2006 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association

29-101 AUTHOR MEET CRITICS: ROMANDCOLES - BEYOND GATES POLITICS:REFLECTIONS FOR THE POSSIBILITY OFDEMOCRACYRoomPanelistTBA, Sat 10:30 amEdwina Barvosa-Carter, University of Caliifornia, SantaBarbaraRomand Coles, Duke UniversityLisa Disch, University of MinnesotaPeter E. Digeser, University of California, Santa BarbaraPaul Apostolidis, Whitman CollegeOverview: TBA30-12 FORMAL THEORIES OF GROUPCONFLICTRoomChairPaperPaperPaperPaperDisc.TBA, Sat 10:30 amCatherine C. Langlois, Georgetown UniversityWhy Exclude? Religious Groups as Allies In State BuildingBirol Baskan, Northwestern UniversityOverview: In this paper, I develop a model of two ideal-typicalpatterns, incorporation vs. exclusion, and show when onepattern prevails, but not the other in the changing relationshipsbetween the state rulers and religious groups during statebuilding.Terrorist Violence and Intra-Terrorist CompetitionSkyler J. Cranmer, University of California, DavisOverview: A formal model of terrorist violence in perfect andimperfect non-competitive terrorism environments (a terroristgroup does not compete with other terrorist groups) as well asperfect and imperfect competition between terrorist groups.On the Political Ecnomy of Clientelism, Patronage andInequalityLeonardo A. Gatica-Arreola, University of GuadalajaraOverview: Some theoretical approaches relate clientelism withpoverty and inequality. The paper builds a formal model whichchallenges this idea and which is consistent with the empiricalevidence.Voting as a Credible ThreatJohn B. Londregan, Princeton UniversityAndrea Vindigni, Princeton UniversityOverview: Voting and effectiveness in battle both involve anoverestimate of one's impact on events. Elections can provide acredible signal of each side's fighting capacity facilitating abargained conflict resolution short of civil war.Catherine C. Langlois, Georgetown University30-22 FORMAL THEORIES OF ELECTIONS:WHO VOTES?RoomChairPaperPaperTBA, Sat 10:30 amJay Goodliffe, Brigham Young UniversityVoting with a Whole Lot of People: Analytical Results for aBehavioral Model of TurnoutJonathan Bendor, Stanford UniversityNathan A. Collins, Stanford UniversitySunil Kumar, Stanford UniversityOverview: Present a formal model of turnout based on ansimple adaptive rule in the limit of an infinite population. Byconsidering this limit, we are able to derive a number of resultsanalytically where a previous model had to rely on computersimulations.Robust Rational TurnoutTasos Kalandrakis, University of RochesterOverview: We establish conditions for the existence highturnout equilibria in regular turnout games of completeinformation, and by extension in nearby games of incompleteinformation.PaperPaperDisc.Ethical Voting and the Probability of a Pivotal Vote:Experimental EvidenceSean Gailmard, Northwestern UniversityTimothy Feddersen, Northwestern UniversityRebecca Morton, New York UniversityOverview: We experimentally investigate the self-selection ofvoters according to other-regarding preferences, as pivotprobability declines. We explore the implications of this selfselectionfor the relative support of equitable distribution ingroups.Shaping the Electorate: Delegating DisfranchisementDecisionsRebecca B. Morton, New York UniversityAnna Bassi, New York UniversityJessica L. Trounstine, Princeton UniversityOverview: We formally model the interaction between a statelegislature and appointed voting officials in felondisfranchisement decisions as a delegation game. Weempirically test these predictions about state election laws forthe period 1980-2000.Jay Goodliffe, Brigham Young UniversityBrian Roberson, Miami University31-101 ROUNDTABLE: PERESTROIKA! THERAUCOUS REBELLION IN POLITICALSCIENCERoomChairPanelistTBA, 10:30 amMaurice J. Meilleur, University of Illinois, Urbana-ChampaignSanford Schram, Bryn Mawr CollegeJoanna Vecchiarelli Scott, Eastern Michigan UniversityDorian T. Warren, University of ChicagoDvora Yanow, Vrije UniversityOverview: Authors from the recently published anthology onPerestroika edited by Kristen Monroe (Yale University Press,2005) discuss themes from the book and current issues relevantto Perestroika's sympathizers, observers, and critics.32-9 THE BEHAVIOR AND GOVERNANCE OFPARTY ORGANIZATIONSRoomChairPaperPaperPaperPaperTBA, Sat 10:30 amDavid Karol, University of California, BerkeleyThe Electoral Benefits of Internal Party Democracy?Denitza A. Bojinova, University of HoustonOverview: Are internally-democratic parties more successfulelectorally? The paper explores parties in 15 Central andEastern European countries and whether the more internallyinclusiveentities have experienced greater and more stableelectoral support.Measuring Electoral Value of Party Label Under DifferentElectoral RulesKenichi Ariga, University of Michigan, Ann ArborOverview: This paper explores empirically the extent to whichcollective party label is important in elections and its differenceunder various electoral rules, using the electoral data fromseveral developed democracies.The Machine is Dead: Does a Change in Party ControlAffect Party Worker Recruitment and Retention?Tim Hundsdorfer, University of ColoradoOverview: This paper examines the effect of a regime changeon a party's ability to recruit and retain campaign workers.Creating a Cross-National Database of Party LawsKenneth Janda, Northwestern UniversityOverview: Describes a database of over 1,000 party laws in over160 nations tagged by the laws’ origins (constitutions, nationallegislation, court rulings, and so on) and targets: politicalparties, political groups, elections, campaigns, candidates,voters, etc.211