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440 Charles Brendon and Giancarlo Corsetti<br />

remain high at t + 1 – that is, the economic state remains ‘bad’ – π t+1 is likely<br />

to be lower for any given level of Y t+1 . Intuitively, an increase in productive<br />

potential reduces inflation pressure. But once more, lower expected inflation<br />

implies a higher real interest rate when the nominal rate is constrained at zero,<br />

and this serves to reduce aggregate demand.<br />

Eggertsson et al. (2014) calibrate their model to match salient features of<br />

the Eurozone economy, and find that the second of these effects dominates<br />

when the zero bound is binding. The long-run implications of structural reforms<br />

remain positive: output in reforming countries increases by as much as 5 per<br />

cent as a consequence, with positive spillovers additionally felt by the wider<br />

region. The short-run consequence, however, is a worsening of the recession.<br />

Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2014) place a slightly different emphasis on a<br />

similar result. They show that supply-side reforms can help the economy to<br />

emerge from a zero-bound trap, provided these reforms are only implemented<br />

after the zero bound has ceased to bind. This overcomes the negative pricing<br />

effect, so that current demand is affected only by an income effect. Here too,<br />

the lesson for policy design is that crucial attention must be given to pricing<br />

dynamics. There are beneficial effects to be had from structural reforms, just as<br />

there may be from lower labour income taxes, but these can easily be dominated<br />

if an effort is not made to offset deflationary consequences.<br />

10.4.7 Empirical Evidence on the ‘Expectations Channel’<br />

Coming in to the crises, very few economies had recent experience of the policy<br />

trade-offs implied at the zero bound, of the sort that could be brought to<br />

bear on the choice among alternative instruments. It is for this reason that<br />

much of the debate has centred around theoretical exercises. Wieland (2014)<br />

provides one of the few empirical attempts to understand whether the policy<br />

models – particularly the New Keynesian framework – make the right predictions.<br />

He studies the observed dynamics of output and inflation at the zero<br />

bound, based on a combination of post-2008 data from the US, Eurozone, UK,<br />

Canada and Sweden, and post-1995 data from Japan. His motivation is to investigate<br />

whether ‘negative supply shocks’ – that is, unanticipated reductions in<br />

economies’ productive potential – are expansionary at the zero lower bound.<br />

This is one of the counterintuitive predictions that emerges in the New Keynesian<br />

framework, and it operates for very similar reasons to those that mean<br />

structural reforms can be contractionary. A negative shock to an economy’s<br />

productive capacity, such as an earthquake or an oil price shock, will tend to<br />

reduce long-run income, and this ought to have a negative impact on aggregate<br />

demand. But at the same time there will be a positive effect on expected future<br />

inflation so long as the zero bound binds: for any given level of actual output,<br />

Y t+1 , a lower level of productive capacity will mitigate disinflationary pressure.<br />

Wieland (2014) shows that this pricing effect can dominate dynamics at the

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