CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT

Yet, despite the attempts to co-opt the warlords, the DDR process failed to
defang them. 88 Warlords largely maintained their military power through which
they continued to terrorize the population, engage in illegal land grabs, and set
up illegal checkpoints, thus preventing the Afghan state from establishing a
monopoly on the use of force. 89 A former UN official recalled that many warlords
created private security companies and maintained their militias as part of
these companies, which U.S. and NATO troops then employed. Private security
forces were also in high demand by construction and transportation contractors
employed by international entities. As private companies, the armed militia forces
were not under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense and the DDR process
did not apply to them. 90
In the 1990s, the Taliban had partly been motivated by, and drew their initial
popular support from, the goal of restoring order and ending the corrupt and
predatory behavior of warlord rule. 91 As the insurgency gained steam after the
first years of OEF, the Taliban again employed this rallying cry against the Karzai
administration, and the warlords and commanders who were associated with it. 92
Michael Semple, a former UN official in Afghanistan and deputy to the European
Union (EU) Special Representative in Afghanistan, noted the Taliban “fed upon
[the coalition’s] mistakes … and our failure to rein in the alienating practices of
the people in the mid-level of the new establishment.” 93
The problem of malign powerbrokers serving in government was compounded
by the 2005 parliamentary elections. An Afghanistan Research and Evaluation
Unit (AREU) report highlighted how warlords and criminals were legitimized by
their election to the National Assembly. The report noted the National Assembly
included “40 commanders still associated with armed groups, 24 members who
belong to criminal gangs, 17 drug traffickers, and 19 members who face serious
allegations of war crimes and human rights violations.” 94
The U.S. government applauded Afghanistan on the success of its elections. And
yet, according to the AREU report, local media reporting suggested a widespread
perception among Afghans that the elections were “marred by weak candidate
vetting, fraud, and intimidation.” 95 The gap between U.S. praise and the public’s
perceptions suggests the U.S. government either poorly judged the elections or
was reluctant to point out their flaws.
In addition to the warlords, a newer class of politically connected strongmen
emerged. These men were not field commanders or former mujahedin, but
rather gained power and wealth through their connection to the international
community, especially the United States. They mobilized their own militias
and commanded strong loyalty from the army or police, while benefiting from
access to foreign militaries and aid agencies. At the same time, these strongmen
strengthened their links to the drug trade, smuggling, and criminal networks. 96
One scholar described the cycle:
Political access gave privileged entry to bid for contracts from
the foreign militaries, donors, international aid organizations,
and the government, or to obtain a government license for
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SIGAR I CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT I SEPTEMBER 2016