CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT

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APPENDIX F U.S. Support to Afghan Government Organizations with an Anticorruption Role Organization High Office of Oversight and Anticorruption (HOO) 603 Control and Audit Office (CAO) 609 Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) 615 Anticorruption Unit (ACU), Attorney General’s Office (AGO) 622 Anticorruption Tribunal (ACT) 628 Sensitive Investigations Unit (SIU) 634 Criminal Investigations Division (CID) of the Ministry of Interior 640 Mandate To lead GIROA’s USAID 605 anticorruption efforts, including overseeing and coordinating the implementation of GIROA’s national strategy to fight corruption 604 To conduct audits over USAID 611 all state entities within central and provincial governments, and over donor funds received by Afghan treasury 610 To conduct criminal investigations of corruption, organized crime, and kidnapping; a vetted unit. Provided cases to the Anticorruption Unit 616 To develop and prosecute cases against individuals suspected of violating anticorruption statutes; a vetted unit 623 To handle significant corruption cases from Kabul and provinces 629 U.S. Agency Leading Support Support Provided Analysis/Notes FBI, DEA, State INL, DOJ, DOD (with the UK’s Serious Organized Crime Agency [SOCA]) 617 State INL, USAID, DOJ 624 Embassy ROL Office, DOJ, State, USAID 630 Helped GIROA draft a new law to strengthen the HOO’s independence and oversight authority. Also launched a capacity-building project. 606 Covered costs of conference and training attendance. 612 FBI and DEA special agents trained and mentored MCTF staff. DOJ helped GIROA complete an enabling law for the MCTF. 618 FBI constructed a facility to house the unit. 619 Provided mentoring, training, and support to prosecutors and judges. 625 Supported judges and provided mentoring and support to judges. 631 To carry out counternarcotics investigations using intelligence developed by a unit within the counter-narcotics police; a specially vetted unit 635 DEA 636 Trained and equipped, including enabling access to a legal wiretapping capability. 637 To lead investigations of national interest, including cases with international links, and organized and white-collar crime 641 DHS/ Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 642 Trained investigators. 643 Struggled to overcome administrative hurdles and gain political support. Embassy Kabul withheld most of planned funding. 607 The CAO’s legislative framework was considered weak and did not provide sufficient independence or authority for it to serve as an effective anticorruption institution. 613 Developed notable investigative capacity, but its success was constrained by the failure of the judicial system to prosecute cases, as well as lack of Afghan political support. 620 Success in building the ACU’s capacity, but due to lack of political will by GIROA to empower the unit and prosecute highlevel corruption cases, the ACU ultimately had limited effect. 626 In 2011, judges “lacked uniform sentencing standards, received little training, used rudimentary case management systems, lacked effective security, and work[ed] in inadequate facilities.” 632 The SIU often identified corrupt officials as a result of its high-level narcotics investigations and routinely partnered with other organizations, including the ATFC. 638 The CID investigators uncovered a major case of human smuggling and bribery involving a senior government official. 644 Dates of Support 2010 to 2013 608 November 2007 to January 2010 614 2009 to present 621 August 2009 to unknown 627 November 2010 to unknown 633 2007 to unknown 639 December 2010 to unknown 645 98 SIGAR I CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT I SEPTEMBER 2016
Organization Afghan Judicial Security Unit (JSU) 646 Mandate To provide security for the Supreme Court, ACU, Counter-Narcotics Court, and at-risk judges and prosecutors 647 To ensure the health of the banking sector and regulate commercial banks and other financial institutions 653 U.S. Agency Leading Support Support Provided Analysis/Notes U.S. Marshals Trained JSU officers. 649 As of 2011, the JSU Service 648 operated in Kabul and planned to extend coverage to the Supreme Court and other major cities. 650 Dates of Support 2010 to unknown 651 Financial Supervision Department (FSD), Afghanistan Central Bank (DAB) 652 Treasury, USAID 654 2003 (USAID) and 2006 (Treasury) to 2011 657 Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Center (FinTRACA), Afghanistan Central Bank (DAB) 658 Joint Independent Anticorruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC, an international body with GIROAappointed Afghan membership) 664 To identify suspicious financial transactions and alert law enforcement; served as DAB’s financial intelligence unit 659 Treasury, DHS/ ICE, DEA 660 Provided technical advisors. 655 The Kabul Bank crisis revealed weaknesses in the FSD’s ability to regulate the banking sector and enforce its supervision function. Karzai then banned U.S. advisors from working with the DAB. 656 Assisted FinTRACA in DHS/ICE and other strengthening Afghan international law information and evidencegathering capacity to identify gave the unit high marks enforcement agencies and target illicit finance in 2010. However, a 2011 networks. 661 IMF report found major shortcomings remained in its functioning. 662 2009 to present 663 To develop anticorruption recommendations and independently monitor, evaluate, and report on anticorruption efforts by GIROA and the international community 665 State, USAID 666 Provided technical assistance (wrote the MEC’s terms of reference) and political support, along with other donors, UNAMA, and GIROA. 667 Considered a model for enhancing transparency and bringing pressure to bear on GIROA 668 March 2010 to present 669 SIGAR I CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT I SEPTEMBER 2016 99
