CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT

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Organization Lead Agency Mandate Highlights CENTCOM Vendor Vetting Cell (VVC) 562 USAID Vetting Support Unit (VSU) 569 Combined Joint Interagency Task Force–Shafafiyat (Shafafiyat) 576 Combined Joint Interagency Task Force–Afghanistan (CJIATF-A) 581 Rule of Law and Law Enforcement Directorate (ROL/LE) 586 DOD 563 USAID 570 DOD, ISAF 577 DOD, ISAF 582 State (embassy offices) INL, DOJ, FBI, DEA, DHS, U.S. Marshals Service, and Rule of Law and Anticorruption elements of USAID; working with USFOR-A and ISAF 587 To vet contract awards to non- U.S. vendors in Afghanistan and Iraq, with the aim of minimizing the risk “that insurgents or criminal groups could use U.S. contracting funds to finance their operations” 564 To vet prospective non- U.S. contract and assistance recipients (i.e., implementing partners) in Afghanistan with the aim of countering “potential risks of U.S. funds being diverted to support criminal or insurgent activity” 571 To promote a common understanding of the corruption problem, plan and implement anticorruption efforts, and integrate USFOR-A anticorruption activities with those of key partners 578 To synchronize and focus strategic counter-corruption, counternarcotics, counterthreat finance, and “No Contracting with the Enemy” activities in order to deny resources to malign actors and enhance transparency and accountability within GIROA 583 To improve coordination and substantially enhance U.S. effectiveness in supporting the Afghan government’s provision of fair, transparent, and efficient justice 588 Start and End Dates Initially vetted vendors with August 2010 existing contracts. 565 GAO found to present 568 a growing backlog of unvetted vendors, and weaknesses in the failure to vet subcontractors. 566 The VVC later expanded its capacity to vet, and identified a greater percentage of vendors as high risk, resulting in vendors being prevented from receiving U.S. funds and contracts. 567 Initially intended to ensure January 2011 U.S. funds did not support to present 575 corrupt powerbrokers, among other bad actors. 572 A former USAID vetting official said the unit stopped vetting for corruption after its first year. 573 A 2011 USAID mission order established a vetting threshold of $150,000. 574 Worked with Afghans and key leaders to develop a common understanding of the problem as a basis for joint action. Assessed that sustained engagement generates the political will necessary to address the threats of corruption and organized crime. 579 Created as an umbrella organization. According to DOD, by 2014, “personnel turnover and bad organizational changes (moving Shafafiyat from CJIATF-A to CSTC-A/NTM-A) at CJIATF-A made it an irrelevant organization.” Under Resolute Support, CJIATF-A dissolved and Shafafiyat became Essential Function 2 (Transparency, September 2010 to October 2014 580 October 2012 to October 2014 585 Accountability and Oversight). 584 Led all U.S. civilian and military 2010 to rule of law programs, including 2013 592 anticorruption. 589 ROL/LE was also meant to improve civilian-military coordination of justice sector assistance. 590 A reorganization in 2011 created the Interagency Rule of Law Office (IROL), which was then merged in 2013 under another office. 591 96 SIGAR I CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT I SEPTEMBER 2016
Organization Lead Agency Mandate Highlights Rule of Law Deputies Committee 593 International Community Transparency and Accountability Working Group (ICTAWG) 598 Embassy Kabul, USFOR-A, and ISAF (plus INL, USAID, DOJ, FBI, DEA, the U.S. Marshals Service, DHS, CSTC-A, IJC, and CJIATF-435) 594 UNAMA and U.S. representatives cochaired, but included all international actors involved in anticorruption 599 To ensure unity of effort among all agencies working to improve Afghan adherence to the rule of law and Afghan law enforcement capacity 595 To share information on anticorruption regarding political engagement with GIROA and messaging. Not a decision-making body 600 Served as a decision- and policy-making body for rule of law issues, including counternarcotics, anticorruption, and law enforcement. In addition to U.S. participants, the committee included non-voting representatives from other embassies and the UN. 596 Improved information sharing among donors. 601 Start and End Dates Summer 2010 to unknown 597 2010 to present 602 SIGAR I CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT I SEPTEMBER 2016 97
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Special Inspector General for Afgha
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Special Inspector General for Afgha
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TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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ILLUSTRATIONS FIGURES FIGURE 1: Sha
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In the early years of the reconstru
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Recommendations To address corrupti
