CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT

dynamic we have to change if we want to use our money well
and effectively achieve our goals. U.S. officials on the ground
have to be appropriately authorized and encouraged to pull
money back if it is not being used well, and these decisions
need to be politically supported in Washington. 39
Another former U.S. official recalled that the United States and donors “began
working almost immediately with NGOs and other third parties and created a
plethora of parallel institutions. This drove confusion and undermined the state.
It also created vast opportunities for rent-seeking behavior on the part of NGOs
and contractors.” 40 Rent-seeking is a term of art used by economists and others to
mean the accrual of personal benefits through actions in the political arena. 41
U.S. and other international agencies were also under pressure to spend money
quickly for three main reasons: Spending money was seen as its own metric of
progress, large expenditures justified further appropriations from legislatures at
home, and insecurity drove the need to do things quickly. 42 The 2011 final report
of the congressionally mandated Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq
and Afghanistan noted the risks of spending quickly. For example, the report
cited a USAID agricultural program in southeastern Afghanistan that expanded
within a few weeks from $60 million to $360 million, resulting in rampant waste
and fraud. 43
Why Should U.S. Policymakers Care About Corruption
in a Conflict Environment?
Ambassador Ryan Crocker, who re-established U.S. Embassy Kabul soon after
9/11 and again led the embassy from 2011 to 2012, concluded in an interview
for this report that “the ultimate point of failure for our efforts … wasn’t an
insurgency. It was the weight of endemic corruption.” 44
Policymakers should care about corruption because it can have devastating
consequences for a state and society, threaten security and the rule of law,
and undermine public trust in institutions. In Afghanistan, the erosion of state
legitimacy weakened the government’s ability to enlist popular support against the
insurgency. 45 ISAF survey data suggest corruption was a catalyst for Afghans to
support the Taliban; between 2010 and 2012, survey respondents ranked corruption
as one of the “top three reasons why some Afghans choose to support the Taliban
instead of the Government of Afghanistan.” 46 Corruption also undercut the viability
of the state itself, as government officials not only exploited their positions to
extract resources from the population and foreign presence, but worse, repurposed
state institutions to engage in organized crime, thus driving insecurity. 47
Security sector corruption had particularly dire consequences. Corruption within
Afghan security ministries and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)
undermined combat readiness and effectiveness, as well as cohesion of the army
and police. 48 This “hollowing out” of security institutions had direct implications
for U.S. and NATO policy in Afghanistan: The schedule to transition security
responsibility from international to Afghan forces depended on the condition of
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SIGAR I CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT I SEPTEMBER 2016