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Special Inspector General for Afgha
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Special Inspector General for Afgha
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TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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ILLUSTRATIONS FIGURES FIGURE 1: Sha
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In the early years of the reconstru
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Recommendations To address corrupti
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1. Corruption undermined the U.S. m
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large sums of money. For example, a
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Corruption Has Increased from Pre-2
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capacity, legislative and regulator
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dynamic we have to change if we wan
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in corruption. 58 Afghans also witn
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ISAF Public Affairs photo PART ONE
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checkpoints, activities which they
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usinesses that served the internati
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for the long-term threat that corru
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combat corruption globally, which i
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opium when they raided the governor
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measurable benchmarks and target da
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While certain individuals and offic
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that Afghan leaders were not commit
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U.S. government documents increasin
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the state’s legitimacy and capabi
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and helping to fund the enemy. The
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would benefit from an approved stra
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fundamental flaw: The Afghan govern
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By the time of Salehi’s arrest an
Page 59 and 60: U.S. Marine Corps photo PART THREE
Page 61 and 62: and partners, other countries in th
Page 63 and 64: BOX 2: ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY In the d
Page 65 and 66: Capacity-building efforts would be
Page 67 and 68: “The international community held
Page 69 and 70: success, due in part to unwillingne
Page 71 and 72: ability to conduct robust oversight
Page 73 and 74: The story elicited a sharp congress
Page 75 and 76: London, Kabul, and Tokyo Conference
Page 77 and 78: officials. The task force member no
Page 79 and 80: These cancelled or forestalled cont
Page 81: a desire to tackle corruption and a
Page 84 and 85: These findings underscore that the
Page 87 and 88: LESSONS USAID/Afghanistan photo Bas
Page 89 and 90: eport, international assistance acc
Page 91: in Afghanistan failed to address th
Page 94 and 95: This legislation should: • Requir
Page 96 and 97: Intelligence agencies should: • C
Page 98 and 99: 10. The State Department should pla
Page 100 and 101: the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, which wa
Page 102 and 103: APPENDIX B ABBREVIATIONS 4A Assista
Page 104 and 105: ODA OECD OEF OSD-P OTI PACC PRT PSC
Page 106 and 107: APPENDIX D Strategy or Plan Assessm
Page 108 and 109: Organization Lead Agency Mandate Hi
Page 112 and 113: ENDNOTES 1 Ryan Crocker, SIGAR inte
Page 114 and 115: 34 OECD Development Assistance Coun
Page 116 and 117: 65 Fishstein and Wilder, Winning He
Page 118 and 119: 101 Joint Staff, Joint and Coalitio
Page 120 and 121: 148 Dressler, Counterinsurgency in
Page 122 and 123: 192 NSC, White Paper on the Interag
Page 124 and 125: 235 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Afghanis
Page 126 and 127: 284 Department of the Treasury, “
Page 128 and 129: Transition to Transformation, July
Page 130 and 131: 368 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the
Page 132 and 133: 411 Torabi, email to SIGAR, March 5
Page 134 and 135: 463 Congressional Research Service,
Page 136 and 137: 525 U.S. Embassy Kabul, U.S. Govern
Page 138 and 139: 586 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Update o
Page 140 and 141: 633 DOD, Report on Progress toward
Page 142 and 143: SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY Afghan Research
Page 144 and 145: Century Foundation. Afghanistan: Ne
Page 146 and 147: Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Page 148 and 149: Human Rights Watch. Blood-Stained H
Page 150 and 151: Koumans, Mark. Testimony before the
Page 152 and 153: Pritchett, Lant, Michael Woolcock,
Page 154 and 155: Schmeidl, Susanne. “The Man Who W
Page 156 and 157: Stanekzai, Mohammad M. “Afghanist
Page 158 and 159: U.S. Department of State, Office of
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United Nations Development Programm
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS SIGAR acknowledges
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SIGAR SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
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CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT

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