CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT

172 Robert Lamb and Kathryn Mixon, Rethinking Absorptive Capacity: A New Framework Applied to
Afghanistan’s Police Training Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2013,
pp. v, 50.
173 U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Afghanistan—JCMB VII Discusses an Integrated Strategy and Counter-
Narcotics February 5 and 6, 2008,” Kabul 461 cable, February 25, 2008, pp. 2, 7; Joint Coordination
and Monitoring Board, Report to JCMB VII, 7th JCMB Meeting, February 6, 2008, pp. 10, 13; Thomas
Ruttig, “A meaningful Afghanistan conference needs civil society involvement,” Afghanistan Analysts
Network, November 25, 2009, pp. 1-2.
174 Hussmann, Working towards common donor responses to corruption, p. 4.
175 Carter and Clark, No Shortcut to Stability, p. vii-ix; Transparency International, Corruption: Lessons
from the International Mission in Afghanistan, February 2015, pp. 30–31; Sarah Chayes, Senior
Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, SIGAR interview, May 26, 2015.
176 ADB, DFID, UNDP, et al., Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan, February 16, 2007, p. 1.
177 Ibid, pp. 14-17.
178 Ibid, p. 2. Vulnerability to Corruption Assessments (VCA) are conducted by many U.S. and
international agencies and donors. The purpose is to develop “concrete insights regarding forms
of corruption, sources, implications, extent, and vulnerabilities to corruption in particular sectors,
agencies, and functions in order to develop practical prevention measures.” (World Bank, Fighting
Corruption in Afghanistan: Summaries of VCAs, May 2009, p. 5.)
179 UNDP, Institutional Arrangement for Combatting Corruption in Afghanistan: Analysis and
Recommendations, Preliminary Report and Final Draft, February 9, 2007, p. 10; High Office
of Oversight and Anticorruption, “About Corruption,” http://anti-corruption.gov.af/en/page/1736
(accessed August 2, 2016); Civil-Military Fusion Centre, Corruption and Anticorruption Issues in
Afghanistan, February 2012, p. 10.
180 GIROA, Strategy and Policy for Anticorruption and Administrative Reform, March 2008, p. 7;
UNDP, Anticorruption Strategies: What Works, What Doesn’t and Why?, 2014, p. 58.
181 Yama Torabi, committee member of the Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and
Evaluation Committee (MEC) and former executive director of Integrity Watch Afghanistan, email to
SIGAR, March 5, 2015.
182 Former NSC Senior Director for Afghanistan (2007-2009), email to SIGAR, March 3, 2016.
183 Hussmann, Working towards common donor responses to corruption, pp. 1, 6.
184 Ibid, p. 1; former senior UN official, SIGAR interview, August 26, 2015.
185 Hussmann, Working towards common donor responses to corruption, p. 1.
186 Dipali Mukhopadhyay, Warlords as Bureaucrats – The Afghan Experience, Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, August 2009, p. 2.
187 ADB, DFID, UNDP, et al., Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan, February 16, 2007, pp. 14-17; U.S.
Embassy Kabul, “Afghanistan—JCMB VII,” Kabul 461 cable, February 25, 2008, p. 7.
188 Defense Intelligence Agency, Charts for SIGAR: Violence by Province 2002 to 2014, FDO 10695-15,
provided to SIGAR on April 29, 2015.
189 Congressional Research Service, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror
Operations Since 9/11, RL33110, December 8, 2014, pp. 82, 84.
190 Brookings Institution, Afghanistan Index: Tracking Progress and Security in Post-9/11
Afghanistan, March 31, 2016, pp. 5-6.
191 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for
Afghanistan and Pakistan,” March 27, 2009; Defense Casualty Systems Analysis (DCAS), “Conflict
Casualties, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Casualties By Month,” U.S. Department of Defense,
updated February 8, 2016, https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/pages/report_oef_month.xhtml (accessed
August 2, 2016).
SIGAR I CORRUPTION IN CONFLICT I SEPTEMBER 2016
109