CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT

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APPENDIX D Strategy or Plan Assessment of Corruption in Strategies and Plans: 2009–2010 Agency/ Body Objectives Anticorruption Elements Strategy focused on targeted programming, for USAID Anticorruption Assistance,” improved conditionality, strengthened Afghan which discussed standing up the HOO; leadership, and an engaged citizenry. 503 agendas for prevention, education, and enforcement; USAID “Do No Harm” precepts; USAID and U.S. government management; and GIROA-donor coordination. 502 Afghanistan 500 USAID 501 Contained a recommended “Strategy Anticorruption Action Plan for Afghanistan 505 SRAP 506 To “improve transparency, reduce corruption and the perception thereof, in order to increase Afghans’ confidence in their government; demonstrate visible gains to advance COIN efforts in the short-term.” 507 Access to Justice Strategy 510 Integrated Civ- Mil Campaign Plan 515 U.S. Government Rule of Law Strategy for Afghanistan 520 U.S. Government Anticorruption Strategy for Afghanistan (draft) 525 Embassy Kabul 511 USFOR-A, Embassy Kabul 516 SRAP 521 Embassy Kabul 526 To increase support for the justice sector at all levels (law enforcement, law reform, capacity-building of the justice sector institutions and personnel, and the legislative process). One of four impact areas was to improve anticorruption efforts, including support of anticorruption institutions and task forces. 512 To provide overall guidance for U.S. civilian and military “efforts and resources.” 517 To focus U.S. rule of law assistance on programs that would offer Afghans access to fair and transparent justice and help eliminate Taliban justice and defeat the insurgency; to help increase the Afghan government’s legitimacy and improve perceptions among Afghans by promoting a culture that valued the rule of law. 522 (2010 version) To strengthen Afghan institutions to provide checks on government power, positively influence the behavior of corrupt officials, and tackle visible corruption so the Afghan people could see that change was occurring. Focused on improving transparency and accountability of Afghan institutions, increasing financial oversight, building judicial capacity, encouraging public demand for better governance, and increasing support for civic education, civil society, and the media. 527 Proposed implementation included strengthening accountability in police and judicial bodies, U.S. advocacy for prosecution of corrupt figures, support for civil service reform, determining how donor funds contribute to corruption, and developing guidelines for field commanders to address corruption. 508 Included supporting the development of anticorruption investigation and prosecution capability, efforts to identify and combat illicit finance, work on drafting effective legislation, and capacity-building of Afghan rule of law institutions. 513 Stated that U.S. personnel should identify and target those key people engaging in corrupt behavior and providing material support to the insurgency, use U.S. leverage to change corrupt behavior, expand accountable and transparent governance, and reduce corruption within ANSF. 518 Recommended capacity-building in the formal justice sector, U.S. pressure on GIROA to take steps against high-level political interference, improved vetting procedures for senior appointments, support for a judicial security force to protect prosecutors and judges, and increased pay for prosecutors and judges. SIGAR found that by 2012, the strategy no longer reflected the operating environment and was outdated. 523 Intended to focus diplomatic, legal, and development assistance tools to increase the political will of GIROA, U.S., and international community to fight corruption; increase support to GIROA for implementing its anticorruption strategy and reform of the HOO; and reform U.S. and ISAF contracting procedures. Never received approval from Washington. Informally adopted by embassy as guidance for anticorruption efforts. 528 Date Drafted March 2009 504 May 2009 509 June 2009 514 August 2009 519 September 2009 524 October 2009, revised in April 2010 529 94 SIGAR I CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT I SEPTEMBER 2016
APPENDIX E U.S. and ISAF Organizations with Anticorruption Objectives Organization Lead Agency Mandate Highlights ISAF Anticorruption Task Force (ACTF) 530 Afghan Threat Finance Cell (ATFC) 535 Combined Joint Interagency Task Force–Nexus (CJIATF- Nexus) 540 International Contract Corruption Task Force (ICCTF) 545 DOD, ISAF 531 To target corrupt actors 532 A working group of people from existing organizations at ISAF and Embassy that had equities in anticorruption. ACTF was formalized into a Deputy Chief of Staff command (Shafafiyat) directly under COMISAF. 533 DEA lead, with Treasury and DOD co-deputies 536 USFOR-A, ISAF 541 FBI. By 2009, added representation from DOD IG/DCIS, State, State OIG, SIGIR, USAID, Army CID, Air Force OSI, SIGAR, and NCIS. By 2010, included Afghan participation from MOI, MOJ, and NDS 546 To identify and disrupt financial networks related to terrorism, the Taliban, narcotics trafficking and corruption, and to provide threat finance expertise and actionable intelligence to the Chief of Mission, USFOR-A Commander, and ISAF 537 To provide actionable information on networks that threatened the stability of GIROA, with focus on narcotics production and corruption 542 To identify contract corruption involving U.S. or Afghan interests and develop criminal cases that may be prosecuted in the U.S. or Afghan judicial venues 547 Task Force 2010 550 USFOR-A 551 To understand the impact of contracting and the flow of contracting money at the sub-contractor level, to help combat corruption 552 Illuminated the complexity and extent of corrupt networks in Afghanistan by identifying malign actors and the nexus among corrupt government officials, drug traffickers, and criminal and insurgent groups. The cell worked with Afghan units on several major corruption-related cases. 538 Enabled military and law enforcement operations that focused on interdicting and disrupting networks. 543 Enabled agencies to take a more coordinated approach to contract corruption. 548 “Influenced U.S. contractingrelated actions through vendor vetting and targeted effects against nefarious entities operating in Afghanistan.” 553 Reviewed transportation, logistics, and security contracts. 554 Included experts in forensic auditing, criminal investigation, and contracting. 555 Start and End Dates September 2009 to September 2010 534 November 2008 to 2014 539 2009 to unknown 544 2006 to present 549 July 2010 to present 556 Task Force Spotlight 557 USFOR-A 558 To enforce private security contractor (PSC) compliance with requirements; help improve the regulation of PSCs; and evaluate policy, help develop more effective contracting procedures, and assist Afghan MOI efforts to regulate PSCs 559 Provided increased coordination and oversight of U.S. and ISAF contracting processes and sought to ensure that international resources did not inadvertently strengthen criminal networks or insurgent groups. 560 June 2010 until the end of 2011, when it was subsumed by CJIATF- Shafafiyat 561 SIGAR I CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT I SEPTEMBER 2016 95
