CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT

125 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Confronting Afghanistan’s Corruption Crisis,” Kabul 3681 cable (declassified
by U.S. Department of State on December 11, 2015, at SIGAR’s request), September 15, 2005, p. 5.
126 USAID, USAID Anticorruption Strategy, pp. 1-2, 16, 23-24.
127 USAID, USAID/Afghanistan Strategic Plan 2005-2010, May 2005, p. 5.
128 Neumann, The Other War, pp. 61-62; State Department, U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for
Afghanistan: Compiled by the Coordinator for Counternarcotics and Justice Reform in
Afghanistan, Ambassador Thomas A. Schweich, August 2007, pp. 15, 30, 53.
129 State Department, U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan, August 2007, pp. 8, 15, 31;
Matthieu Aikins, “Our Man in Kandahar,” Atlantic, November 2011, pp. 4-5; Matthieu Aikins, “The
Master of Spin Boldak,” Harper’s Magazine, December 2009, pp. 54, 60, 62.
130 State Department, 2005 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Afghanistan Country
Report, March 2005, p. 267.
131 State Department, U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan, pp. 15, 64.
132 GAO, Afghanistan Reconstruction: Despite Some Progress, Deteriorating Security and Other
Obstacles Continue to Threaten Achievement of U.S. Goals, GAO-05-742, July 2005, p. 26; USAID,
USAID/Afghanistan Strategic Plan 2005-2010, May 2005, pp. 7-8; USAID official, SIGAR interview,
May 5, 2015; former senior U.S. official, SIGAR interview, December 11, 2015.
133 GAO, Afghanistan Reconstruction: Despite Some Progress, GAO-05-742, p. 26.
134 SIGAR, Afghanistan’s Banking Sector: The Central Bank’s Capacity to Regulate Commercial Banks
Remains Weak, SIGAR 14-16-AR, January 2014, pp. 6-8; GAO, Afghanistan Reconstruction: Despite
Some Progress, GAO-05-742, p. 26.
135 SIGAR, Afghanistan’s Banking Sector, SIGAR 14-16-AR, pp. 6-8.
136 Ibid, p. 4.
137 Transparency International, The Anticorruption Plain Language Guide, July 2009, p. 44; USAID’s
Anticorruption Projects Database provides a complete listing of projects, implemented between 2007
and 2013, that USAID identified as having distinctive project interventions to reduce corruption or
promote government integrity, accountability, and transparency and ultimately result in reducing
opportunities to corruption. This database can be found at: https://www.usaid.gov/data/dataset/
b2cd92f6-e8bb-447b-9720-510222a80d0b (accessed August 2, 2016).
138 USAID, USAID/Afghanistan Strategic Plan 2005-2010, May 2005, p. 5.
139 Ibid, pp. 12-13.
140 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Confronting Afghanistan’s Corruption Crisis,” Kabul 3681 cable (declassified
by U.S. Department of State on December 11, 2015, at SIGAR’s request), September 15, 2005, p. 5;
SIGAR, Afghan Customs: U.S. Programs Have Had Some Successes, but Challenges Will Limit
Customs Revenue as a Sustainable Source of Income for Afghanistan, SIGAR 14-47-AR, April 2014,
p. 12.
141 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Confronting Afghanistan’s Corruption Crisis,” Kabul 3681 cable (declassified
by U.S. Department of State on December 11, 2015, at SIGAR’s request), September 15, 2005, p. 5.
142 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Afghanistan Ninth Meeting of the JCMB September 10,” Kabul 2572 cable,
September 20, 2008, p. 4; U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Confronting Afghanistan’s Corruption Crisis,” Kabul
3681 cable (declassified by U.S. Department of State on December 11, 2015, at SIGAR’s request),
September 15, 2005, pp. 4, 5.
143 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Afghan Telecom Chief Fired for Corruption,” Kabul 229 cable, January 23,
2007.
144 Strmecki, “Afghanistan at a Crossroads,” p. 36.
145 Suhrke, When More Is Less, pp. 106-107.
146 Jeffrey Dressler, Counterinsurgency in Helmand, Institute for the Study of War, January 2011, p. 26.
147 Suhrke, When More Is Less, p. 107; Damien McElroy, “Afghan Governor Turned 3,000 Men Over to
Taliban,” Telegraph, November 20, 2009, p. 2.
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