CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT

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368 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 30, 2014, pp. 11, 136; former senior legal policy advisor at the MEC, SIGAR interview, March 1, 2016. 369 SIGAR, Afghanistan’s Mineral, Oil, and Gas Industries: Unless U.S. Agencies Act Soon to Sustain Investments Made, $488 Million in Funding is at Risk, SIGAR 15-55-AR, April 2015, pp. 19, 21. 370 Global Witness, “Gaps in new Afghan mining law pose a threat to stability,” August 19, 2014; see also Mary Beth Goodman and Trevor Sutton, “Tackling Corruption in Afghanistan: It’s Now or Never,” Center for American Progress, March 17, 2015, p. 11; and IRIN News, “Afghan mining law ‘could strengthen armed groups,’” August 28, 2014. 371 GAO, Foreign Operations: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight, GAO-11-419T, pp. ii, 8-9; Congressional Research Service, Wartime Contracting in Afghanistan, R42084, p. 5. 372 Torabi, email to SIGAR, March 5, 2015. 373 SIGAR, U.S. Reconstruction Efforts in Afghanistan Would Benefit from a Finalized Comprehensive U.S. Anticorruption Strategy, SIGAR 10-15-AR, p. 20; USAID, Annex 1: Alternative Courses of Action for the High Office of Oversight, n.d., p. 1; SIGAR, Afghanistan’s High Office of Oversight, SIGAR 10-2-AR, p. 2. 374 SIGAR, Afghanistan’s High Office of Oversight, SIGAR 10-2-AR, p. 3. 375 SIGAR, U.S. Reconstruction Efforts in Afghanistan Would Benefit from a Finalized Comprehensive U.S. Anticorruption Strategy, SIGAR 10-15-AR, p. 17. 376 USAID, “Assistance for Afghanistan’s Anti-Corruption Authority (4A) Project: Annual Report – Year 2,” October 28, 2012, p. 8; SIGAR, U.S. Reconstruction Efforts in Afghanistan Would Benefit from a Finalized Comprehensive U.S. Anticorruption Strategy, SIGAR 10-15-AR, p. 9. 377 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Rule of Law in Afghanistan: HOO Chairman Lodin Continues Public Campaign against Corruption,” Kabul 4620 cable, July 26, 2012; SIGAR, U.S. Reconstruction Efforts in Afghanistan Would Benefit from a Finalized Comprehensive U.S. Anticorruption Strategy, SIGAR 10-15-AR, p. 6. 378 Former U.S. Embassy Kabul official, SIGAR interview, September 15, 2015; senior U.S. official, SIGAR interview, March 29, 2016. 379 Lianne Gutcher, “Afghanistan’s Anticorruption Efforts Thwarted at Every Turn,” Guardian. July 19, 2011. 380 U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Evaluating U.S. Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan, S. Prt. 112-21, p. 19. 381 Former U.S. Embassy Kabul official, SIGAR interview, September 15, 2015; see also U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Evaluating U.S. Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan, S. Prt. 112-21, p. 19. 382 U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Evaluating U.S. Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan, S. Prt. 112-21, p. 19. 383 Former U.S. Embassy Kabul official, SIGAR interview, September 15, 2015. 384 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Anticorruption in Afghanistan,” Kabul 736 cable, February 8, 2013; SIGAR, Afghan Customs, SIGAR 14-47-AR, p. 1. 385 SIGAR, Afghan Customs, SIGAR 14-47-AR, p. 12. 386 Ibid, p. 16. 387 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Afghanistan: Attorney General Responds Positively to International Requests to Accelerate Vital Pay and Grade Reform,” Kabul 744 cable, February 8, 2011, p. 3; see also U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Afghanistan: Bamyan Governor Optimistic about Transition, but Formal Rule of Law Remains a Work in Progress,” Kabul 4790 cable, July 24, 2011. 388 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Meeting with Attorney General Aloko on Anticorruption Efforts,” Kabul 2248 cable, April 13, 2011; former Department of Justice attaché in Kabul, email to SIGAR, February 2, 2016. 118 SIGAR I CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT I SEPTEMBER 2016
