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DELIVERING SERVICES<br />
163<br />
level of development determine their impact. Surprisingly,<br />
e-procurement was not associated with<br />
any reduction on average in firm perceptions of corruption<br />
in government contracting, but again with<br />
considerable variation (figure 3.10, panel b). Nor were<br />
there significant average differences across types<br />
of firms or in the functionality of the systems. This<br />
negative finding is striking because one of the main<br />
reasons for investing in these systems is reducing<br />
corruption in contracting and increasing the valuefor-money<br />
of government capital spending.<br />
E-procurement is also conditional on regulatory,<br />
institutional, and human resource factors for impact.<br />
In one of India’s leading reformers in e-procurement,<br />
Karnataka state, reform was underpinned by an<br />
amended procurement law that made it mandatory<br />
to use the government e-procurement portal for all<br />
state departments and agencies. Run from the chief<br />
minister’s office to give it authority, the system was<br />
implemented under a public-private partnership to<br />
bring in skills from the market. 26<br />
Figure 3.9 e-filing and e-payment on average<br />
reduced the time required to prepare and pay taxes<br />
Time required to prepare and pay taxes<br />
(year of e-filing introduction = 100)<br />
125<br />
100<br />
75<br />
50<br />
−10 −5 0 5 10<br />
Years before and after introduction of e-filing<br />
Sources: WDR 2016 team, based on World Bank (2015b) e-Government Core Systems database and the<br />
Doing Business database for 2014 data. Data at http://bit.do/WDR2016-Fig3_9.<br />
Note: Shaded area shows the 95 percent confidence interval for 75 countries.<br />
Figure 3.10 e-procurement has no effect on firms’ likelihood of bidding for a government<br />
contract or of being solicited for a bribe in select European and Central Asian countries<br />
a. Change in the number of firms<br />
bidding for government contracts<br />
b. Change in the number of firms<br />
being solicited for bribes<br />
Bosnia and Herzegovina<br />
Croatia<br />
Average (7 countries)<br />
Moldova<br />
Turkey<br />
Azerbaijan<br />
Kyrgyz Republic<br />
Uzbekistan<br />
Informational<br />
Uzbekistan<br />
Bosnia and Herzegovina<br />
Moldova<br />
Azerbaijan<br />
Average (6 countries)<br />
Croatia<br />
Kyrgyz Republic<br />
Informational<br />
Tajikistan<br />
Armenia<br />
Slovenia<br />
Russian Federation<br />
Estonia<br />
Ukraine<br />
Average (12 countries)<br />
Macedonia, FYR<br />
Mongolia<br />
Kazakhstan<br />
Georgia<br />
Belarus<br />
Slovak Republic<br />
Transactional<br />
Russian Federation<br />
Slovenia<br />
Tajikistan<br />
Belarus<br />
Macedonia, FYR<br />
Average (11 countries)<br />
Ukraine<br />
Estonia<br />
Georgia<br />
Armenia<br />
Mongolia<br />
Kazakhstan<br />
Transactional<br />
–20 –10 0 10 20<br />
–100 –50 0 50<br />
Percent change<br />
Percent change<br />
Statistically significant<br />
Statistically not significant<br />
Statistically significant<br />
Statistically not significant<br />
Source: Kochanova, Hasnain, and Larson, forthcoming, for the WDR 2016. Data at http://bit.do/WDR2016-Fig3_10.<br />
Note: The figures show the impact of introducing informational and transactional e-procurement systems, after controlling for firm-specific characteristics and fixed effects. Informational<br />
systems provide only information on government contracts online; transactional systems also enable firms to submit bids online. The bars stand for the average effects in each country.<br />
Based on a sample of 25,961 firms (panel a) and 4,343 firms (panel b), from the World Bank Enterprise Survey.
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