CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT

London, Kabul, and Tokyo Conferences Loosely Tie Aid to
Better Governance
At international conferences in London and Kabul in 2010 and Tokyo in 2012,
donors committed to sustain high levels of funding in return for commitments
by the Afghan government on governance and economic reform, to include
fighting corruption. 449 Donors pledged to align 80 percent of their funding with
GIROA development priorities (as articulated in National Priority Programs),
and to work toward directing 50 percent of their assistance on-budget. These
funding commitments represented a soft form of conditionality, allowing donors
flexibility in their assessments of GIROA’s progress toward its commitments. 450
The 2012 Tokyo Conference produced a more detailed Tokyo Mutual
Accountability Framework (TMAF) for tracking progress on mutual
commitments. TMAF represented an evolution in incentivizing Afghan
accountability by establishing more specific conditions for assistance. The
framework laid out indicators for monitoring the Afghan government’s
performance in five major areas of development and governance. Several of the
indicators were anticorruption-related, including annual asset declarations of
senior public officials, asset recovery and accountability related to the Kabul
Bank crisis, strengthened banking supervision, and greater accountability and
transparency in customs and tax systems. 451
In a Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) in July 2013, the United States announced
an “incentive fund” of $175 million in assistance over two years, of which
$75 million was tied to progress in TMAF benchmarks. 452 Of the $75 million,
$15 million was later made available to the Afghan government due to progress
in elections-related benchmarks, which was the priority area donors stressed
at the SOM. 453 Another $15 million was disbursed because GIROA developed
a draft provincial budgeting policy. However, progress in the other three
TMAF areas—governance, rule of law, and human rights; integrity of public
finance and commercial banking; and inclusive and sustained growth and
development—was deemed insufficient to disburse the remaining $45 million. 454
Anticorruption‐related benchmarks fell mainly within the first two of these
three areas. Embassy Kabul judged that although the non-disbursed funds were
a small amount relative to total development assistance, “the government will
acutely feel the loss.” 455
Efforts to Improve Oversight of U.S. Assistance
During the 2010 to 2014 period, U.S. attempts to improve oversight of its own
contracting and procurement practices gained momentum. The main goals were
to prevent U.S. money from funding insurgent groups, stop U.S. practices from
creating opportunities for corruption, and safeguard U.S. resources.
DOD Initiatives
ISAF’s 2010 COIN Contracting Guidance called upon commanders to
understand how contracting with corrupt powerbrokers could undermine
the mission and to establish systems to vet contractors. It also directed
commanders to follow best contracting practices, ensure transparency and
accountability, and invest in oversight. 456
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