CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT

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large sums of money. For example, a senior official may receive a kickback in exchange for directing a lucrative government contract to a favored company. Grand corruption can also include the manipulation of policies, institutions, and procedures, enabling high-level officials to benefit at the expense of the public good; this is sometimes referred to as “political corruption.” 7 Systemic Corruption, a Dilemma for Anticorruption Efforts Many Afghan and international observers have asserted that corruption in Afghanistan, by at least 2009, had become systemic, or pervasive and entrenched. 8 In 2010, U.S. Embassy Kabul reported that in a meeting with senior U.S. officials, Afghan National Security Advisor Dr. Rangin Dadfar Spanta said “corruption is not just a problem for the system of governance in Afghanistan; it is the system of governance.” 9 In such an environment, government leaders and private citizens who are connected at high political levels can seek to maintain their control over resources and levers of power through their abuse of entrusted authority. This poses a dilemma for any attempt to prevent or combat corruption: Tackling systemic corruption demands cooperation from political leaders whose dominance may rely on the very power structures anticorruption efforts seek to dismantle. These leaders thus have every reason to block reform; their interest lies in maintaining the corrupt system that benefits them, as well as larger identity groups with which they associate. In situations where corruption is systemic, as in Afghanistan, it is important to acknowledge the false dichotomy of petty versus grand corruption. That framework, while useful for understanding different levels of corruption, can obscure the fact that corruption is vertically integrated. Petty corruption is directly linked to grand corruption, as powerbrokers at the top use state institutions (for example, the police, courts, customs, and procurement systems) to extract resources from the bottom. 10 Tackling systemic corruption demands cooperation from political leaders whose dominance may rely on the very power structures anticorruption efforts seek to dismantle. A key mechanism of this integrated structure is the purchase of public positions. Numerous reports and interviews note that often, “government employment is purchased rather than earned.” 11 For example, a 2007 study by the Afghan NGO Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA) described a “bazaar economy” in which “every position, favor, and service can be bought and sold.” 12 The study cited “the strong and interwoven spider web of illicit networks, which are closely collaborating from district to provincial and central level,” and these networks’ abilities to effectively block reform. 13 According to a former mid-level Afghan government official, ministers and deputy ministers sought to control access not to all positions, but to the most lucrative subordinate positions, such as certain posts in major cities, border security posts, and senior positions in provinces and districts that grow poppies or have mines. 14 This upward flow of money and power victimizes ordinary people, while enriching a few. 4 SIGAR I CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT I SEPTEMBER 2016
Measuring Corruption Because corruption is often hidden behavior, it is difficult to measure in any country. In Afghanistan, this problem is magnified by the dearth of economic and other information, 30 years of conflict, and logistical, social, and cultural challenges to collecting reliable data or conducting methodologically sound surveys. 15 This report therefore relies on a combination of survey data, international indices, and interviews to attempt to understand the scope of corruption in Afghanistan. Petty corruption is directly linked to grand corruption, as powerbrokers at the top use state institutions (for example, the police, courts, customs, and procurement systems) to extract resources from the bottom. Available survey data provide imperfect but helpful indicators about Afghan perceptions of and experiences with corruption. Appendix C presents data from IWA, the Asia Foundation (TAF), and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) surveys on experiences and perceptions of corruption. The data suggest that, since 2001, Afghans have consistently and increasingly perceived corruption as one of their biggest problems, rivaled only by insecurity and unemployment. Various governance and business indices for Afghanistan also point to high levels of corruption. The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators shows Afghanistan in the bottom 4 percent of nations for “control of corruption” from 2002 through 2013. 16 The World Bank’s 2005 Investment Climate in Afghanistan, which identified key constraints to growth, reported “nearly 58 percent of surveyed firms cited corruption as a major or severe problem, just behind access to land and electricity. Firms reported paying an average 8 percent of sales as bribes, more than four times the average reported in neighboring Pakistan.” 17 In addition, since 2011, Afghanistan has consistently ranked as one of the three most corrupt countries in the world in Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perceptions Index. Table 2 illustrates these findings. TABLE 2: AFGHANISTAN’S CORRUPTION RANKINGS Transparency World Bank International 2001 - - 2002 196 of 197 - 2003 195 of 199 - 2004 198 of 206 - 2005 203 of 206 117 of 159 2006 199 of 206 - 2007 205 of 207 172 of 180 2008 205 of 207 176 of 180 2009 208 of 210 179 of 180 2010 209 of 211 176 of 178 2011 209 of 212 180 of 183 2012 206 of 210 174 of 176 2013 206 of 210 175 of 177 2014 196 of 209 172 of 175 2015 - 166 of 168 Source: SIGAR analysis of World Bank data; The World Bank, “Worldwide Governance Indicators: Control of Corruption,” The World Bank Databank, 2002–2014; Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index,” 2005, 2007–2015. Note: The data reflect Afghanistan’s international ranking among select countries. The number of countries included in these rankings changes from year to year based on the availability of reliable data. SIGAR I CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT I SEPTEMBER 2016 5
