CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT

for the long-term threat that corruption posed to U.S. goals in Afghanistan. 106
Security, political stability, and immediate reconstruction needs took priority over
the slow, iterative work of building good governance and the rule of law, including
combating corruption. This was partly a function of the Bush administration’s
aversion to “nation-building,” as the administration looked to the UN and other
donors to take on the responsibility of shaping a new post-Taliban social order
and public institutions. 107 One senior U.S. official recalled the perceived tradeoffs
between security objectives and anticorruption, saying that U.S. agencies did not
want to aid and abet corruption, but national security was the higher priority. He
recalled a pragmatic willingness to work with unsavory powerbrokers in order to
pursue U.S. counterterrorism objectives, with the assumption that eventually, the
United States would hold the malign powerbrokers to account—only that rarely, if
ever, happened. 108 Similarly, a former senior State official said, “If you want to get
bad guys, you work with anyone and everyone to help you do that—even if they
fundamentally act against your economic goals.” 109
Nevertheless, there is evidence that some U.S. officials were attuned to the
threat of corruption. According to a senior Treasury official and two USAID
representatives who served in Kabul, their agencies harbored early concerns
about the risks of not addressing corruption in Afghanistan. 110 In addition, the
Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 authorized programs “designed to
combat corruption and other programs for the promotion of good governance.” 111
It was several years, however, before U.S. agencies developed programs geared
specifically toward reducing corruption.
By mid-decade, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan
were reporting sporadically on police corruption, illegal police checkpoints,
extrajudicial killings, and local warlords maintaining private militias while serving
in government positions. There were also reports on warlords’ links to the drug
trade, smuggling, and criminal networks. 112 Embassy Kabul reported on Afghan
police who were unable to pursue politically connected individuals and complex
power struggles among provincial officials and militia commanders. 113
In 2005, the embassy voiced louder concerns. A cable entitled “Confronting
Afghanistan’s Corruption Crisis” summarized the embassy’s assessment:
Several factors have turned Afghan corruption in recent years
from a customary practice into a major threat to the country’s
future. Many of our contacts fear that narcotics could be the
factor that causes corruption to spin out of control. They also
see international aid and necessary USG/Coalition engagement
with some unsavory figures as perpetuating the problem ….
In the short term, President Karzai must take the moral high
ground by removing corrupt officials …. The U.S. Mission
is already taking steps to fight corruption …. The stakes are
high, since fighting corruption is fundamental to the success of
U.S. policy in Afghanistan. 114
SIGAR I CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT I SEPTEMBER 2016
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