389 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Afghanistan: Attorney General Responds Positively,” Kabul 744 cable, February 8, 2011. These high-level efforts included a joint letter from Ambassador Eikenberry and General Petraeus to President Karzai, and persistent pressure on senior Afghan officials, in concert with other donors. 390 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Consultations on Justice Sector National Priority Program,” Kabul 5038 cable, July 27, 2011, p. 1. In 2011, Afghan ministries were drafting National Priority Programs (NPP) to define the Afghan government’s top governance and development priorities. Each NPP was put forward to donors for approval as a joint Afghan-international plan. “Law and Justice for All” was GIROA’s NPP for the justice sector and included many anticorruption elements. 391 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Rule of Law in Afghanistan: Progress Despite the Challenges,” Kabul 8608 cable, December 18, 2011; former Department of Justice attaché in Kabul, email to SIGAR, February 2, 2016. 392 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Anticorruption in Afghanistan,” Kabul 736 cable, February 25, 2013, p. 1. 393 Former U.S. Embassy Kabul official, SIGAR interview, September 15, 2015; U.S. Embassy Kabul documents: Anticorruption in Afghanistan: Recent Successes, February 25, 2013, p. 1; Kabul Bank Working Group Matrix and Engagement Strategy, February 23, 2013; Anti-corruption Rule of Law Engagement Strategy, February 24, 2013; and Borders Working Group and Engagement Strategy, February 23, 2013. 394 Former U.S. Embassy Kabul official, SIGAR interview, September 15, 2105; senior State Department official, SIGAR interview, April 26, 2016. 395 Former U.S. Embassy Kabul official, SIGAR interview, September 15, 2015. 396 U.S. Embassy Kabul, Anticorruption Rule of Law Engagement Strategy, February 24, 2013, p. 5. 397 State Department officials, SIGAR interview, December 16, 2015. 398 Associated Press, “Afghanistan government corruption remains despite President Karzai’s pledge to root out graft probes,” NY Daily News, October 11, 2011. 399 Adam Goldman and Heidi Vogt, “Despite Karzai’s Pledge, Government Graft Eludes Prosecution,” Washington Times, October 12, 2011, p. 1. 400 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Afghanistan: Head of High Office of Oversight Lodin Discusses Concerns, Priorities and Frustration with Prosecutions,” Kabul 2494 cable, May 6, 2011, p. 1; U.S. Embassy Kabul, “The Afghan Supreme Court’s Control and Monitoring Department: A Rare Island of Anticorruption Integrity,” Kabul 4674 cable, July 18, 2011, p. 2; U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Rule of Law in Afghanistan: HOO Chairman Lodin,” Kabul 4620 cable, July 26, 2012, p. 1. 401 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Rule of Law in Afghanistan: Administrative Anticorruption Tribunals Struggle to Curb Official Graft,” Kabul 8786 cable, December 21, 2011, p. 1. 402 SIGAR, Rule of Law in Afghanistan, SIGAR 15-68-AR, Appendix II, p. 29. Justice Department’s Rule of Law program was $22.8 million. The total expended by State, Justice, DOD, and USAID was $1.084 billion. 403 SIGAR, Rule of Law in Afghanistan, SIGAR 15-68-AR, pp. 11, 30. 404 Ibid, pp. 12-13. 405 Ibid, p. 13. 406 Former Department of Justice attaché in Kabul, email to SIGAR, February 2, 2016; U.S. Embassy Kabul, “The Afghan Supreme Court’s Control and Monitoring Department,” Kabul 4674 cable, July 18, 2011, pp. 2-3. 407 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “The Afghan Supreme Court’s Control and Monitoring Department,” Kabul 4674 cable, July 18, 2011, p. 1. 408 Ibid, pp. 1-2. 409 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Rule of Law in Afghanistan: Judicial Official on Corruption and Potential New Judges,” Kabul 2216 cable, April 30, 2012, p. 1. 410 Former Department of Justice attaché in Kabul, email to SIGAR, February 2, 2016. SIGAR I CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT I SEPTEMBER 2016 119
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Special Inspector General for Afgha
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Special Inspector General for Afgha
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TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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ILLUSTRATIONS FIGURES FIGURE 1: Sha
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In the early years of the reconstru
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Recommendations To address corrupti
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1. Corruption undermined the U.S. m
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large sums of money. For example, a
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Corruption Has Increased from Pre-2
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capacity, legislative and regulator
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dynamic we have to change if we wan
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in corruption. 58 Afghans also witn
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ISAF Public Affairs photo PART ONE
