CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT

Afghan forces. Corruption undercut the readiness and effectiveness of both the
Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). 49
The U4 Anticorruption Resource Center at the Christian Michelsen Institute in
Norway found that corruption within the security sector can lead to increased levels
of crime and armed violence; the population feeling insecure, vulnerable, and
distrustful of security services; the purchase of unnecessary equipment, which
wastes resources that might have been used for legitimate purposes; and reduced
operational effectiveness through poor equipment or inadequately trained staff. 50
“The ultimate point of failure for our efforts …
wasn’t an insurgency. It was the weight of
endemic corruption.”
—Ambassador Ryan Crocker
Some reports suggest corruption has been a motivating factor for Afghans joining
the insurgency. 51 The Taliban’s annual Eid al-Fitr statements highlight government
corruption, while other propaganda has attempted to capitalize on corruption and
injustice as sources of alienation. 52
Economically, corruption chokes growth by draining revenue from the national
treasury, discouraging direct foreign investment, and distorting the terms of
trade. 53 The USAID 2005 Anticorruption Strategy noted that “crony lending and
weak supervision misallocate credit and may lead to banking sector collapse,” a
phenomenon that occurred in Afghanistan in 2010 with the near-collapse of Kabul
Bank. 54 In addition, corruption creates uncertainty for firms regarding costs and
the consistent implementation of the rule of law. Together, these effects erode
the government’s fiscal stability and chances for sustained economic growth.
The World Bank’s 2005 Investment Climate in Afghanistan stated corruption
was “threatening to foreign investors or Afghans returning from overseas who
do not have powerful patrons or understand the system.” 55 Corruption also adds
a financial burden on ordinary Afghans. It discourages the formalization and
expansion of small-scale economic ventures because of fears of becoming visible
targets for corrupt officials.
Abusive strongmen were sometimes legitimized and empowered through their
appointments to positions of authority and responsibility by President Hamid
Karzai. In such positions, they sought to consolidate their power base by rewarding
their followers with government positions and gaining access to lucrative contracts
connected to the military and aid agencies. 56 These men repressed rival groups and
ordinary citizens through illegal land grabs, economic marginalization, and human
rights violations. 57 In the instances where the Afghan state was seen as being in
collusion with or controlled by these strongmen, the government was no longer
viewed as an honest broker, but complicit in and the source of injustices.
By extension, because the international donor community, including the United
States, supported the government, Afghans saw international actors as complicit
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