CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT

HOO director and deputy director claimed involved embezzlement, forgery,
and bribes ranging from $1,000 to more than $100 million that implicated
sitting ministers. 400 In other cases, the lack of training, resources, security,
and expertise undermined the effectiveness of judicial bodies. For example,
anticorruption tribunals established in Kabul and the provinces to hear
corruption cases ultimately proved ineffective due to these challenges. 401
Training and mentoring of Afghan justice sector officials was a significant part
of U.S. anticorruption efforts. 402 DOJ’s Senior Federal Prosecutors Program
began mentoring a counternarcotics task force and later trained and advised the
AGO, ACU, MCTF, the Antiterrorism Prosecution Department (ATPD), and—to
a lesser extent—other justice sector elements of the Afghan government from
2005 to 2014, at a cost of nearly $23 million. 403 The program aimed to reform
Afghan criminal law and build the capacity of the ACU to effectively combat
public corruption. A 2014 SIGAR audit on rule of law efforts in Afghanistan
found DOJ officials noted anecdotally they had made some progress in building
the capacity of the ACU, but “their efforts … were eventually ignored due to
the Afghan government’s lack of political will to allow corruption cases to be
prosecuted.” 404 DOJ officials also cited the Karzai administration’s interference
in specific cases. Eventually, DOJ dramatically reduced its involvement with the
ACU and continued only minor activities. 405
The Supreme Court’s internal affairs unit, the Control and Monitoring
Department (CMD), was not directly supported by the United States but
was lauded for its effectiveness at times. 406 The unit served as the primary
oversight body for judges, court staff, and certain prosecutors. Embassy Kabul
reported that, despite challenges, the CMD was successful and exhibited “good
leadership and staff and a remarkable record in misconduct and corruption
cases involving judges.” 407 Between 2006 and 2011, the CMD oversaw
185 arrests and 795 disciplinary actions of judges and court staff. Of the
62 judges arrested, 50 were tried and convicted. Another 726 judges received
administrative reprimands or censure. 408 In 2012, the embassy reported
the CMD was “still the most effective governmental body in rooting out
corruption.” 409 Yet, the CMD never received formal mentoring from the United
States. A former Justice attaché in Kabul stated the CMD was successful
because its honest, capable director focused on low- to mid-level officials
rather than high-level cases that might draw political attention. The attaché
also believed the CMD benefitted from the absence of international advisors
interfering in its activities. 410
An Afghan anticorruption expert said that later, the CMD became known for
extorting money from judges and for its role in consolidating a corrupt network of
judges. The new chief justice dismantled the unit in 2015. 411
Financial Oversight
Most U.S. efforts on financial oversight from 2010 to 2014 were diplomatic,
not programmatic. Before the Kabul Bank scandal, USAID and Treasury had
provided technical assistance to the Central Bank’s Financial Supervision
Department. 412 The Kabul Bank crisis revealed grave weaknesses in the FSD’s
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SIGAR I CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT I SEPTEMBER 2016