2006 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association

3-26 THE DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMICGROWTHRoomChairPaperPaperPaperDisc.TBA, Thur 10:30 amIra Parnerkar, University of ChicagoEconomic Policy-Making in a Segmented Rentier StateSteffen Hertog, St. Antony's College, OxfordOverview: My paper scrutinizes several recent Saudi Arabianeconomic reform efforts against a historical analysis of Saudistate creation, arguing that despite internally efficient agencies,the segmentation of the state leads to severe policy failures.Democracy, Development, and the Resource-Rich StateAndrew B. Kirkpatrick, Emory UniversityOverview: TBAPolitical Foundations of Growth in Dictatorships andDemocraciesArmando Razo, Indiana University, BloomingtonOverview: This paper tests an institutional theory ofpolicymaking and growth to explain the variation in economicperformance between democracies and dictatorships byaccounting for specific mechanisms that may differ acrosspolitical regimes.Christian Ponce de Leon, University of Chicago4-1 POLITICAL TRUST IN ANAUTHORITARIAN STATE: THE CHINESECASE (Co-sponsored with Asian Politics, see 8-16)RoomChairPaperPaperPaperPaperPaperDisc.TBA, Thur 10:30 amWenfang Tang, University of PittsburghTrust in the Media in ChinaDaniela Stockmann, University of Michigan, Ann ArborOverview: This paper addresses three issues, the concept ofmedia trust and its relationship to political trust in China, thechange of media trust over time, and the impact of media truston media consumption and on attitude change.Incumbent-Based and Regime-Based Trust: An Explanationof Their Gap in ChinaTianjian Shi, Duke UniversityOverview: This paper examines why trust in central governmentis higher than in government officials in China. Survey datafrom China reveals that the answer lies in the uniqueunderstanding of authority relationship in Chinese politicalculture.Sources of Institutional Trust in ChinaQing Yang, University of PittsburghOverview: This paper explores four different sources oninstitutional trust in China: modernization, mobilization,political culture, and institutional performance. It also discussesthe impact of institutional trust on the prospect of democracy inChina.Institutional Trust "Personalized"Ning Zhang, University of California, Santa BarbaraOverview: Using interviews with both masses and agents ofinstitutions, this paper explores the processes in whichinstitutional trust originates, develops, gains momentum, andreaches threshold of the diffusing effects in Chinese localpolitical environment.Political Trust in an Authoritarian State: The Chinese CaseWenfang Tang, University of PittsburghPierre Landry, Yale UniversityOverview: The four papers in this panel examine popular trustin authoritarian political institutions in China, including trust inthe central government and in political officials, in central andlocal governments, and in the media.Pierre F. Landry, Yale University4-21 INSTITUTIONALIZING DEMOCRATICNORMS IN TRANSITIONAL STATESRoomChairPaperPaperPaperDisc.TBA, Thur 10:30 amTBAPromoting Democratic Values in Transitional SocietiesThrough Foreign AidArthur H. Miller, University of IowaOverview: To what extent does US foreign aid promotedemocratization? A 2000-04 panel study of aid programparticipants in four transitional societies sheds light on recentdemocratic revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine as well asdemocratization generally.Promoting Democracy Without Naming It: InternationalOrganizations in ChinaXiangfeng Yang, University of Southern CaliforniaOverview: Under what conditions can internationalorganizations (IOs) push authoritarian states to democratize?This paper analyzes the influence of three types of IOs(international governmental organizations; grant-giving, privateinstitutions; NGOs) on theMeasuring the Impact of Courts on DemocraticConsolidationEric N. Nelson, Texas Tech UniversityOverview: This paper examines the impact of an independentjudiciary on democratic consolidation. If courts are seen asviable options, then evidence of consolidation exists due toincreasing transaction costs of regime change.William A. Barnes, Independent Scholar, Attorney at Law5-1 ASSESSING ORGANIZATIONAL IMPACTSON EU POLICYRoomChairPaperPaperPaperPaperPaperDisc.TBA, Thur 10:30 amZeki Sarigil, University of PittsburghAllocation of the EU Budget: An Examination of Voting andProposal RightsDeniz Aksoy, University of RochesterOverview: This paper seeks to explain budgetary allocation inthe EU. I specifically illustrate the role of two key institutionalfactors: voting and proposal rights of the member states indetermining the amount of funding they receive from the EU.The Influence of EU-Level Interest GroupsStacy M. Bondanella, University of PittsburghOverview: This paper asks whether and under what conditionsEU-level organizations of national interest groups have anindependent influence on EU policy. The agricultural policynetwork is examined and hypotheses are generated for testingacross issue areas.Decision-making in the European Union: The Case ofPension PortabilityAlexandra Hennessy, Boston UniversityOverview: Using document analysis, interviews, and gametheoreticmodeling, I hypothesize that efforts to create aEuropean-wide regulatory framework to govern pensionportability across borders was a credible project in 2003, but notbefore (1991-1999).Assessing the Effect of Power on Committee Bias in theEuropean ParliamentBjorn Hoyland, University College LondonOverview: The paper analyzes the development of thecommittee system in the European Parliament between 1979and 2004. It compares the preferences of the committeerapporteurs and the floor median. The difference is decreasingas committee power increases.A Principal-Agent Perspective to MEP Voting BehaviorM. Shawn Reichert, University of Central FloridaOverview: Why do MEPs vote the way they do? This paperemploys a principal-agent (PA) model to examine MEPs' votingbehavior. Roll-call votes are used to test hypotheses derivedfrom this P-A model.Jens A. Blom-Hansen, Aarhus University, Denmark82