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442 Charles Brendon and Giancarlo Corsetti<br />

transmission of fiscal policy. As discussed above, the New Keynesian mechanism<br />

adopted by Eggertsson (2011) and Christiano et al. (2011) posits that<br />

higher spending is associated with higher future inflation, which reduces the<br />

ex ante real interest rate and raises current output more than one-for-one with<br />

the increase in G t . Bahaj and Rendahl instead find evidence that unanticipated<br />

increases in government spending are associated with decreases in inflation.<br />

This means that the inflation expectations channel works against stabilization:<br />

the real interest rate is higher when future government spending is expected<br />

to be higher. Consequently, Bahaj and Rendahl show that the fiscal multipliers<br />

would be higher without the inflation expectations channel. Unlike Wieland<br />

(2014), these results do rely on data from periods when the zero bound was<br />

not binding, and for this reason they cannot be viewed as a direct contradiction<br />

to the New Keynesian mechanism. It is possible that expectations react<br />

differently during a liquidity trap, due to the role of monetary policy counteracting<br />

any fiscal stimulus. Nonetheless, strong evidence in favour of the New<br />

Keynesian mechanism remains notably absent.<br />

Given the central role of inflation expectations in the policy conclusions surveyed<br />

above, this is an area where further contributions are urgently needed. If<br />

it is the case that changes in inflation expectations do not deliver large inducements<br />

to spend, or if the empirical relationship between real economic developments<br />

and inflation expectations departs from the New Keynesian model,<br />

conclusions ranging from the size of the fiscal multipliers to the role of forward<br />

guidance will need to be rethought. This would not rule out the possibility<br />

of, for instance, fiscal multipliers being higher at the zero bound than during<br />

normal times, but it may have very important implications for the appropriate<br />

ranking of policies. When the inflation expectations channel is weak, forward<br />

guidance in particular does not appear such a useful option.<br />

10.5 Policies and Diagnoses of the Crisis<br />

In keeping with the bulk of the literature, our analysis so far has assumed that<br />

the main reason for nominal interest rates reaching their zero bound is an exogenous<br />

increase in the willingness of consumers to save. This is often interpreted<br />

as a reduction in the ‘natural’ real rate of interest that equates aggregate savings<br />

and aggregate investment in the economy, but it is unclear what economic<br />

phenomenon could be driving such a drop. A more recent literature has sought<br />

to account for this development in a more detailed manner.<br />

10.5.1 What Causes ‘Savings Shocks’?<br />

Work by Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2015) has formalized the idea that large increases<br />

in aggregate net savings rates could be driven by a need for households

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