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Special Inspector General for Afgha
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Special Inspector General for Afgha
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TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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ILLUSTRATIONS FIGURES FIGURE 1: Sha
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In the early years of the reconstru
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Recommendations To address corrupti
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1. Corruption undermined the U.S. m
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large sums of money. For example, a
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Corruption Has Increased from Pre-2
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capacity, legislative and regulator
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dynamic we have to change if we wan
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in corruption. 58 Afghans also witn
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ISAF Public Affairs photo PART ONE
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checkpoints, activities which they
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usinesses that served the internati
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for the long-term threat that corru
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combat corruption globally, which i
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opium when they raided the governor
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measurable benchmarks and target da
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While certain individuals and offic
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that Afghan leaders were not commit
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U.S. government documents increasin
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the state’s legitimacy and capabi
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and helping to fund the enemy. The
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would benefit from an approved stra
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fundamental flaw: The Afghan govern
Page 56 and 57: By the time of Salehi’s arrest an
Page 59 and 60: U.S. Marine Corps photo PART THREE
Page 61 and 62: and partners, other countries in th
Page 63 and 64: BOX 2: ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY In the d
Page 65 and 66: Capacity-building efforts would be
Page 67 and 68: “The international community held
Page 69 and 70: success, due in part to unwillingne
Page 71 and 72: ability to conduct robust oversight
Page 73 and 74: The story elicited a sharp congress
Page 75 and 76: London, Kabul, and Tokyo Conference
Page 77 and 78: officials. The task force member no
Page 79 and 80: These cancelled or forestalled cont
Page 81: a desire to tackle corruption and a
Page 84 and 85: These findings underscore that the
Page 87 and 88: LESSONS USAID/Afghanistan photo Bas
Page 89 and 90: eport, international assistance acc
Page 91: in Afghanistan failed to address th
Page 94 and 95: This legislation should: • Requir
Page 96 and 97: Intelligence agencies should: • C
Page 98 and 99: 10. The State Department should pla
Page 100 and 101: the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, which wa
Page 102 and 103: APPENDIX B ABBREVIATIONS 4A Assista
Page 104 and 105: ODA OECD OEF OSD-P OTI PACC PRT PSC
Page 108 and 109: Organization Lead Agency Mandate Hi
Page 110 and 111: APPENDIX F U.S. Support to Afghan G
Page 112 and 113: ENDNOTES 1 Ryan Crocker, SIGAR inte
Page 114 and 115: 34 OECD Development Assistance Coun
Page 116 and 117: 65 Fishstein and Wilder, Winning He
Page 118 and 119: 101 Joint Staff, Joint and Coalitio
Page 120 and 121: 148 Dressler, Counterinsurgency in
Page 122 and 123: 192 NSC, White Paper on the Interag
Page 124 and 125: 235 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Afghanis
Page 126 and 127: 284 Department of the Treasury, “
Page 128 and 129: Transition to Transformation, July
Page 130 and 131: 368 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the
Page 132 and 133: 411 Torabi, email to SIGAR, March 5
Page 134 and 135: 463 Congressional Research Service,
Page 136 and 137: 525 U.S. Embassy Kabul, U.S. Govern
Page 138 and 139: 586 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Update o
Page 140 and 141: 633 DOD, Report on Progress toward
Page 142 and 143: SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY Afghan Research
Page 144 and 145: Century Foundation. Afghanistan: Ne
Page 146 and 147: Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Page 148 and 149: Human Rights Watch. Blood-Stained H
Page 150 and 151: Koumans, Mark. Testimony before the
Page 152 and 153: Pritchett, Lant, Michael Woolcock,
Page 154 and 155: Schmeidl, Susanne. “The Man Who W
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Stanekzai, Mohammad M. “Afghanist
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U.S. Department of State, Office of
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United Nations Development Programm
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS SIGAR acknowledges
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SIGAR SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
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CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT

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