CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT

the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, which was particularly important to SIGAR’s analysis;
that cable is cited in the report.
While the documentary evidence tells its own story, it cannot substitute for
the experience, knowledge, and wisdom of people who participated in the
Afghanistan reconstruction effort. The research team interviewed more than
80 individuals with direct and indirect knowledge of facts on the ground that
affected U.S. engagement on corruption. Individuals interviewed included
U.S., Afghan, and other international experts from academia, think tanks, NGOs,
and government entities, as well as current and former U.S. civilian and military
officials at the National Security Council, intelligence agencies, USAID, and
the Departments of Defense, State, Treasury, and Justice. The team also drew
from dozens of interviews conducted by other SIGAR researchers and auditors.
Further, Transparency International’s Defence and Security Programme graciously
shared transcripts of selected interviews completed for its report, Corruption:
Lessons from the International Mission in Afghanistan.
Interviews provided invaluable insight on the thinking and assumptions behind
decisions, debates within and between agencies, and frustrations that spanned
years, but often remained unwritten. Due, in part, to the politically sensitive
nature of the topic of corruption, a majority of the interviewees wished to
remain anonymous. For those still working in government, confidentiality was
particularly important. Therefore, to preserve anonymity, our interview citations
often cite a “senior U.S. official” or “senior State Department official.” We
conducted most interviews in person in the Washington, DC area or by telephone;
however, we also interviewed individuals during research trips to Kabul, Boston,
New York City, Brussels, Bergen, London, Oslo, and Copenhagen. We performed
our documentary research in SIGAR’s offices in Arlington, Virginia.
Corruption in Conflict reflects careful, thorough consideration of the wide
range of sources; however, it is not an exhaustive treatment of the topic. Given
the timeframe and scale of U.S. engagement in Afghanistan, the ambiguity in
perceptions about corruption, and the paucity of empirical data on levels of
corruption, the report does not aim to fully address how thousands of U.S. civilian
and military officials dealt with corruption on a daily basis since 2001. Rather, the
report focuses on certain key events and provides context on the manifestation
of corruption in Afghanistan, relevant U.S. policies and initiatives, and competing
U.S. priorities. From these, we derive lessons and recommendations to inform
current and future contingency operations.
The report underwent an extensive process of peer and agency review. First,
we sought feedback on a draft of the full report from seven subject matter
experts; four additional subject matter experts reviewed the draft lessons and
recommendations. The experts included Americans, Afghans, and Europeans,
all of whom had substantial experience working on or in Afghanistan. These
reviewers provided significant, detailed comments on the report, which we
incorporated, as possible. The draft was then shared with another group of
subject matter experts, including current and former U.S. government officials
who shared their personal perspectives. Seven members of this group convened to
88 SIGAR I CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT I SEPTEMBER 2016