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1. Corruption undermined the U.S. m
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large sums of money. For example, a
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Corruption Has Increased from Pre-2
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capacity, legislative and regulator
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dynamic we have to change if we wan
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in corruption. 58 Afghans also witn
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ISAF Public Affairs photo PART ONE
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checkpoints, activities which they
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usinesses that served the internati
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for the long-term threat that corru
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combat corruption globally, which i
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opium when they raided the governor
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measurable benchmarks and target da
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While certain individuals and offic
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that Afghan leaders were not commit
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U.S. government documents increasin
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the state’s legitimacy and capabi
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and helping to fund the enemy. The
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would benefit from an approved stra
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fundamental flaw: The Afghan govern
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By the time of Salehi’s arrest an
Page 59 and 60: U.S. Marine Corps photo PART THREE
Page 61 and 62: and partners, other countries in th
Page 63 and 64: BOX 2: ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY In the d
Page 65 and 66: Capacity-building efforts would be
Page 67 and 68: “The international community held
Page 69 and 70: success, due in part to unwillingne
Page 71 and 72: ability to conduct robust oversight
Page 73 and 74: The story elicited a sharp congress
Page 75 and 76: London, Kabul, and Tokyo Conference
Page 77 and 78: officials. The task force member no
Page 79 and 80: These cancelled or forestalled cont
Page 81: a desire to tackle corruption and a
Page 84 and 85: These findings underscore that the
Page 87 and 88: LESSONS USAID/Afghanistan photo Bas
Page 89 and 90: eport, international assistance acc
Page 91: in Afghanistan failed to address th
Page 94 and 95: This legislation should: • Requir
Page 96 and 97: Intelligence agencies should: • C
Page 98 and 99: 10. The State Department should pla
Page 100 and 101: the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, which wa
Page 102 and 103: APPENDIX B ABBREVIATIONS 4A Assista
Page 104 and 105: ODA OECD OEF OSD-P OTI PACC PRT PSC
Page 106 and 107: APPENDIX D Strategy or Plan Assessm
Page 110 and 111: APPENDIX F U.S. Support to Afghan G
Page 112 and 113: ENDNOTES 1 Ryan Crocker, SIGAR inte
Page 114 and 115: 34 OECD Development Assistance Coun
Page 116 and 117: 65 Fishstein and Wilder, Winning He
Page 118 and 119: 101 Joint Staff, Joint and Coalitio
Page 120 and 121: 148 Dressler, Counterinsurgency in
Page 122 and 123: 192 NSC, White Paper on the Interag
Page 124 and 125: 235 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Afghanis
Page 126 and 127: 284 Department of the Treasury, “
Page 128 and 129: Transition to Transformation, July
Page 130 and 131: 368 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the
Page 132 and 133: 411 Torabi, email to SIGAR, March 5
Page 134 and 135: 463 Congressional Research Service,
Page 136 and 137: 525 U.S. Embassy Kabul, U.S. Govern
Page 138 and 139: 586 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Update o
Page 140 and 141: 633 DOD, Report on Progress toward
Page 142 and 143: SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY Afghan Research
Page 144 and 145: Century Foundation. Afghanistan: Ne
Page 146 and 147: Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Page 148 and 149: Human Rights Watch. Blood-Stained H
Page 150 and 151: Koumans, Mark. Testimony before the
Page 152 and 153: Pritchett, Lant, Michael Woolcock,
Page 154 and 155: Schmeidl, Susanne. “The Man Who W
Page 156 and 157: Stanekzai, Mohammad M. “Afghanist
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U.S. Department of State, Office of
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United Nations Development Programm
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS SIGAR acknowledges
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SIGAR SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
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CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT

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