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Education Systems: Assignment, Admissions, Accountability, Autonomy 185 4.3.3 Education Market Structure: Policy Summary Two notes of caution are needed before offering a policy summary. As has been evident throughout this chapter, much of the research in the economics of education is about policy. However, it should be clear that we are nowhere near, for example, an engineering level of precision in policy discussion. An engineer could say ‘if you want the bridge x% longer it will need y% more concrete and be subject to z% more stress’. As education economists we cannot equivalently say: ‘if you reduce the schools budget by x% by raising class sizes and put that money into y% more child care, then end-of-schooling attainment will rise by z%’. Secondly, European countries differ in very many ways, including in their education systems, 4 both in terms of the overall system and in the detail, so it is impossible to describe the ways in which specific policies might work in each country. This is the industrial organization approach to schools, determining the market rules and the market incentives. There are a number of interlocking factors that create an effective school system. Accountability matters for schools’ performance, even relatively low-stakes accountability (Reis et al., 2015). Accountability requires some common and consistent form of assessment, typically centralized external exit exams. Accountability also makes more sense if schools have autonomy in their operations. All of these factors have been robustly shown to raise school performance and pupil attainment. Such a policy also leads to a focus on two other things. First, if schools are held to account on a specific assessment basis, then this is undoubtedly what schools will focus on. So governments need to take care that the assessment is well designed, and that it does indeed test the skills that society wants pupils to have. Teaching to the test is detrimental if a test is badly designed. Second, publication of rankings showing schools are better performing can in principle increase socio-economic sorting of pupils, though the evidence on this is mixed. Whether it does so depends on the admissions process to schools and whether this is manipulable by parents. While the broad characteristics of a successful market structure are reasonably clear, the details of any implementation will vary according to existing institutional arrangements. Acknowledgements I would like to thank a number of people for their comments and suggestions. Most thanks of all to Susanna Loeb, who was particularly helpful and made a number of great suggestions to improve the first draft. Many thanks also to Paolo Battaglia, Lex Borghans, Gabriella Conti, Neil Davies, Matt Dickson, Emla Fitzsimons, Robin Naylor, Kjell Salvanes, Ismael Sanz, Paolo Sestito, Helen Simpson, Eleanor Stringer and Anna Vignoles. I would also like to thank
186 Simon Burgess Julia Belau, Marc Ivaldi and Wolfgang Leininger for comments and for organizational support. All errors and omissions are my own. Notes 1. The full review is available at http://www.coeure.eu/wp-content/uploads/Human- Capital-and-education.pdf; for space reasons, only a portion can be included here. 2. See https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/fpfis/mwikis/eurydice/index.php/Countries for levels of devolution. 3. ET2020; http://ec.europa.eu/education/policy/strategic-framework/index_en.htm. 4. See https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/fpfis/mwikis/eurydice/index.php/Countries. References Aakvik, A., Salvanes, K., and Vaage, K. 2010. Measuring Heterogeneity in the Returns to Education Using an Education Reform. European Economic Review, 54, 483– 500. Abdulkadiroğlu, A., and Sonmez, T. 2003. School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach. American Economic Review, 93, 729–747. Abdulkadiroğlu, A., Pathak, P., Roth, A. E., and Sonmez, T. 2005a. The Boston Public School Match. American Economic Review, 95, 368–71. Abdulkadiroğlu, A., Pathak, P. A., and Roth, A. E. 2005b. The New York City High School Match. American Economic Review, 95, 364–367. Abdulkadiroğlu, A., Angrist, J., Dynarski, S., Kane, T., and Pathak, P. 2009a. Accountability and Flexibility in Public Schools: Evidence From Boston’s Charters and Pilots. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 15549. Abdulkadiroğlu, A., Pathak, P. A., and Roth, A. E. 2009b. Strategyproofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match. American Economic Review, 99, 1954–1978. Abdulkadiroğlu, A., Angrist, J., Dynarski, S., Kane, T., and Pathak, P. 2011. Accountability and Flexibility in Public Schools: Evidence from Boston’s Charters and Pilots. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126, 699–748. Abdulkadiroğlu, A., Angrist, J., Hull, P., and Pathak, P. 2014. Charters without Lotteries: Testing Takeovers in New Orleans and Boston. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 20792. Ahlin, Å. 2003. Does School Competition Matter? Effects of a Large-scale School Choice Reform on Student Performance. Department of Economics, Uppsala University Working Paper No.2. Allen, R. 2010. Replicating Swedish ‘Free School’ Reforms in England. Research in Public Policy, 10. http://bristol.ac.uk/media-library/sites/cmpo/migrated/ documents/allen10.pdf. Allen, R. 2013. Measuring Foundation School Effectiveness using English Administrative Data, Survey Data and a Regression Discontinuity Design. Education Economics, 21, 431–446. Allen, R., and Burgess, S. 2011. Can School League Tables Help Parents Choose Schools? Fiscal Studies, 32, 245–261.
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Introduction Richard Blundell, Este
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634 Index Diversified Cities, 385 D
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