CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT

eform. 139 Other programmatic efforts included reducing the chances for
corruption in the levying and collection of customs revenue at border crossings
by streamlining the valuation of imports. 140
The strategic plan, however, mainly described existing efforts that had broader
goals than anticorruption, for example, good governance, civil society and
media development, and economic growth. The plan appeared to fit existing
programs within the anticorruption agenda. It reflected a technical approach to
anticorruption and failed to address two fundamental aspects of the corruption
problem: how U.S. contracting and procurement in Afghanistan had set up
perverse incentive structures that created opportunities for corruption and the
deeply political nature of corruption in Afghanistan. As a result, the document did
not consider how better oversight of U.S. assistance might reduce corruption or
the extent to which technical anticorruption efforts could succeed if the Afghan
government itself did not cooperate in such efforts.
Diplomatic Pressure
By mid-decade, State, DOD, and USAID began to grapple more with the problem
of corruption. Embassy Kabul worked with international partners to lobby Karzai
“to remove a number of key officials implicated in corruption and other
wrongdoing.” 141 This was an area of important but uneven progress. 142 For
example, the president and chief executive officer of Afghan Telecom,
Afghanistan’s state-owned communications company, was fired in part due to
corruption charges that centered on a fuel contract for a corporate vehicle fleet. 143
In a 2006 briefing for Secretary Rumsfeld, a senior DOD official noted that
Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, commander of Combined Forces Command-
Afghanistan, had “worked successfully with President Karzai to appoint better
governors in Zabul, Uruzgan, and Helmand Provinces, and the new appointees
have performed better and improved security conditions.” 144
[The plan] reflected a technical approach to
anticorruption and failed to address two fundamental
aspects of the corruption problem: how U.S.
contracting and procurement in Afghanistan had
set up perverse incentive structures that created
opportunities for corruption and the deeply political
nature of corruption in Afghanistan.
On the other hand, U.S. and international insistence on replacing corrupt officials
backfired in some cases. For example, President Karzai had granted the Helmand
provincial governorship to Sher Mohammed Akhundzada, whose clan had aligned
with Karzai while Karzai and his family were in exile in Pakistan. Akhundzada
took an inclusive approach to governance, distributing key security offices
across tribal lines to ensure broad-based support. 145 But under Akhundzada, the
provincial police acted as little more than a militia controlled by him, facilitating
a large narcotics network in the central Helmand River Valley and abusing the
local population. 146 In late 2005, U.S. forces allegedly found a large stash of
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SIGAR I CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT I SEPTEMBER 2016