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213 McChrystal, COMISAF’s Initial Assessment, p. [2-9]; U.S. Embassy Kabul, “2007 in Review,” Kabul 71
cable, January 7, 2008, pp. 2, 5; U.S. Embassy Kabul, “PRT Badghis,” Kabul 5180 cable, December 20,
2005, pp. 2-4; Congressional Research Service, Wartime Contracting in Afghanistan: Analysis and
Issues for Congress, R42084, November 4, 2011, p. 6.
214 Ladbury, Testing Hypotheses on Radicalisation in Afghanistan, p. 7. According to the U.S.
Department of State, Hezb-i Islami is “a political and paramilitary organization in Afghanistan
founded in 1976 by Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.” An offshoot called Hezb-i Islami
Gulbuddin (HIG) has “espoused virulently anti-U.S. ideologies, and supports making Afghanistan
an Islamic state rooted in sharia.” (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Media
Note: Rewards for Justice–Reward Offers for Information on Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)
Terrorists, February 26, 2015.)
215 Martine van Bijlert, Who Controls the Vote? Afghanistan’s Evolving Elections, Afghan Analyst
Network, May 2010, pp. 1, 6.
216 Pamela Constable, “Abdullah withdraws from Afghan runoff election,” Washington Post, November
2, 2009; see also Democracy International, U.S. Election Observation Mission to the Afghanistan
Presidential and Provincial Council Elections 2009, revised and updated August 2010, p. 3; UN
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, “ECC Makes Decisions on Fraudulent Ballots and Complaints,”
October 20, 2009.
217 International Crisis Group, “Afghanistan: Elections and the Crisis of Governance,” Crisis Group Asia
Briefing No. 96, November 25, 2009, pp. 1-2; Noah Coburn and Anna Larson, “Electing the Peace?:
Afghanistan’s Fast-Track Democracy,” in Derailing Democracy in Afghanistan: Elections in an
Unstable Political Landscape (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2014), p. 156.
218 Chayes, SIGAR interview, May 26, 2015.
219 Combating Terrorism Archive Project, “Interview with Kirk Meyer”; former Deputy Director, Afghan
Threat Finance Cell, SIGAR interview, June 17, 2015.
220 Combating Terrorism Archive Project, “Interview with Kirk Meyer.”
221 Former Deputy Director, Afghan Threat Finance Cell, SIGAR interview, June 17, 2015; Combating
Terrorism Archive Project, “Interview with Kirk Meyer.”
222 Dexter Filkins, “The Afghan Bank Heist,” New Yorker, February 14, 2011; former Deputy Director,
Afghan Threat Finance Cell, SIGAR interview, June 17, 2015.
223 Combating Terrorism Archive Project, “Interview with Kirk Meyer.”
224 McChrystal, COMISAF’s Initial Assessment, pp. [2-9], [2-10].
225 Former Deputy Director, Afghan Threat Finance Cell, SIGAR interview, June 17, 2015; Combating
Terrorism Archive Project, “Interview with Kirk Meyer.”
226 Combating Terrorism Archive Project, “Interview with Kirk Meyer.”
227 Ibid; see also Barnett Rubin, “What I Saw in Afghanistan,” New Yorker, July 1, 2015.
228 U.S. Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, p. [1-1].
229 U.S. Embassy Kabul and USFOR-A, The U.S. Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign
Plan for Support to Afghanistan, August 2009, p. 13.
230 McChrystal, COMISAF’s Initial Assessment, p. [2-5].
231 Ibid, p. [2-9]; see also DOD, Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, April
2010, p. 46.
232 McChrystal, COMISAF’s Initial Assessment, p. [2-10].
233 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for
Afghanistan and Pakistan,” March 27, 2009.
234 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Press Briefing by Bruce Riedel, Ambassador Richard
Holbrooke, and Michele Flournoy on the New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan,” March 27,
2009.
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