CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT

65 Fishstein and Wilder, Winning Hearts and Minds?, p. 5; Murtazashvili, email to SIGAR, March
5, 2016; Transparency International, Corruption: Lessons from the International Mission in
Afghanistan, February 2015, pp. 25, 31-32.
66 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Confronting Afghanistan’s Corruption Crisis,” Kabul 3681 cable (declassified
by U.S. Department of State on December 11, 2015, at SIGAR’s request), September 15, 2005, p. 1.
67 Marin Strmecki, “Afghanistan at a Crossroads: Challenges, Opportunities, and a Way Ahead,” a
briefing in the Rumsfeld Papers, August 17, 2006, p. 36-37.
68 George W. Bush, “Defeating the Terrorist Threat to the United States,” National Security Presidential
Directive-9, October 25, 2001, p. 1.
69 Donald Rumsfeld, “Strategic Thoughts,” Memo for President George W. Bush, September 30, 2001, p.
1; Barnett Rubin, “Saving Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, January 2007, p. 65; Jones, In the Graveyard
of Empires, pp. 117-118, 131; Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure
of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New York, NY: Penguin Books,
2009), p. 61.
70 Paul Wolfowitz, “Using Special Forces on ‘Our Side’ of the Line,” Memo to Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld, September 23, 2001, p. 2; Donald Rumsfeld, “Strategic Thoughts,” Memo
for President George W. Bush, September 30, 2001, p. 1; Donald Rumsfeld, “U.S. Strategy in
Afghanistan,” Memo to Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Doug Feith with edits from Rumsfeld,
October 30, 2001, pp. 3-4; Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires, p. 117.
71 Rashid, Descent into Chaos, p. 61.
72 Ibid, p. 62; Suhrke, When More is Less, p. 15; Wolfowitz, “Using Special Forces on ‘Our Side’ of the
Line,” p. 1.
73 Rumsfeld, “U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan,” p. 2; Rashid, Descent into Chaos, p. 62.
74 Rumsfeld, “U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan,” p. 3; Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires, pp. 90-
91; Congressional Research Service, Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA Paramilitary
Operations: Issues for Congress, RS22017, August 3, 2009, p. 2. The Rumsfeld document describes a
draft plan for these operations; the Jones book recounts how such operations occurred.
75 Human Rights Watch, Blood-Stained Hands: Past Atrocities in Kabul and Afghanistan’s Legacy
of Impunity, July 6, 2005, pp. 3-5; Afghanistan Justice Project, “Violations of International Human
Rights and Humanitarian Law during the period of the Islamic State of Afghanistan (ISA), 1992-1996,
and by the United Front, 1996-1998” in Afghanistan Justice Project, Casting Shadows: War Crimes
and Crimes against Humanity: 1978-2001, 2005, pp. 61-62; Amnesty International, “UK: Afghan
Warlord should be investigated,” press release, August 1, 2000, pp. 1-2; Amnesty International,
Afghanistan: Making Human Rights the Agenda, November 1, 2001, p. 8.
76 AIHRC, A Call for Justice: A Report on National Consultations on Transitional Justice in
Afghanistan, January 2005, pp. 51-52, 75.
77 Rubin, “Saving Afghanistan,” pp. 64, 69, and 77; Michael Bhatia and Mark Sedra, Afghanistan,
Arms and Conflict: Armed groups, disarmament and security in a post-war society (New York,
NY: Routledge, 2008), p. 178; Rustam Qobil, “At the mercy of Afghanistan’s warlords,” BBC Uzbek
Service, November 28, 2012, http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-19983266 (accessed July 19, 2016).
78 Dipali Mukhopadhyay, Warlords, Strongmen Governors, and the State in Afghanistan (New York,
NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 25.
79 Barnett Rubin, Central Asia Wars and Ethnic Conflicts–Rebuilding Failed States, UNDP Human
Development Report Office, February 2004, p. 20; Barnett Rubin, interview by Nermeen Shaikh,
The Asia Society, n.d., p. 2; Donald P. Wright, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army
in Operation Enduring Freedom October 2001—September 2005 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat
Studies Institute Press, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, 2010), p. 97.
80 Former senior DOD advisor, SIGAR interview, October 19, 2015; Elizabeth Rubin, “Karzai in His
Labyrinth,” New York Times Magazine, August 4, 2009.
104 SIGAR I CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT I SEPTEMBER 2016