsand executive orders. Presidential activity involves using formalpowers, going public, and personally contacting political actors.Presenter The Dynamics of Recess AppointmentsRoomTBA, Board 15, Thur 10:30 amAnthony Madonna, Washington University, St. LouisRyan Owens, Washington University, St. LouisOverview: This paper looks at all recess appointments from the40th to the 108th Congresses. We evaluate important factorsthat influence a President's decision to make a recessappointment. We then apply these results to recent controversialappointees.91
- Page 1 and 2: MidwestPolitical Science Associatio
- Page 4 and 5: 9-4 STATE BUILDING AND BUREAUCRATIC
- Page 6 and 7: 14-1 GLOBALIZATION AND SECURITYRoom
- Page 8 and 9: PaperPaperDisc.The Divide: African
- Page 10 and 11: 29-210 INFORMAL ROUNDTABLE: CULTURE
- Page 12 and 13: PaperDisc.Defining Federalism: The
- Page 14 and 15: PaperDisc.estimates connections amo
- Page 16 and 17: 3-26 THE DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMICGR
- Page 18 and 19: PaperPaperPaperDisc.Bad Civil Socie
- Page 20 and 21: PaperPaperDisc.Voting Patterns in t
- Page 22 and 23: PaperDisc.'Going Local': Candidate
- Page 26 and 27: Presenter Out of Time: Examining th
- Page 28 and 29: is: to what extent are intergovernm
- Page 30 and 31: Presenter Economic Inequality, Its
- Page 32 and 33: PaperPaperPaperPaperDisc.during the
- Page 34 and 35: 10-3 BACK TO EUROPE? THE EU AND"EUR
- Page 36 and 37: PaperPaperPaperDisc.Interested Part
- Page 38 and 39: PaperPaperthatDisc.Don't Know, Don'
- Page 40 and 41: Disc.Suzanne Soule, Center for Civi
- Page 42 and 43: epistemology which is attentive to
- Page 44 and 45: 37-3 CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATIONA
- Page 46 and 47: 47-201 INFORMAL ROUNDTABLE: RELIGIO
- Page 48 and 49: PaperPaperDisc.terms and reciprocal
- Page 50 and 51: PaperPaperPaperDisc.116Education, E
- Page 52 and 53: 19-202 INFORMAL ROUNDTABLE: YOUNG A
- Page 54 and 55: 26-6 ASIAN AMERICAN POLITICSRoomCha
- Page 56 and 57: PaperPaperPaperDisc.of how partisan
- Page 58 and 59: PaperPaperDisc.124An Experimental S
- Page 60 and 61: PaperPaperDisc.Policy Windows, Atte
- Page 62 and 63: Friday, April 21 - 8:30 am - 10:15
- Page 64 and 65: PaperPaperPaperDisc.The Determinant
- Page 66 and 67: PaperPaperDisc.A Simple Game-Theore
- Page 68 and 69: PaperDisc.partisans is causing chan
- Page 70 and 71: 28-201 INFORMAL ROUNDTABLE: DEWEY'S
- Page 72 and 73: 35-4 THE EFFECTS OF REDISTRICTING O
- Page 74 and 75:
Presenter Regulation, Enforcement a
- Page 76 and 77:
Friday, April 21 - 10: 30 am - 12:1
- Page 78 and 79:
PaperPaperDisc.144Regional Minority
- Page 80 and 81:
PaperPaperDisc.Administration of Gl
- Page 82 and 83:
PaperPaperPaperDisc.The Paradox Soc
- Page 84 and 85:
Disc.("Policy Mood") since 1972 usi
- Page 86 and 87:
Disc.likelihood of a filibuster is
- Page 88 and 89:
38-301 POSTER SESSION: COMPARATIVEI
- Page 90 and 91:
54-1 SOCIAL ACTIVISM AND CIVICENGAG
- Page 92 and 93:
3-203 INFORMAL ROUNDTABLE: THE LEGA
- Page 94 and 95:
PaperPaperPaperPaperDisc.Toward Res
