CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT

Organization Lead Agency Mandate Highlights
CENTCOM Vendor
Vetting Cell (VVC) 562
USAID Vetting Support
Unit (VSU) 569
Combined Joint
Interagency Task
Force–Shafafiyat
(Shafafiyat) 576
Combined Joint
Interagency Task
Force–Afghanistan
(CJIATF-A) 581
Rule of Law and
Law Enforcement
Directorate (ROL/LE) 586
DOD 563
USAID 570
DOD, ISAF 577
DOD, ISAF 582
State (embassy offices) INL,
DOJ, FBI, DEA, DHS, U.S.
Marshals Service, and Rule
of Law and Anticorruption
elements of USAID; working
with USFOR-A and ISAF 587
To vet contract awards to non-
U.S. vendors in Afghanistan
and Iraq, with the aim of
minimizing the risk “that
insurgents or criminal groups
could use U.S. contracting
funds to finance their
operations” 564
To vet prospective non-
U.S. contract and assistance
recipients (i.e., implementing
partners) in Afghanistan
with the aim of countering
“potential risks of U.S.
funds being diverted to
support criminal or insurgent
activity” 571
To promote a common
understanding of the
corruption problem, plan and
implement anticorruption
efforts, and integrate
USFOR-A anticorruption
activities with those of key
partners 578
To synchronize and focus
strategic counter-corruption,
counternarcotics, counterthreat
finance, and “No
Contracting with the Enemy”
activities in order to deny
resources to malign actors
and enhance transparency
and accountability within
GIROA 583
To improve coordination
and substantially enhance
U.S. effectiveness in
supporting the Afghan
government’s provision of
fair, transparent, and efficient
justice 588
Start and
End Dates
Initially vetted vendors with August 2010
existing contracts. 565 GAO found to present 568
a growing backlog of unvetted
vendors, and weaknesses in the
failure to vet subcontractors. 566
The VVC later expanded its
capacity to vet, and identified a
greater percentage of vendors
as high risk, resulting in vendors
being prevented from receiving
U.S. funds and contracts. 567
Initially intended to ensure January 2011
U.S. funds did not support to present 575
corrupt powerbrokers, among
other bad actors. 572 A former
USAID vetting official said
the unit stopped vetting for
corruption after its first year. 573
A 2011 USAID mission order
established a vetting threshold
of $150,000. 574
Worked with Afghans and key
leaders to develop a common
understanding of the problem
as a basis for joint action.
Assessed that sustained
engagement generates the
political will necessary to
address the threats of corruption
and organized crime. 579
Created as an umbrella
organization. According to
DOD, by 2014, “personnel
turnover and bad organizational
changes (moving Shafafiyat from
CJIATF-A to CSTC-A/NTM-A) at
CJIATF-A made it an irrelevant
organization.” Under Resolute
Support, CJIATF-A dissolved and
Shafafiyat became Essential
Function 2 (Transparency,
September
2010 to
October
2014 580
October 2012
to October
2014 585
Accountability and Oversight). 584
Led all U.S. civilian and military 2010 to
rule of law programs, including 2013 592
anticorruption. 589 ROL/LE
was also meant to improve
civilian-military coordination of
justice sector assistance. 590 A
reorganization in 2011 created
the Interagency Rule of Law
Office (IROL), which was then
merged in 2013 under another
office. 591
96 SIGAR I CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT I SEPTEMBER 2016