CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT

ISAF Public Affairs photo
PART ONE
Failure to Fully Appreciate the Corruption Threat:
2001–2008
In the early years of the post-2001 U.S. reconstruction effort, some U.S. officials
recognized corruption could undermine the Afghan state’s legitimacy and drain
resources from it. However, there was not sufficient appreciation for the threat
corruption posed to the long-term U.S. goal of a peaceful, stable Afghanistan. With
other pressing needs—to pursue al-Qaeda and the Taliban, prevent a humanitarian
disaster, shepherd a political transition process, and begin basic reconstruction—
anticorruption was not a top priority for U.S. policymakers and practitioners.
By mid-decade, that began to change. Aid programs and military contracts were
increasing, the drug economy was expanding, and security had deteriorated.
In 2005, U.S. Embassy Kabul reported that corruption was “a major threat” to
Afghanistan’s future, and fighting corruption was “fundamental to the success
of U.S. policy in Afghanistan.” 66 In 2006, a high-level DOD briefing assessed
corruption was feeding a “crisis in governance” and proposed a strategy for
strengthening Afghan governance. 67 Despite these calls, however, there was no
cohesive, consistent response to corruption; U.S. anticorruption efforts lacked
sustained political commitment, strategies, expertise, and resources.
SIGAR I CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT I SEPTEMBER 2016
15