- Page 96 and 97:
Presenter The Shanghai Cooperation
- Page 98 and 99:
PaperPaperPaperDisc.poised to becom
- Page 100 and 101:
PaperDisc.chapter in Foucault's int
- Page 102 and 103:
PaperDisc.Campaign Ad Images as Sig
- Page 104 and 105:
43-6 INDEPENDENT SCRUTINY OF AGENCI
- Page 106 and 107:
Friday, April 21 - 3:45 pm - 5:30 p
- Page 108 and 109:
6-2 PARTIES AND PARTY DISCIPLINERoo
- Page 110 and 111:
PaperDisc.assesses the impact of co
- Page 112 and 113:
19-301 POSTER SESSION: VOTING BEHAV
- Page 114 and 115:
24-9 WHO LEADS: UNTANGLING THERELAT
- Page 116 and 117:
PaperPaperPaperDisc.182Understandin
- Page 118 and 119:
Paper The Rehnquist Court and the N
- Page 120 and 121:
PaperDisc.Revenge of Socialist Supe
- Page 122 and 123:
Saturday, April 22 - 8:30 am - 10:1
- Page 124 and 125:
PaperDisc.South Korean Public Opini
- Page 126 and 127:
PaperDisc.several other variables b
- Page 128 and 129:
22-15 PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL (Co-spo
- Page 130 and 131:
PaperDisc.never seems to provide us
- Page 132 and 133:
PaperPaperPaperDisc.Polarization an
- Page 134 and 135:
PaperDisc.Networks of Local Governm
- Page 136 and 137:
47-203 INFORMAL ROUNDTABLE: RELIGIO
- Page 138 and 139:
PaperPaperPaperPaperDisc.Between De
- Page 140 and 141:
11-9 NEW THEORIES AND THUS NEWDEBAT
- Page 142 and 143:
PaperPaperPaperAre Political Market
- Page 144 and 145:
26-9 MINORITY REPRESENTATIONRoomCha
- Page 146 and 147:
PaperDisc.Evolving Political Machin
- Page 148 and 149:
PaperPaperPaperDisc.economic gains
- Page 150 and 151:
PaperPaperPaperDisc.A Social Versus
- Page 152 and 153:
Saturday, April 21 - 1:45 pm - 3:30
- Page 154 and 155:
PaperPaperDisc.Riptides in Ontario:
- Page 156 and 157:
PaperPaperPaperDisc."works," a stat
- Page 158 and 159:
PaperPaperPaperPaperDisc.Preference
- Page 160 and 161:
PaperPaperPaperDisc.226that encoura
- Page 162 and 163:
32-12 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ELECTION
- Page 164 and 165:
PaperPaperDisc.Challenging Others o
- Page 166 and 167:
52-3 SOCIAL POLICIES: CHALLENGES AN
- Page 168 and 169:
Saturday, April 22 - 3:45 pm - 5:30
- Page 170 and 171:
PaperDisc.It's Not the Economy Stup
- Page 172 and 173:
15-10 DEMOCRACY, EQUALITY, AND PEAC
- Page 174 and 175:
Presenter Polarization, Public Opin
- Page 176 and 177:
PaperDisc.John S. Mill and Alexis d
- Page 178 and 179:
PaperDisc.Lobbying by Transportatio
- Page 180 and 181:
42-202 INFORMAL ROUNDTABLE: DOMESTI
- Page 182 and 183:
Presenter Female Athletes Making He
- Page 184 and 185:
PaperPaperDisc.Micro-Level Determin
- Page 186 and 187:
PaperDisc.Governmental Structure, P
- Page 188 and 189:
PaperDisc.Social Class Identity and
- Page 190 and 191:
33-9 PRESIDENTIAL-CONGRESSIONALRELA
- Page 192 and 193:
PaperPaperDisc.Equal Employment Opp
- Page 194 and 195:
Sunday, April 23 - 10:30 am - 12:15
- Page 196 and 197:
PaperPaperPaperDisc.State Legitimac
- Page 198 and 199:
18-14 THE STUDY AND MEASUREMENT OFR
- Page 200 and 201:
28-14 ROUSSEAU RECONSIDEREDRoomChai
- Page 202 and 203:
PaperDisc.The Judicial Treatment of