CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT

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463 Congressional Research Service, Wartime Contracting in Afghanistan, R42084, p. 10. Suspensions and debarments are “actions taken by U.S. agencies to exclude companies or individuals from receiving federal contracts or assistance because of misconduct.” They are considered an important tool for ensuring that agencies award contracts only to responsible entities. As of the end of December 2015, “the efforts of SIGAR to utilize suspension and debarment to address fraud, corruption, and poor performance in Afghanistan [had] resulted in a total of 129 suspensions, 374 finalized debarments, and 28 special entity designations of individuals and companies engaged in U.S. funded reconstruction projects.” (SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 30, 2016, pp. 36-37.) 464 Joint Staff, Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, Operationalizing Counter/Anticorruption Study, p. 27. 465 Berthold, SIGAR interview, October 6, 2015. 466 GAO, Afghanistan: U.S. Efforts to Vet Non-U.S. Vendors, GAO-11-355, p. 14. 467 Ibid, pp. 14-16. 468 DOD, response to SIGAR data call, December 2, 2015, pp. 5-6. 469 Ibid, p. 6. 470 SIGAR, Contracting with the Enemy, SIGAR 13-6-AR, p. 2. 471 Ibid, p. 4. 472 Ibid, p. 8. 473 Task Force 2010 member, SIGAR interview, March 7, 2016; former USAID vendor vetting official, SIGAR interview, December 8, 2015. 474 Former Task Force 2010 member in Kabul, SIGAR interview, October 6, 2015; Task Force 2010 member, SIGAR interview, March 7, 2016; Creal, SIGAR interview, March 23, 2016. 475 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Proposed USAID/Kabul Vetting Support Unit,” Kabul 372 cable, January 22, 2011. 476 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Establishing Greater Acquisition Accountability in Afghanistan,” Kabul 2058 cable, April 9, 2011. 477 State Department, “Cooperation to Achieve Greater Assistance Oversight,” State 45622 cable, May 11, 2011. 478 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Accountable Assistance for Afghanistan (A 3 ): Corrected Copy 2,” Kabul 4054 cable, July 5, 2011. 479 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Proposed USAID/Kabul Vetting,” Kabul 372 cable, January 22, 2011; U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Accountable Assistance,” Kabul 4054 cable, July 5, 2011. 480 USAID, email to SIGAR, June 28, 2016. 481 GAO, Afghanistan: U.S. Efforts to Vet Non-U.S. Vendors, GAO-11-355, p. 20; former USAID vendor vetting official, SIGAR interview, December 8, 2015. 482 Former USAID vendor vetting official, SIGAR interview, December 8, 2015. 483 GAO, Afghanistan: U.S. Efforts to Vet Non-U.S. Vendors, GAO-11-355, pp. 15, 25-26. 484 Dixon, email to SIGAR, March 7, 2016. 485 Senior State Department official, SIGAR interview, January 14, 2016; Crocker, SIGAR interview, January 11, 2016. 486 Meyer, email to SIGAR, March 6, 2016; Dixon, email to SIGAR, March 7, 2016. 487 DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2015, pp. 1-2. 488 Emma Graham-Harrison, “Ashraf Ghani: the intellectual president who can now put theory into practice,” Guardian, September 26, 2014. 489 The Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2015: Survey of the Afghan People, November, 2015, p. 10; Transparency International and Integrity Watch Afghanistan, National Integrity System Assessment: Afghanistan 2015, 2015, p. 14. 122 SIGAR I CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT I SEPTEMBER 2016
490 World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators: Afghanistan, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/ reports.aspx?source=Worldwide-Governance-Indicators (accessed March 17, 2016). 491 Crocker, SIGAR interview, January 11, 2016. 492 Ashraf Ghani, “Afghan President Ashraf Ghani Address to Joint Meeting of Congress,” Washington, DC, March 25, 2015, http://www.rs.nato.int/article/transcripts/afghan-president-ashraf-ghani-addressto-joint-meeting-of-congress.html (accessed July 27, 2016). 493 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 30, 2014, p. 66. 494 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 30, 2015, pp. 56, 60. 495 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 30, 2016, pp. 150, 153. 496 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 30, 2016, pp. 144-145, 154; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 30, 2015, p. 156. 497 Crocker, SIGAR interview, January 11, 2016. 498 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 30, 2016, p. 187; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 30, 2014, p. 202-3; World Bank, World Development Indicators: GDP at market prices, World Bank Databank. 499 Hussman, Working towards common donor responses to corruption, p. 3; see also Suhrke, When More is Less, p. 119, which cites an IMF calculation of foreign aid to Afghanistan in FY 2009-2010 as equivalent to 49.5 percent of GDP (IMF, Sixth Review Under the Arrangement Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, IMF Country Report No. 10/22, January 2010, p. 19). The Hussman report does not define “international assistance.” 500 USAID, Assessment of Corruption in Afghanistan. 501 Ibid, p. 1. 502 Ibid, p. 28. 503 Ibid, pp. 26-27. 504 Ibid. 505 Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Anticorruption Action Plan for Afghanistan, May 21, 2009. 506 Ibid, p. 1. 507 Ibid. 508 Ibid, pp. 1-2. 509 Ibid, p. 1. 510 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Supporting COIN—Increasing Access to Justice in Afghanistan,” Kabul 1573 cable, June 20, 2009, p. 1. 511 Ibid, p. 1. 512 Ibid. 513 Ibid, p. 4. 514 Ibid, p. 1. 515 U.S. Embassy Kabul and USFOR-A, The U.S. Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan, August 2009. 516 Ibid, p. i. 517 Ibid, p. 1. 518 Ibid, pp. 5, 7-8, and 13. 519 Ibid, title page. 520 State Department, U.S. Government Rule of Law Strategy for Afghanistan, September 2009. 521 SIGAR, Rule of Law in Afghanistan, SIGAR 15-68-AR, p. i. 522 State Department, U.S. Government Rule of Law Strategy for Afghanistan, September 2009, p. 1. 523 Ibid, pp. 6-7; SIGAR, Rule of Law in Afghanistan, SIGAR 15-68-AR, p. 5. 524 State Department, U.S. Government Rule of Law Strategy for Afghanistan, September 2009, p. 1. SIGAR I CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT I SEPTEMBER 2016 123