Page 1 and 2: Special Inspector General for Afgha
Page 3 and 4: Special Inspector General for Afgha
Page 5 and 6: TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Page 7 and 8: ILLUSTRATIONS FIGURES FIGURE 1: Sha
Page 9 and 10: In the early years of the reconstru
Page 11: Recommendations To address corrupti
Page 14 and 15: 1. Corruption undermined the U.S. m
Page 18 and 19: Corruption Has Increased from Pre-2
Page 20 and 21: capacity, legislative and regulator
Page 22 and 23: dynamic we have to change if we wan
Page 24 and 25: in corruption. 58 Afghans also witn
Page 27 and 28: ISAF Public Affairs photo PART ONE
Page 29 and 30: checkpoints, activities which they
Page 31 and 32: usinesses that served the internati
Page 33 and 34: for the long-term threat that corru
Page 35 and 36: combat corruption globally, which i
Page 37 and 38: opium when they raided the governor
Page 39 and 40: measurable benchmarks and target da
Page 41: While certain individuals and offic
Page 44 and 45: that Afghan leaders were not commit
Page 46 and 47: U.S. government documents increasin
Page 48 and 49: the state’s legitimacy and capabi
Page 50 and 51: and helping to fund the enemy. The
Page 52 and 53: would benefit from an approved stra
Page 54 and 55: fundamental flaw: The Afghan govern
Page 56 and 57: By the time of Salehi’s arrest an
Page 59 and 60: U.S. Marine Corps photo PART THREE
Page 61 and 62: and partners, other countries in th
Page 63 and 64: BOX 2: ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY In the d
Page 65 and 66: Capacity-building efforts would be
Page 67 and 68:
“The international community held
Page 69 and 70:
success, due in part to unwillingne
Page 71 and 72:
ability to conduct robust oversight
Page 73 and 74:
The story elicited a sharp congress
Page 75 and 76:
London, Kabul, and Tokyo Conference
Page 77 and 78:
officials. The task force member no
Page 79 and 80:
These cancelled or forestalled cont
Page 81:
a desire to tackle corruption and a
Page 84 and 85:
These findings underscore that the
Page 87 and 88:
LESSONS USAID/Afghanistan photo Bas
Page 89 and 90:
eport, international assistance acc
Page 91:
in Afghanistan failed to address th
Page 94 and 95:
This legislation should: • Requir
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Intelligence agencies should: • C
Page 98 and 99:
10. The State Department should pla
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the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, which wa
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APPENDIX B ABBREVIATIONS 4A Assista
Page 104 and 105:
ODA OECD OEF OSD-P OTI PACC PRT PSC
Page 106 and 107:
APPENDIX D Strategy or Plan Assessm
Page 108 and 109:
Organization Lead Agency Mandate Hi
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APPENDIX F U.S. Support to Afghan G
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ENDNOTES 1 Ryan Crocker, SIGAR inte
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34 OECD Development Assistance Coun
Page 116 and 117:
65 Fishstein and Wilder, Winning He
Page 118 and 119:
101 Joint Staff, Joint and Coalitio
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148 Dressler, Counterinsurgency in
Page 122 and 123:
192 NSC, White Paper on the Interag
Page 124 and 125:
235 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Afghanis
Page 126 and 127:
284 Department of the Treasury, “
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Transition to Transformation, July
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368 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the
Page 132 and 133:
411 Torabi, email to SIGAR, March 5
Page 134 and 135:
463 Congressional Research Service,
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525 U.S. Embassy Kabul, U.S. Govern
Page 138 and 139:
586 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Update o
Page 140 and 141:
633 DOD, Report on Progress toward
Page 142 and 143:
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY Afghan Research
Page 144 and 145:
Century Foundation. Afghanistan: Ne
Page 146 and 147:
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Page 148 and 149:
Human Rights Watch. Blood-Stained H
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Koumans, Mark. Testimony before the
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Pritchett, Lant, Michael Woolcock,
Page 154 and 155:
Schmeidl, Susanne. “The Man Who W
Page 156 and 157:
Stanekzai, Mohammad M. “Afghanist
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U.S. Department of State, Office of
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United Nations Development Programm
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS SIGAR acknowledges
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SIGAR SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
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