CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT

BOX 2: ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY
In the development community, the concept of “absorptive capacity” generally
refers to the “amount and form of international aid and attention that recipient
institutions and societies can receive without suffering significant social,
economic, or political disruptions.” 330 In other words, “absorptive capacity sets
limits on the productive potential of aid.” 331 Scholar Robert Lamb describes a
useful metaphor for understanding the concept:
Place a dry sponge on a dry table and pour water onto the sponge
from a pitcher. Pour too much water and the table gets wet after
the sponge reaches capacity; pour too little water and the sponge
does not consume as much water as it could; pour too quickly and
the table gets wet even before the sponge reaches capacity. Some
sponges absorb more water than others; a dry sponge absorbs
water less quickly than does a damp sponge. Most sponges get
larger as they absorb the water. All have limits to the quantity and
rate of absorption. 332
Afghanistan’s ability to absorb and effectively use assistance funds has been
a significant concern in the debate over the scale and rate of reconstruction
assistance. 333 In Afghanistan, spillover from more than $100 billion in
reconstruction assistance contributed to pervasive corruption, illicit activity, and
other adverse effects that distorted economic norms and undermined state
legitimacy. 334 Integrity Watch Afghanistan founder and former director Lorenzo
Delesgues stressed that “staying within absorption limits is Development 101.” 335
120%
FIGURE 4:
U.S. Appropriated Reconstruction Funding for Afghanistan Shown
as a Percentage of Afghan GDP
120%
100%
100%
80%
80%
60%
60%
40%
20%
TYPICAL POINT OF AID SATURATION
40%
20%
0%
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
0%
Note: The aid saturation point is the theoretical point at which a state has reached its capacity
for absorbing aid. Aid provided beyond that point may be counterproductive. The red line shows
U.S. reconstruction funding as a percentage of Afghan GDP over time (see figure 3, p. 18). The
grey area reflects the generally accepted range of aid saturation, typically 15 to 45% of GDP (see
endnote 339).
Source: SIGAR Lessons Learned Program analysis of: SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States
Congress, January 30, 2016, p. 187; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,
October 30, 2014, pp. 202–203; World Bank, World Development Indicators: GDP at market prices
(current U.S. dollars), World Bank Databank, accessed July 12, 2016.
SIGAR I CORRUPTION IN IN CONFLICT I I SEPTEMBER 2016 2016
51