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STATEMENTSIn chapter 1 statements were defined as sentences that make a specificknowledge claim concerning an aspect of reality. Statements, it was said, aresentences in which a demonstrable epistemic claim is made. It follows fromthis that statements have to be either true or false. The epistemic claims that aremade in statements are either correct or not.For the purposes of this book, two types of statements are discussed —definitions and hypotheses. As we discussed the nature and structure ofdefinitions in chapter 3, we shall merely summarize the main points here.DefinitionsDefinitions can be defined as statements by means of which the meaning(connotation and denotation) of concepts is specified. An importantclassification of definitions is based upon the distinction drawn earlier,between connotative and denotative meaning.Free download from www.hsrcpress.ac.zaTHEORETICAL DEFINITIONSWhere the connotative meaning of a concept (the general intention or “idea”that it incorporates) is more closely specified, we usually refer to thetheoretical or connotative definition. This means that the relationships betweena given concept and related concepts within a specific conceptual framework(model or theory) are brought into focus. In other words, the context withinwhich a concept is used virtually delimits its connotation. Let us look at anexample from the physical sciences: In theories developed during theeighteenth century heat was defined as a type of liquid (our concept ofelectrical current can still be traced back to this view). Nowadays, however,heat is defined as a form of energy. This shows that concepts have differentconnotations depending upon the currently accepted theory within which itoccurs and from which the definition is derived. The same variation in meaningapplies to different theoretical (i.e. high-level abstract concepts) concepts suchas energy, gravitation, space, and time. This is even more true of concepts inthe social sciences. The definition of culture, for example, would differbetween materialist-evolutionist, idealist, and structural- functionalist frames ofreference. The same applies to other concepts such as violence, aggression,intelligence and so on.A theoretical or constitutive definition of a concept, therefore, derives from theconceptual framework or theory within which it is used. Because conceptualframeworks differ (for example, a conflict approach and a consensus approachto social phenomena), considerable variation exists between the connotationsof concepts. In addition, one has to bear in mind that connotation usually alsodetermines the denotative content of concepts.131