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Special Inspector General for Afgha
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Special Inspector General for Afgha
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TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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ILLUSTRATIONS FIGURES FIGURE 1: Sha
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In the early years of the reconstru
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Recommendations To address corrupti
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1. Corruption undermined the U.S. m
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large sums of money. For example, a
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Corruption Has Increased from Pre-2
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capacity, legislative and regulator
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dynamic we have to change if we wan
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in corruption. 58 Afghans also witn
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ISAF Public Affairs photo PART ONE
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checkpoints, activities which they
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usinesses that served the internati
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for the long-term threat that corru
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combat corruption globally, which i
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opium when they raided the governor
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measurable benchmarks and target da
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While certain individuals and offic
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that Afghan leaders were not commit
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U.S. government documents increasin
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the state’s legitimacy and capabi
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and helping to fund the enemy. The
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would benefit from an approved stra
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fundamental flaw: The Afghan govern
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By the time of Salehi’s arrest an
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U.S. Marine Corps photo PART THREE
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and partners, other countries in th
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BOX 2: ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY In the d
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Capacity-building efforts would be
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“The international community held
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success, due in part to unwillingne
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ability to conduct robust oversight
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The story elicited a sharp congress
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London, Kabul, and Tokyo Conference
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officials. The task force member no
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These cancelled or forestalled cont
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a desire to tackle corruption and a
Page 84 and 85: These findings underscore that the
Page 87 and 88: LESSONS USAID/Afghanistan photo Bas
Page 89 and 90: eport, international assistance acc
Page 91: in Afghanistan failed to address th
Page 94 and 95: This legislation should: • Requir
Page 96 and 97: Intelligence agencies should: • C
Page 98 and 99: 10. The State Department should pla
Page 100 and 101: the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, which wa
Page 102 and 103: APPENDIX B ABBREVIATIONS 4A Assista
Page 104 and 105: ODA OECD OEF OSD-P OTI PACC PRT PSC
Page 106 and 107: APPENDIX D Strategy or Plan Assessm
Page 108 and 109: Organization Lead Agency Mandate Hi
Page 110 and 111: APPENDIX F U.S. Support to Afghan G
Page 112 and 113: ENDNOTES 1 Ryan Crocker, SIGAR inte
Page 114 and 115: 34 OECD Development Assistance Coun
Page 116 and 117: 65 Fishstein and Wilder, Winning He
Page 118 and 119: 101 Joint Staff, Joint and Coalitio
Page 120 and 121: 148 Dressler, Counterinsurgency in
Page 122 and 123: 192 NSC, White Paper on the Interag
Page 124 and 125: 235 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Afghanis
Page 126 and 127: 284 Department of the Treasury, “
Page 128 and 129: Transition to Transformation, July
Page 130 and 131: 368 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the
Page 132 and 133: 411 Torabi, email to SIGAR, March 5
Page 136 and 137: 525 U.S. Embassy Kabul, U.S. Govern
Page 138 and 139: 586 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Update o
Page 140 and 141: 633 DOD, Report on Progress toward
Page 142 and 143: SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY Afghan Research
Page 144 and 145: Century Foundation. Afghanistan: Ne
Page 146 and 147: Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Page 148 and 149: Human Rights Watch. Blood-Stained H
Page 150 and 151: Koumans, Mark. Testimony before the
Page 152 and 153: Pritchett, Lant, Michael Woolcock,
Page 154 and 155: Schmeidl, Susanne. “The Man Who W
Page 156 and 157: Stanekzai, Mohammad M. “Afghanist
Page 158 and 159: U.S. Department of State, Office of
Page 160 and 161: United Nations Development Programm
Page 162 and 163: ACKNOWLEDGMENTS SIGAR acknowledges
Page 164: SIGAR SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
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CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT

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