CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT

ENDNOTES
1 Ryan Crocker, SIGAR interview, January 11, 2016.
2 This definition appears in the USAID Anticorruption Strategy: A Mandatory Reference for ADS
Chapter 200, January 2005, p. 8, and closely parallels other international organizations’ definitions.
See also Transparency International, “What Is Corruption,” http://www.transparency.org/whatis-corruption/
(accessed August 2, 2016); World Bank, Helping Countries Combat Corruption:
The Role of the World Bank, September 1997; Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation,
Anticorruption Approaches: A Literature Review, January 2009, p. 40.
3 USAID, USAID Anticorruption Strategy, p. 8.
4 Ibid.
5 Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, Anticorruption Approaches, p. 41; DFID, Why
Corruption Matters: Understanding Causes, Effects and How to Address Them, January 2015, pp.
12-13. “Petty” is sometimes used interchangeably with “administrative” or “bureaucratic” corruption,
as “political” is sometimes used synonymously with “grand” corruption.
6 USAID, USAID Anticorruption Strategy, p. 8.
7 Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, Anticorruption Approaches, p. 41; Transparency
International, “FAQs on Corruption: How Do You Define Corruption?” http://www.transparency.org/
whoweare/organisation/faqs_on_corruption (accessed August 2, 2016).
8 USAID, Assessment of Corruption in Afghanistan, prepared under contract with Checchi and
Company Consulting, Inc. and the Louis Berger Group, Inc., March 1, 2009, p. 4; ADB, DFID, UNDP,
UNODC, and the World Bank, Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan: A Roadmap for Strategy and
Action, February 16, 2007, pp. 7-8, 18; Karen Hussman, Working towards common donor responses
to corruption: Joint donor responses vis-à-vis corruption in Afghanistan: Myth or reality?,
OECD, October 18, 2009, p. 3; World Bank, The Investment Climate in Afghanistan: Exploiting
Opportunities in an Uncertain Environment, December 30, 2005, pp. vii-viii, 21; IWA, Afghans’
Experience of Corruption, 2007, pp. 9-10; U.S. Embassy Kabul, “NSA Spanta Stresses That the
Corruption ‘Elephant’ Needs To Be Tackled Together,” Kabul 5184 cable, October 2, 2010.
9 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “NSA Spanta,” Kabul 5184 cable, October 2, 2010.
10 Sarah Chayes, Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security (New York, NY: W.
W. Norton, 2015), pp. 58-62, 112; Katherine Dixon, Director of Defence and Security Programme,
Transparency International, and former UK government official, email to SIGAR, March 7, 2016.
11 USAID, Assessment of Corruption in Afghanistan, p. 8; see also IWA, Afghans’ Experience of
Corruption, p. 10; Tim Sullivan and Carl Forsberg, Confronting the Threat of Corruption and
Organized Crime in Afghanistan: Implications for Future Armed Conflict, PRISM, vol. 4, no. 4, p.
160; Paul Fishstein and Andrew Wilder, Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationships
Between Aid and Security in Afghanistan, Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, 2011, p.
46; Christopher D. Kolenda, former senior advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and
former strategic advisor to three COMISAFs, SIGAR interview, April 5, 2016.
12 IWA, Afghans’ Experience of Corruption, p. 10.
13 Ibid, p. 10; see also Transparency International, Corruption Threats and International Missions:
Practical Guidance for Leaders, Defence and Security Programme, September 2014, p. 23.
14 Former mid-level Afghan government official, SIGAR interview, April 7, 2016.
15 Sarah Chayes, “In Afghanistan, It’s Not All in the Numbers,” Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, December 3, 2012. See also Fishstein and Wilder, Winning Hearts and Minds?, p. 75, for
discussion of the complex social, cultural, and political challenges to conducting objective research
100 SIGAR I CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT I SEPTEMBER 2016