CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT

success, due in part to unwillingness by the Afghan Customs Department
to accept sweeping reform of customs security and payment. Instead, these
reforms were scaled down and implemented over several years, thereby limiting
their impact. 385 The audit concluded that without greater Afghan political
commitment to anticorruption measures, customs revenue would remain highly
vulnerable to corrupt actors. 386
In support of judicial reform, the United States sought to raise prosecutors’
salaries in the Attorney General’s Office. At $70 to $100 per month, prosecutors’
wages were below the average police salary. Afghan officials in Kabul and
the provinces cited low pay as creating strong incentives for prosecutors to
demand or accept bribes and hindered the recruitment and retention of qualified
prosecutors. 387 For years, Attorney General Mohammad Ishaq Aloko stalled
on implementing pay and grade reform that Karzai had mandated in order to
set appropriate salaries and use merit-based, transparent hiring processes. 388
High-level U.S. interventions by Ambassador Eikenberry and General Petraeus
in 2011 helped prompt limited, but ultimately inadequate, progress. 389 In early
to mid‐2011, the Afghan government drafted its National Priority Program
5, Law and Justice for All that included accelerated pay and grade reform at
the AGO. 390 Later that year, the reform was formally approved, but Aloko only
superficially implemented it, maintaining a non-merit-based hiring system. 391
In the fall of 2012, Embassy Kabul chose to concentrate on three areas where
it judged U.S. anticorruption efforts could have maximum impact: Kabul Bank
and the strengthening of financial supervision, borders and customs reform,
and rule of law and building institutional capacity. 392 The Deputy Ambassador
convened weekly working groups to provide guidance on priorities, arrange
high-level engagements as needed, and synchronize efforts with international
partners politically, programmatically, and in terms of messaging. 393 To date, this
was the highest level at which the embassy regularly convened stakeholders
on corruption issues. The Deputy Ambassador provided participants with clear
direction on how to pursue objectives and held them accountable for doing
so. 394 According to a former participant, the working groups became a forcing
function for action. However, military personnel were not included, damaging
civilian-military coordination on corruption issues. In addition, the groups did
not address U.S. contract oversight issues. 395
Judicial Capacity and Law Enforcement Actions
Despite the Kabul Bank and Salehi events, U.S. officials continued to press
for investigation and prosecution of corruption cases. 396 In addition to the
prosecution of individuals responsible for fraud at Kabul Bank, one major
case on which the United States pushed for action was that of Ghulam Qawis
Abu Bakr, the Kapisa Provincial Governor. 397 Abu Bakr had allegedly received
a $200,000 bribe in exchange for a contract to build a cell tower. 398 He was
suspended as governor, reportedly after COMISAF General Petraeus presented
Karzai with evidence of Abu Bakr’s collusion with the Taliban. 399
Overall, Afghan officials resisted U.S. pressure. The AGO was notorious for
not following through on corruption cases referred to it, including cases the
SIGAR I CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT I SEPTEMBER 2016
57