CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT

High-Water Mark for U.S. Anticorruption Efforts
An invigorated U.S. response to corruption arose from the increasing concern
in 2009–2010 that corruption posed a critical threat to core U.S. goals. The
White House, DOD, State, USAID, Justice, and Treasury became more engaged
on the issue and devoted more resources to it. 247 The agencies sought to tackle
corruption in different ways, but all broadly aimed to prevent funds from going to
the insurgency; boost the legitimacy and viability of the Afghan state; and improve
oversight of contracting and development assistance.
Strategies and Plans to Fight Corruption
Multiple strategies, each with elements related to anticorruption, were drafted in
2009 and 2010, as ISAF, USFOR-A, NSC, DOD, State, USAID, and NATO undertook
distinct but intertwined planning efforts. 248 Appendix D provides an overview
of the most relevant documents and their key proposed actions. The strategies
shared several broad themes:
• Building GIROA capacity to provide more transparent, accountable
governance and financial oversight, and to investigate and prosecute
corrupt officials
• Increasing political will to fight corruption and undertake reforms
• Supporting civil society and the media to increase popular demand for
combating corruption
• Ensuring contracting procedures do not facilitate or enable
corrupt activities 249
At the same time, the various strategy documents were generated at different
levels and by different actors, and were not unified or integrated. Embassy Kabul
set out to craft a comprehensive interagency anticorruption strategy.
The embassy’s April 2010 draft U.S. Government Anticorruption Strategy for
Afghanistan was the most thorough articulation of U.S. anticorruption goals to
date. It emphasized the points of agreement outlined above and, more specifically,
called for leveraging diplomatic, legal, and development assistance tools to
increase political will to fight corruption and support GIROA in implementing
its anticorruption strategy. The draft strategy urged U.S. support for reform
of the High Office of Oversight (GIROA’s anticorruption body) and addressed
U.S. oversight of contracting, calling for the reform of U.S. and ISAF contracting
procedures “to ensure they … are transparent, and do not fund the activities of
corrupt officials and powerbrokers.” 250 The strategy recommended reducing layers
of subcontracting, providing more direct grants to Afghan organizations, initiating
a “fair price” scheme, and barring firms controlled by corrupt individuals from
receiving U.S. government contracts. 251
Despite grave concerns about corruption during this time, State never approved
the embassy’s draft. A senior State Department official said the lack of an
approved strategy did not hinder U.S. anticorruption efforts at the time because,
in practice, the embassy used the draft strategy as authoritative guidance. 252
Nevertheless, a 2010 SIGAR report concluded that U.S. anticorruption efforts
SIGAR I CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT I SEPTEMBER 2016
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