CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT

Overall, these efforts had some success, but were largely tactical; they were
not unified by an overarching strategy or backed by sustained, high-level
U.S. political commitment.
Competing High-Level Priorities
From 2010 to 2014, several high-level U.S. priorities required political
cooperation from the Karzai administration. The United States sought to
maintain good relations with the Afghan leadership to ensure continued access
for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. This was particularly
important at the height of the military surge in March 2011, which saw nearly
100,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan. 307
Then, in June 2011, President Obama announced that U.S. forces would
significantly draw down in Afghanistan, handing over security responsibilities
to Afghan security forces by 2014. 308 The U.S. government became focused
on “transition,” the process of withdrawing troops and preparing for the shift
of security responsibilities. Training and equipping the ANSF to combat the
insurgency was a key part of the U.S. exit strategy; as the ANSF took the lead in
operations, U.S. and international forces could gradually take a back seat. 309 This
process required close coordination with Afghan civilian and military leadership.
U.S. agencies were trying to advance these priorities in partnership with the
Afghan government. Yet the fragile U.S. relationship with Karzai had reached
a low point amid deep concerns—emanating from the executive agencies
and Congress—about widespread corruption and impunity within the
Karzai administration. 310
The U.S. government sought a strategic partnership agreement (SPA) with
the Afghan government to provide the framework for a strong, post-transition
relationship. A key pillar of the SPA was the initiation of negotiations on a
bilateral security agreement (BSA) to define the terms of the U.S. troop presence
after 2014. 311 Signed in May 2012, the SPA underscored “the crucial importance
of the fight against corruption.” 312 U.S. commitments to support Afghanistan’s
development and security were “matched by Afghan commitments to strengthen
accountability, transparency, [and] oversight.” 313
Negotiations around the BSA, however, became contentious, snagging on
disagreements over security and financial guarantees for Afghanistan, and issues
of jurisdiction for U.S. forces. Despite consensus backing from Afghan elites on
a draft agreement presented at a November 2013 consultative loya jirga, Karzai
refused to sign the draft, citing sovereignty concerns. 314
In December 2013, SRAP James Dobbins testified before Congress that Karzai’s
refusal to sign the BSA was a cause for deep concern. Without a BSA, there was
no clarity on the future of the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. Further,
the agreement was critical to bolster Afghan confidence in the international
community’s commitment to Afghanistan as the country prepared for presidential
elections in 2014; ensure fulfillment of pledges of assistance that NATO and non-
NATO nations had made at key international conferences; and signal to U.S. allies
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SIGAR I CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT I SEPTEMBER 2016