2006 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association

PaperPaperPaperDisc.182Understanding the Political in Ancient ComedyKeith Mataya, University of California, Los AngelesOverview: This paper addresses problems that arise fromunderstanding Aristophanes and the role of laughter as a part ofAthenian democratic culture.Plato's Phaedo and the Limits of PhilosophyLucas B. Allen, Michigan State UniversityOverview: This paper examines Plato's presentation of the limitsof rationality and philosophy as presented in the Phaedo in lightof the dramatic portrayal of Socrates' last day and death.What Makes Democracy So Special?Brian A. Rockwood, University of ConnecticutOverview: This presentation asks the question "What makesDemocracy so Special?" and analyses the responses that variousmodern interpretations of the doctrine would give. Ultimately,all of these responses are found to be lacking.Elizabeth Markovits, Saint Louis University30-10 FORMAL THEORIES OF FEDERALISMRoomChairPaperPaperPaperPaperDisc.TBA, Fri 3:45 pmJohn B. Londregan, Princeton UniversityValuing Exit OptionsJenna Bednar, University of Michigan, Ann ArborOverview: This paper explores the contribution of a state'spotential to secede on the overall robustness of the union.Partisan Politics and the Structure and Stability ofFederalism, Indian StyleSunita A. Parikh, Washington University, St. LouisBarry R. Weingast, Stanford UniversityOverview: We develop a formal model of the party system andfederal structure in India to explain the structure and stability ofcentralized federalism in the era of Congress dominance fromindependence to the late 1980s.Provincial ProtectionismKonstantin Sonin, New Economic School/CEFIROverview: In a federal state with weak political institutions,constituent units might protect their enterprises fromenforcement of federal taxes. Effectiveness of such protectiondepends on the ability of local politicians to extract rents fromenterprises.Feasibility of the Popular Legitimacy of a FederalConstitution in a Representative DemocracyOlga Shvetsova, Binghamton UniversityKevin Roust, Duke UniversityOverview: Starting with the premise that institutions havebiased distributive consequences and that distributive coalitionsof federation members can successfully challenge theconstitutional status-quo.John B. Londregan, Princeton UniversityHartmut Lenz, University of Essex30-21 STRATEGIC VOTINGRoomChairPaperPaperPaperDisc.TBA, Fri 3:45 pmKen Shotts, Stanford UniversityStrategic Voting in Multi-Office Elections: Policy Balancing,Directional Voting, and Other VarietiesMichael Peress, Carnegie Mellon UniversityOverview: I analyze strategic voting incentives in a 'Checks andBalances' system of government. In particular, I considerpolicy-balancing and directional voting. I find little support forpolicy-balancing and solid support for directional voting.Strategic Challengers and the Incumbency AdvantageInsun Kang, University of RochesterOverview: I develop a dynamic model of infinitely repeatedelections that incorporates asymmetric information and strategiccampaigning by challengers and find "simple" equilibrium.Analysis of a Formal Model of Strategic VotingAllen B. Brierly, University of Northern IowaOverview: A strategic vote is generally considered a vote for asecond-best alternative that has a greater chance of winning thana preferred alternative. In this study, rates of strategic votingand misrepresentation of preferences are estimated.Ken Shotts, Stanford University31-1 A CORNUCOPIA OF METHODSRoomChairPaperPaperPaperDisc.TBA, Fri 3:45 pmLee Walker, Harvard UniversityThe Emergence of Political HierarchyBritt A. Cartrite, Alma CollegeOverview: This study utilizes agent-based modeling to evaluatethe dynamics underlying the endogenous emergence of politicalhierarchy, demonstrating the powerful role the spatialdistribution of heirarchy plays in the emergence of higher levelsof authority.Publication Bias: An Analysis of Two Leading Journals andTwo Important LiteraturesNeil Malhotra, Stanford UniversityAlan Gerber, Yale UniversityOverview: An audit of empirical research over the past ten yearsshows evidence of publication bias in two major journals(APSR and AJPS) and two prominent literatures in politicalbehavior (economic voting and the effect of negativeadvertisements).Leader Survival and Interstate WarAlejandro Flores, New York UniversityLeslie Johns, New York UniversityOverview: We empirically examine the role of interstate war onthe tenure of the political leaders.James H. Fowler, University of California, Davis33-101 ROUNDTABLE: THE 2008 PRESIDENTIALELECTION: A LOOK AHEADRoomChairPanelistTBA, Fri 3:45 pmRandall E. Adkins, University of Nebraska, OmahaWilliam Mayer, Northeastern UniversityBarbara Norrander, University of ArizonaWayne Steger, DePaul UniversityClyde Wilcox, Georgetown UniversityHans Noel, Princeton UniversityOverview: The 2008 Presidential Election: A Look Ahead34-9 DO PARTIES IN MATTER INLEGISLATURES?RoomChairPaperPaperPaperPaperTBA, Fri 3:45 pmBarbara Sinclair, University of California, Los AngelesMinority Party Influence in the U.S. HouseC. Lawrence Evans, College of William and MaryEdward P. Blue, College of William and MaryLogan H. Ferree, College of William and MaryAngela S. Petry, College of William and MaryOverview: Although the influence of political parties withinCongress has been a major source of conceptual and empiricaldispute, little attention has been paid to the role of the partisanminority.Partisan Differences and Restrictive Rules in the U.S. HouseKen Moffett, University of IowaOverview: I examine whether differences exist betweenRepublican and Democratic House majorities from 1974-2004. Ifind that Republican majorities are more likely to direct theRules Committee to place restrictive rules on bills thanDemocratic majorities.Assessing the Influence of Party Activists on ConfereeSelectionAlan D. Rozzi, University of California, Los AngelesOverview: This study analyzes the influence of political partyactivists over the choice of House delegates to conferences withthe Senate. It uses data from the 96th through the 108thCongresses and tests several related theories on legislativeorganization.Agenda Positions and the Moderation of LegislativeProposalsJonathan Woon, Carnegie Mellon UniversityOverview: I test the hypothesis that legislators with greaterinfluence over the legislative agenda have incentives tocompromise, thereby moderating their proposals, than otherlegislators, who are more likely to propose for position-takingpurposes.