CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT

The cable explained that some Afghans “imagine that the U.S. government and
coalition could use their considerable influence more forcefully to deal with
corrupt Afghan officials and their wrongdoing.” 115 Similarly, one of Ambassador
Ronald Neumann’s main recommendations to Washington at the end of his tenure
in 2007 was to push “the Afghan government harder on issues of corruption and
good governance.” 116
DOD officials also became more attuned to corruption as a threat to the success
of counterinsurgency operations in 2005 and 2006. Ambassador Neumann
reported that, during a December 2005 visit to Kabul, Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld noted that “Afghanistan was plagued by corruption and bad
governance.” 117 In the summer of 2006, a senior DOD official was tapped to
review U.S. policy in Afghanistan and assessed that corruption was feeding
a “crisis in governance.” 118 The official briefed Rumsfeld that corruption was now
a security issue:
Enormous popular discontent is building against corrupt and
ineffective governance, undermining Karzai’s political standing,
weakening the legitimacy of the new political order, and
creating a vacuum of power in the south and other areas that
the Taliban can exploit. 119
The official claimed that a consensus existed “among key Afghan leaders and
international officials on the nature of the problem.” The brief given to Rumsfeld
described current reform efforts and further actions needed to monitor the
performance of local and national government bodies and prosecute “selected bad
actors—abusive police chiefs, spoilers, and officials involved in the drug trade—
as an example to others.” The brief also called for the United States to assume a
“de facto lead role” in mobilizing a comprehensive judicial reform program. 120
Shortly thereafter, in December 2006, the U.S. Army issued Field Manual 3-24,
Counterinsurgency, known as the COIN manual. This publication explicitly aimed
to offer principles and guidelines for forces fighting insurgencies in Afghanistan
and Iraq. 121 The manual stated, “The primary objective of any COIN operation is
to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government.” 122
It repeatedly warned that corruption threatens counterinsurgency efforts by
eroding public trust in the host nation government and thus undermining the
state’s legitimacy. The doctrine detailed several historical examples where
corruption had posed a serious and even fatal threat to COIN efforts: Chiang
Kai-shek’s counterinsurgency against Mao Zedong in China, the British
counterinsurgency in Malaysia, and the U.S.-trained South Vietnamese military. 123
In addition, the COIN manual noted that weak oversight could undermine the
mission, calling for commanders to “supervise contracted personnel to ensure
they do not undermine achieving COIN objectives.” 124
At USAID, concerns about corruption in Afghanistan also rose during this
time. In 2004, the agency undertook a comprehensive assessment of Afghan
corruption, which the embassy described as informing USAID anticorruption
programming. 125 In early 2005, USAID headquarters articulated a new strategy to
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SIGAR I CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT I SEPTEMBER 2016