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checkpoints, activities which they
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usinesses that served the internati
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for the long-term threat that corru
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combat corruption globally, which i
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opium when they raided the governor
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measurable benchmarks and target da
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While certain individuals and offic
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that Afghan leaders were not commit
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U.S. government documents increasin
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the state’s legitimacy and capabi
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and helping to fund the enemy. The
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would benefit from an approved stra
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fundamental flaw: The Afghan govern
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By the time of Salehi’s arrest an
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U.S. Marine Corps photo PART THREE
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and partners, other countries in th
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BOX 2: ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY In the d
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Capacity-building efforts would be
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“The international community held
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success, due in part to unwillingne
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ability to conduct robust oversight
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The story elicited a sharp congress
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London, Kabul, and Tokyo Conference
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officials. The task force member no
Page 79 and 80: These cancelled or forestalled cont
Page 81: a desire to tackle corruption and a
Page 84 and 85: These findings underscore that the
Page 87 and 88: LESSONS USAID/Afghanistan photo Bas
Page 89 and 90: eport, international assistance acc
Page 91: in Afghanistan failed to address th
Page 94 and 95: This legislation should: • Requir
Page 96 and 97: Intelligence agencies should: • C
Page 98 and 99: 10. The State Department should pla
Page 100 and 101: the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, which wa
Page 102 and 103: APPENDIX B ABBREVIATIONS 4A Assista
Page 104 and 105: ODA OECD OEF OSD-P OTI PACC PRT PSC
Page 106 and 107: APPENDIX D Strategy or Plan Assessm
Page 108 and 109: Organization Lead Agency Mandate Hi
Page 110 and 111: APPENDIX F U.S. Support to Afghan G
Page 112 and 113: ENDNOTES 1 Ryan Crocker, SIGAR inte
Page 114 and 115: 34 OECD Development Assistance Coun
Page 116 and 117: 65 Fishstein and Wilder, Winning He
Page 118 and 119: 101 Joint Staff, Joint and Coalitio
Page 120 and 121: 148 Dressler, Counterinsurgency in
Page 122 and 123: 192 NSC, White Paper on the Interag
Page 124 and 125: 235 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Afghanis
Page 126 and 127: 284 Department of the Treasury, “
Page 128 and 129: Transition to Transformation, July
Page 132 and 133: 411 Torabi, email to SIGAR, March 5
Page 134 and 135: 463 Congressional Research Service,
Page 136 and 137: 525 U.S. Embassy Kabul, U.S. Govern
Page 138 and 139: 586 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Update o
Page 140 and 141: 633 DOD, Report on Progress toward
Page 142 and 143: SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY Afghan Research
Page 144 and 145: Century Foundation. Afghanistan: Ne
Page 146 and 147: Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Page 148 and 149: Human Rights Watch. Blood-Stained H
Page 150 and 151: Koumans, Mark. Testimony before the
Page 152 and 153: Pritchett, Lant, Michael Woolcock,
Page 154 and 155: Schmeidl, Susanne. “The Man Who W
Page 156 and 157: Stanekzai, Mohammad M. “Afghanist
Page 158 and 159: U.S. Department of State, Office of
Page 160 and 161: United Nations Development Programm
Page 162 and 163: ACKNOWLEDGMENTS SIGAR acknowledges
Page 164: SIGAR SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
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CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT

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