CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT

PART TWO
A Call to Action: 2009–2010
U.S. attention to corruption in Afghanistan surged in 2009 and 2010 as
U.S. officials became increasingly concerned about three issues: (1) Corruption
was fueling the insurgency by financing insurgent groups and reinforcing
grievances that led to greater popular support of the groups, (2) corruption was
undermining the legitimacy of the Afghan state, and (3) the United States itself
was contributing to corruption through limited oversight of its aid and military
contracting, and by partnering with malign powerbrokers. As a result of these
insights, as well as increased numbers of personnel and resources dedicated to
Afghanistan, anticorruption became a key element of U.S. activities in the country.
A flurry of strategies for tackling corruption were drafted, and several U.S. and
ISAF entities were formed to better understand the nexus of corruption, drugs,
crime, and insurgency; prevent terrorist financing; and improve oversight of U.S.
contracting. These efforts, however, were not unified by a comprehensive strategy.
White House photo
This surge in awareness and activity came up against the reality of entrenched
criminal patronage networks that involved high-level Afghan officials who did not
share U.S. objectives. Two major events in 2010—the arrest on corruption charges
and prompt release of a key Karzai aide, and the near-collapse of Kabul Bank
due to massive fraud by politically connected bank executives—demonstrated
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