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Developments in Data for Economic Research 593<br />

Auctions. In experimental auctions, one typically observes the winner’s curse<br />

in common value auctions, and overbidding in auctions where bidders’ values<br />

are privately known and unaffiliated.<br />

Social preferences. Participants do not simply care about their own earnings.<br />

Fairness, reciprocity motives and social image motivations also have an impact<br />

on their behaviour (see e.g., Fehr et al., 1998).<br />

Public goods. In games of voluntary provision of public good, participants<br />

typically start with a contribution level of 50 per cent of their endowment. This<br />

is followed by a decrease of the contributions to 10 per cent. If participants<br />

have the opportunity to punish each other at a personal cost, contributions start<br />

and stay at high levels because low contributions are sometimes punished, with<br />

important cultural variations (Herrmann et al., 2008).<br />

Monopoly. In experimental markets with a monopolist, the actual price<br />

demanded by the monopolist is below the monopoly price because buyers withhold<br />

demand, which disciplines the monopolist to lower prices.<br />

In all these cases the experiments were typically replicated 10–100 times,<br />

either as pure replications or with an initial replication followed by changes<br />

to the original design to test the robustness of the findings. A typical example<br />

is provided by the public good experiments, with and without punishment<br />

opportunities (see Herrmann et al., 2008).<br />

On the other hand, some experimental findings are not as robust, due to<br />

endogenous expectations, local norms, or other reasons. An example of this<br />

is provided by experimental financial markets. Some, but not all, of these<br />

markets experience price bubbles and, when bubbles occur, their size differs<br />

substantially.<br />

Lab experiments are also used in teaching economics. More and more introductory<br />

classes in economics use experiments to bring theoretical concepts like<br />

the impact of incentives, or market equilibration, or social dilemmas, to life.<br />

This increasing use of simple economic experiments arises from the fact that<br />

the results are reliable. The dependability of economic experiments is similar<br />

to other experimental demonstrations, such as visual illusions that are used to<br />

teach principles of perception in cognitive psychology, and chemical reactions<br />

used in basic chemistry. On the other hand, experimental economics still has<br />

limited influence on the core courses in economics graduate training. Even at<br />

institutions such as Caltech, where most economics faculty do some experiments,<br />

PhD students can graduate without knowing anything at all about the<br />

methods or findings.<br />

New Developments and Outlook for Lab Experiments<br />

A new development in lab experiments is the use of biomedical tools. This<br />

started with the use of eye-tracking tools and the measurement of response

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