CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT

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JOWZJAN BALKH KUNDUZ TAKHAR BADAKHSHAN FARYAB SAMANGAN BAGHLAN HERAT BADGHIS GHOR SAR-E PUL DAYKUNDI BAMYAN PANJSHIR NURISTAN PARWAN KAPISA KUNAR WARDAK KABUL LAGHMAN NANGARHAR LOGAR PAKTIYA GHAZNI KHOWST FARAH URUZGAN ZABUL PAKTIKA NIMROZ HELMAND KANDAHAR Cover photo credit: Getty Images
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction Corruption in Conflict: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan is the first in a series of lessons learned reports planned to be issued by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). The report examines how the U.S. government—primarily the Departments of Defense, State, Treasury, and Justice, and the U.S. Agency for International Development—understood the risks of corruption in Afghanistan, how the U.S. response to corruption evolved, and the effectiveness of that response. The report identifies lessons to inform U.S. policies and actions at the onset of and throughout a contingency operation and makes recommendations for both legislative and executive branch action. Our analysis reveals that corruption substantially undermined the U.S. mission in Afghanistan from the very beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom. We found that corruption cut across all aspects of the reconstruction effort, jeopardizing progress made in security, rule of law, governance, and economic growth. We conclude that failure to effectively address the problem means U.S. reconstruction programs, at best, will continue to be subverted by systemic corruption and, at worst, will fail. SIGAR began its lessons learned program, in part, at the urging of General John Allen, Ambassador Ryan Crocker, and others who had served in Afghanistan. This report and those that will follow comply with SIGAR’s legislative mandate to provide recommendations to promote economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and leadership on policies to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse, as well as to inform Congress and the Secretaries of State and Defense about problems and deficiencies relating to reconstruction and the need for corrective action. Unlike other inspectors general, Congress created SIGAR as an independent agency, not housed inside any single department, and it is thus able to provide independent and objective oversight of Afghanistan reconstruction projects and activities. SIGAR is the only inspector general focused solely on the Afghanistan mission, and the only one devoted exclusively to reconstruction issues. While other inspectors general have jurisdiction over the programs and operations of their respective departments or agencies, SIGAR has jurisdiction to conduct audits and investigations of all programs and operations supported with U.S. reconstruction dollars, regardless of the agency involved. SIGAR I CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT I SEPTEMBER 2016
Page 1: Special Inspector General for Afgha
Page 5 and 6: TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Page 7 and 8: ILLUSTRATIONS FIGURES FIGURE 1: Sha
Page 9 and 10: In the early years of the reconstru
Page 11: Recommendations To address corrupti
Page 14 and 15: 1. Corruption undermined the U.S. m
Page 16 and 17: large sums of money. For example, a
Page 18 and 19: Corruption Has Increased from Pre-2
Page 20 and 21: capacity, legislative and regulator
Page 22 and 23: dynamic we have to change if we wan
Page 24 and 25: in corruption. 58 Afghans also witn
Page 27 and 28: ISAF Public Affairs photo PART ONE
Page 29 and 30: checkpoints, activities which they
Page 31 and 32: usinesses that served the internati
Page 33 and 34: for the long-term threat that corru
Page 35 and 36: combat corruption globally, which i
Page 37 and 38: opium when they raided the governor
Page 39 and 40: measurable benchmarks and target da
Page 41: While certain individuals and offic
Page 44 and 45: that Afghan leaders were not commit
Page 46 and 47: U.S. government documents increasin
Page 48 and 49: the state’s legitimacy and capabi
Page 50 and 51: and helping to fund the enemy. The
Page 52 and 53:
would benefit from an approved stra
Page 54 and 55:
fundamental flaw: The Afghan govern
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By the time of Salehi’s arrest an
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U.S. Marine Corps photo PART THREE
Page 61 and 62:
and partners, other countries in th
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BOX 2: ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY In the d
Page 65 and 66:
Capacity-building efforts would be
Page 67 and 68:
“The international community held
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success, due in part to unwillingne
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ability to conduct robust oversight
Page 73 and 74:
The story elicited a sharp congress
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London, Kabul, and Tokyo Conference
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officials. The task force member no
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These cancelled or forestalled cont
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a desire to tackle corruption and a
Page 84 and 85:
These findings underscore that the
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LESSONS USAID/Afghanistan photo Bas
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eport, international assistance acc
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in Afghanistan failed to address th
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This legislation should: • Requir
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Intelligence agencies should: • C
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10. The State Department should pla
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the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, which wa
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APPENDIX B ABBREVIATIONS 4A Assista
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ODA OECD OEF OSD-P OTI PACC PRT PSC
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APPENDIX D Strategy or Plan Assessm
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Organization Lead Agency Mandate Hi
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APPENDIX F U.S. Support to Afghan G
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ENDNOTES 1 Ryan Crocker, SIGAR inte
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34 OECD Development Assistance Coun
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65 Fishstein and Wilder, Winning He
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101 Joint Staff, Joint and Coalitio
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148 Dressler, Counterinsurgency in
Page 122 and 123:
192 NSC, White Paper on the Interag
Page 124 and 125:
235 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Afghanis
Page 126 and 127:
284 Department of the Treasury, “
Page 128 and 129:
Transition to Transformation, July
Page 130 and 131:
368 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the
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411 Torabi, email to SIGAR, March 5
Page 134 and 135:
463 Congressional Research Service,
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525 U.S. Embassy Kabul, U.S. Govern
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586 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Update o
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633 DOD, Report on Progress toward
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SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY Afghan Research
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Century Foundation. Afghanistan: Ne
Page 146 and 147:
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
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Human Rights Watch. Blood-Stained H
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Koumans, Mark. Testimony before the
Page 152 and 153:
Pritchett, Lant, Michael Woolcock,
Page 154 and 155:
Schmeidl, Susanne. “The Man Who W
Page 156 and 157:
Stanekzai, Mohammad M. “Afghanist
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U.S. Department of State, Office of
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United Nations Development Programm
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS SIGAR acknowledges
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SIGAR SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
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CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT

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