policymakers demonstrate

216 Nikolaos Vettas
hardcore restriction is established, the agreement is presumptively both anticompetitive
and unjustifiable. Nevertheless, it is recognized that this double
presumption is rebuttable and the parties can bring forward evidence that the
positive effects of the agreement under examination outweigh the presumed
negative effects. Regarding minimum price and fixed price RPM, in particular,
the Guidelines offer a detailed exposition about evidence that could be put
forward in RPM cases. 41 However, a restriction on passive sales (responding
to ‘unsolicited’ requests from customers outside the specified territory or consumer
group) would be considered a hard-core restriction. Regarding selective
distribution, the BER allows suppliers to have a selective distribution system,
where distributors are selected according to some specified criteria. 42 On the
basis of academic research, many economists would not necessarily agree with
the approach taken by the EC Guidelines regarding the treatment of RPM and
would favour a less formalistic approach that recognizes efficiencies.
Perhaps one of the important areas where research can offer greater clarity is
the more detailed definition and study of online sales. Treating all online sales
as ‘passive’, and with restrictions on these not being allowed, the assessment of
practically any restriction of cross-border online sales is a one way street which
does not necessarily lead to a correct assessment. Resale price maintenance is
also an important topic for further research, with part of the relevant economic
approaches not being always aligned with the direction of the Guidelines or
with some recent policy practice. Naturally, especially with the presence of
both online and offline sales, when competition is examined, it is also important
to examine the relevant investment incentives by the suppliers, since quality
improvement may often be at least as important an issue as pricing.
5.4 Recent Research on Competition Issues Related
to Digital Markets
Some recent work specifically considers the effects that the ability to price discriminate
or restrictions to this ability (because of strategic or regulatory reasons)
may have on markets with vertical relations. In particular, Edelman and
Wright (2015) examine the implications of ‘price coherence’, the constraint that
the purchase from an intermediary has to occur at the same price as the purchase
of the same good directly from the initial supplier or through some alternative,
competing, intermediary. This pricing practice is often used in payment card
systems, travel reservation systems, rebate services and other related services.
It differs from some other vertical restraints like RPM. RPM would restrict the
absolute prices (not necessarily at the same level for every intermediary), while
price coherence restricts relative price differences.
In the Edelman and Wright (2015) model, an intermediary provides a benefit
to buyers when they purchase from sellers using the intermediary’s technology,