policymakers demonstrate

Competition and Regulation in Markets for Goods and Services 229
impacted by the web compared with southern European markets, while the UK will
have the largest proportion of web-impacted sales by 2020.
5. On recent issues in the development of digital markets, see also Ng (2014).
6. See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/20years/singlemarket20/facts-figures/
what-is-the-single-market_en.htm.
7. See http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/digital-single-market/index_en.htm.
8. Some first results would be expected in 2016 – http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
IP-15-4921_en.htm.
9. See Motta (2004) for an overview that connects the policy and the economic analysis
sides of this relation.
10. A case to be noted is Intel, which has been considered as a critical test for the EC
effects-based approach in abuse of dominance cases, as set out in its 2009 Guidelines.
This approach was in contrast to the prior case law which was form-based and
left little room for an analysis of the competitive nature of potentially exclusionary
conduct. In a key recent (June 2014) General Court judgment, the EC 2009 Intel
decision was confirmed. In particular, the 2009 decision had found the computerchip
producer to infringe competition rules by granting anti-competitive rebates to
computer manufacturers in an attempt to exclude its rival AMD from the market.
The General Court’s Intel judgment holds that the Commission rightly found that
the chip producer breached competition rules. Importantly, however, the judgment
also notes that the effects-based analysis was redundant given the particular form of
rebates used. Thus, from a policy perspective, the Court re-asserts the form-based
standard and finds that effects-based analysis is largely unnecessary for these types
of rebates. See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-416_en.htm.
11. There is now a number of high-quality competition policy textbooks and handbooks
with articles describing the progress in specific areas, see, for example, Buccirossi
(2008).
12. Some ‘hidden costs’ of free goods, and associated antitrust implications, are examined
in Gal and Rubinfeld (2015).
13. See, for example, Bolt and Chakravorti (2012).
14. See, for example, Garicano and Kaplan (2001) and Jullien (2012).
15. See, for example, Bajari and Hortaçsu (2004).
16. See Fudenberg and Villas-Boas (2006).
17. See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5323_en.htm.
18. In September 2014, the European Court of Justice upheld a 2007 decision by the
EC that MasterCard’s multilateral interchange fees on cross-border transactions
breached competition rules. Overall, through a sequence of decisions, caps have
been placed in EU Member States to interchange fees of 0.3 per cent of the value
of credit-card transactions and 0.2 per cent for debit-card transactions.
19. See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5166_en.htm.
20. See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5432_en.htm.
21. Broadcasters also have to take into account the applicable regulatory framework
beyond EU competition law when considering sales to consumers located elsewhere.
This includes, for online pay-TV services, relevant national copyright laws,
a matter related to EC’s proposal to modernize EU copyright rules, as part of its
Digital Single Market Strategy.
22. According to a statement in 2013 by FCO President Andreas Mundt, ‘Such clauses
make the market entry of new suppliers offering innovative services, such as