CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT

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ODA OECD OEF OSD-P OTI PACC PRT PSC QDDR RC SFPP SIGAR SIU SOM SPA SRAP TAF TF TMAF UN UNAMA UNCAC UNDP UNODC USAID USFOR-A VSU VVC Official Development Assistance Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Operation Enduring Freedom Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Office of Transition Initiatives Parliamentary Anticorruption Caucus Provincial Reconstruction Team Private Security Companies Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review Regional Command Senior Federal Prosecutors Program Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction Sensitive Investigations Unit Senior Officials Meeting Strategic Partnership Agreement Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan The Asia Foundation Task Force Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework United Nations UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UN Convention Against Corruption UN Development Programme UN Office of Drugs and Crime U.S. Agency for International Development U.S. Forces-Afghanistan Vetting Support Unit Vendor Vetting Cell 92 SIGAR I CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT I SEPTEMBER 2016
APPENDIX C The Asia Foundation ANQAR % of respondents who experienced corruption when interacting with the customs office % of respondents who experienced corruption when interacting with the Afghan National Police % of respondents who experienced corruption when interacting with the judiciary % of respondents who describe corruption as a major problem in their daily lives % of respondents who describe corruption as a major problem in Afghanistan as a whole % of respondents who describe corruption as one of the top two problems facing Afghanistan as a whole % of respondents who feel the Government does very poorly or a little poorly at reducing corruption in the Government % of respondents who strongly or somewhat agree that corruption is a serious problem in the government % of respondents who say there is corruption in the state court system % of respondents who say that corruption affects their daily lives % of respondents who say that corruption in the Central Government is greater than one year ago Rank of corruption in list of reasons why Afghans choose to support the Taliban instead of the Government of Afghanistan Survey Data on Corruption 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 39.8% 34.2% 36.4% 38.0% 42.0% 52.6% 48.6% 56.8% 47.4% 61.6% 53.0% 42.9% 39.9% 46.8% 49.0% 53.8% 48.5% 52.2% 45.1% 53.5% 55.4% 47.8% 49.1% 51.7% 51.9% 62.5% 59.9% 62.0% 54.8% 63.7% 42.1% 47.1% 50.7% 52.8% 54.8% 56.3% 56.1% 54.4% 62.4% 61.1% 77.3% 74.2% 75.8% 76.0% 75.8% 75.6% 78.8% 76.1% 75.7% 76.5% 18.7% 16.2% 13.6% 16.9% 27.3% 21.2% 24.5% 27.3% 28.4% 24.3% - - 60.3% 64.2% 59.1% 61.8% 56.2% 53.9% - - - - 88.4% 85.5% 88.4% 90.0% 84.9% 83.4% - - - - 82.6% 84.6% - 85.5% - - - - - - - 78.4% 82.1% 87.8% 78.3% 79.1% - - - - - - 30.6% 38.2% 38.5% - - - - - - - 2nd 1st 2nd - - - Integrity Watch Average value of bribe U.S. $ (GDP per capita [p/c]) Biggest concern for Afghans—Corruption (1st, 2nd, 3rd) - - - - 192 (570) = 34% GDP p/c - 191 (691) = 28% GDP p/c - 240 (634) = 38% GDP p/c - - - - 3rd - 3rd - 2nd - - Source: SIGAR analysis of data from the Asia Foundation (TAF), “A Survey of the Afghan People,” Explore Data Tool, 2006–2015; Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA), “National Corruption Survey 2010,” 2010, p. 10; IWA, “National Corruption Survey 2014,” 2014, pp. 3, 61 (GDP per capita numbers were taken from the World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD); COMISAF, Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research (ANQAR), quarterly surveys. Data used was from September of each year. SIGAR I CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT I SEPTEMBER 2016 93
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Special Inspector General for Afgha
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Special Inspector General for Afgha
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TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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ILLUSTRATIONS FIGURES FIGURE 1: Sha
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In the early years of the reconstru
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Recommendations To address corrupti
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1. Corruption undermined the U.S. m
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large sums of money. For example, a
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Corruption Has Increased from Pre-2
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capacity, legislative and regulator
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dynamic we have to change if we wan
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in corruption. 58 Afghans also witn
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ISAF Public Affairs photo PART ONE
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checkpoints, activities which they
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usinesses that served the internati
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for the long-term threat that corru
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combat corruption globally, which i
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opium when they raided the governor
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measurable benchmarks and target da
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While certain individuals and offic
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that Afghan leaders were not commit
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U.S. government documents increasin
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the state’s legitimacy and capabi
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and helping to fund the enemy. The
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would benefit from an approved stra
Page 54 and 55: fundamental flaw: The Afghan govern
Page 56 and 57: By the time of Salehi’s arrest an
Page 59 and 60: U.S. Marine Corps photo PART THREE
Page 61 and 62: and partners, other countries in th
Page 63 and 64: BOX 2: ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY In the d
Page 65 and 66: Capacity-building efforts would be
Page 67 and 68: “The international community held
Page 69 and 70: success, due in part to unwillingne
Page 71 and 72: ability to conduct robust oversight
Page 73 and 74: The story elicited a sharp congress
Page 75 and 76: London, Kabul, and Tokyo Conference
Page 77 and 78: officials. The task force member no
Page 79 and 80: These cancelled or forestalled cont
Page 81: a desire to tackle corruption and a
Page 84 and 85: These findings underscore that the
Page 87 and 88: LESSONS USAID/Afghanistan photo Bas
Page 89 and 90: eport, international assistance acc
Page 91: in Afghanistan failed to address th
Page 94 and 95: This legislation should: • Requir
Page 96 and 97: Intelligence agencies should: • C
Page 98 and 99: 10. The State Department should pla
Page 100 and 101: the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, which wa
Page 102 and 103: APPENDIX B ABBREVIATIONS 4A Assista
Page 106 and 107: APPENDIX D Strategy or Plan Assessm
Page 108 and 109: Organization Lead Agency Mandate Hi
Page 110 and 111: APPENDIX F U.S. Support to Afghan G
Page 112 and 113: ENDNOTES 1 Ryan Crocker, SIGAR inte
Page 114 and 115: 34 OECD Development Assistance Coun
Page 116 and 117: 65 Fishstein and Wilder, Winning He
Page 118 and 119: 101 Joint Staff, Joint and Coalitio
Page 120 and 121: 148 Dressler, Counterinsurgency in
Page 122 and 123: 192 NSC, White Paper on the Interag
Page 124 and 125: 235 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Afghanis
Page 126 and 127: 284 Department of the Treasury, “
Page 128 and 129: Transition to Transformation, July
Page 130 and 131: 368 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the
Page 132 and 133: 411 Torabi, email to SIGAR, March 5
Page 134 and 135: 463 Congressional Research Service,
Page 136 and 137: 525 U.S. Embassy Kabul, U.S. Govern
Page 138 and 139: 586 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Update o
Page 140 and 141: 633 DOD, Report on Progress toward
Page 142 and 143: SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY Afghan Research
Page 144 and 145: Century Foundation. Afghanistan: Ne
Page 146 and 147: Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Page 148 and 149: Human Rights Watch. Blood-Stained H
Page 150 and 151: Koumans, Mark. Testimony before the
Page 152 and 153: Pritchett, Lant, Michael Woolcock,
Page 154 and 155:
Schmeidl, Susanne. “The Man Who W
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Stanekzai, Mohammad M. “Afghanist
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U.S. Department of State, Office of
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United Nations Development Programm
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS SIGAR acknowledges
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SIGAR SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
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