CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT

measurable benchmarks and target dates for anticorruption steps. These included
ratification of the UN Convention against Corruption and national legislation
that conformed to international norms and standards as outlined therein; review
and reform of oversight procedures relating to corruption; reforms of key justice
sector institutions; and more arrests and prosecutions of drug traffickers and
corrupt officials. 170 Other benchmarks were set for the professionalization of
the security forces and disbandment of illegal armed groups; reform of the civil
service, elections, and judicial sector; improvements to the land registration
system and settling land disputes; protection of human rights; improved financial
management at the national and provincial levels; and supervision of banking.
The compact also laid out benchmarks for transparency and accountability to
improve aid effectiveness by both the Afghan government and international
donor community. 171
The compact benchmarks were highly ambitious, given Afghanistan’s
development challenges and a deteriorating security situation. 172 The compact
lacked prioritization and likely reflected unrealistic expectations of donors
eager to demonstrate progress and a host government anxious to comply. The
benchmarks also embodied the dilemma around anticorruption: They covered
many areas of reform, but largely depended on the political commitment of
Afghan leaders who had a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. By 2008,
the lack of Afghan progress toward meeting the initial benchmarks elicited
frustration within the donor community. 173
The 2009 OECD report noted that in London, some donors had advocated for
“concrete anticorruption benchmarks” in the compact, but the United States
and UN supported the Afghans’ preference for softer benchmarks. 174 Other
former U.S. officials and international experts supported this observation that
anticorruption in Afghanistan was still not a high priority for the United States,
despite growing concern about corruption’s impact. 175
After the 2006 London Conference, donors focused on helping the Afghan
government devise a comprehensive strategy to fight corruption. The World
Bank, Asian Development Bank, DFID, UN Development Program (UNDP), and
UNODC collaborated to write “Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan” in 2007. 176
The paper identified modest signs of progress, including GIROA’s recognition
of corruption as a critical issue, some progress in public administration, better
fiduciary standards and improved management of state assets, initial efforts to
establish checks and balances on executive power, streamlining of administrative
processes, and some efforts to prosecute corruption cases. 177 The paper suggested
a broad roadmap for action against corruption, highlighting the need for greater
commitment by GIROA to fight corruption; a clearer institutional framework
for anticorruption; better understanding of the context, problems, actors, and
dynamics of corruption in Afghanistan; corruption assessments for key sectors,
agencies, and functions; cross-cutting reforms; a national anticorruption strategy;
and a harmonized approach by the international donor community, while ensuring
GIROA leadership. 178 The roadmap helped to inform the Afghan government’s
anticorruption strategy within the larger Afghanistan National Development
Strategy (ANDS), a multi-sectoral development plan for 2008 to 2013.
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