Technical Provisions for Mode S Services and Extended Squitter

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DRAFT - Working Paper ASP TSGWP11-01 for review by the TSG during the meeting in June 2011 in Paris B-16 Technical Provisions for Mode S Services and Extended Squitter Coding Meaning 0 1 The barometric altitude that is being reported in the Airborne Position Message is based on a Gilham coded input that has not been cross-checked against another source of pressure-altitude. The barometric altitude that is being reported in the Airborne Position Message is either based on a Gilham code input that has been cross-checked against another source of pressure-altitude and verified as being consistent, or is based on a non-Gilham coded source. Note 1.— The barometric altitude value itself is conveyed within the ADS-B Position Message. Note 2.— The NICBARO subfield provides a method of indicating a level of data integrity for aircraft installed with Gilham encoding barometric altitude sources. Because of the potential of an undetected error when using a Gilham encoded altitude source, a comparison shall be performed with a second source and only if the two sources agree shall the NICBARO subfield be set to a value of “1”. For other barometric altitude sources (Synchro or DADS) the integrity of the data is indicated with a validity flag or SSM. No additional checks or comparisons are necessary. For these sources the NICBARO subfield shall be set to a value of “1” whenever the barometric altitude is valid. Note 3.— The use of Gilham type altimeters is strongly discouraged because of the potential for undetected altitude errors. B.2.3.9.14 SURVEILLANCE INTEGRITY LEVEL (SIL) This 2-bit (ME bits 45 — 46, message bits 77 — 78) subfield shall be used to define the probability of the integrity containment region described by the NIC subfield being exceeded for the selected position source, including any external signals used by the source. The SIL subfield shall be encoded as specified in the following table. If an update has not been received from an on-board data source for SIL within the past 5 seconds, then the SIL subfield shall be encoded as a value indicating “Unknown.” Draft The probability specified by the SIL subfield shall be the largest likelihood of any one of the following occurring when a valid geometric position is provided by the selected position source: a. a position source equipment malfunction (per hour), b. the per sample probability of a position source error larger than the horizontal or vertical integrity containment region associated with the NIC value(s), or, c. for GNSS, the probability of the signal-in-space causing a position error larger than the horizontal or vertical containment region associated with the NIC value(s) without an indication (see Note 1 below the table), within a time period determined by the positioning source, as indicated in the table. DRAFT - Working Paper ASP TSGWP11-01 for review by the TSG during the meeting in June 2011 in Paris
Appendix B B-17 Coding (Binary) (Decimal) Probability of exceeding the Horizontal Containment Radius (RC) reported in the NIC Subfield without an indication Probability of exceeding the Vertical Integrity Containment Region (VPL) without an indication 00 0 Unknown Unknown 01 1 10 2 11 3 DRAFT - Working Paper ASP TSGWP11-01 for review by the TSG during the meeting in June 2011 in Paris ≤1 × 10 –3 per flight hour or per sample ≤1 × 10 –5 per flight hour or per sample ≤1 × 10 –7 per flight hour or per sample ≤1 × 10 –3 per flight hour or per sample ≤1 × 10 –5 per flight hour or per sample ≤2 × 10 –7 per 150 seconds or per sample Note 1.— “An Indication” may include, for example, a flag for invalid position report, or a change in NIC, or switching to another data source. Note 2.— A problem for installations that include currently available GNSS receivers and FMS systems is that SIL is not output by these systems. Most implementers are expected to determine SIL by off-line analysis of the installed configuration. This off-line analysis can be performed on the various primary and alternate means of determining the reported position. SIL is a static value for each of these configurations. Note 3.— The vertical integrity containment column only applies to NIC values greater than 8. Note 4.— The SIL code value is the lower of the horizontal or vertical coding values. Note 5.— It is recognized that there are three possible derivations of SIL: (a) the integrity value provided by navigation sensors with self-monitoring capability (e.g., GPS), (b) the reliability of aircraft systems given as indicated by a failure rate commensurate with the equipment design assurance, and (c) the integrity of other navigation systems, (e.g., RNP) that rely on ground-based self-monitoring equipment for integrity assurance, and for which no specific hourly integrity value can be ascribed. These three values are not readily interchangeable. Selection of the largest of the values as specified in the table above is felt to provide a reasonable bound on the order of magnitude of the probability of possible failures affecting ADS-B applications. Draft Note 6.— GNSS systems report integrity in terms of flight hours and FMS systems report in terms of per measurement sample (derived from a number of position measurements). While these are not equivalent measures of integrity, the difference is not considered to be critical for initial applications. B.2.3.9.14.1 Recommendations. — 1. SIL is intended to reflect the integrity of the navigation source of the position information broadcast, therefore the SIL value transmitted should be indicative of the true integrity of the ADS-B position data. 2. If SIL information is not provided by the navigation source, implementers should not arbitrarily set a SIL value of zero indicating unknown integrity. 3. Unless there is a tightly coupled navigation source where SIL can be unambiguously determined and set dynamically, the ADS-B Transmitting Subsystem should provision for the static setting of SIL as part of the installation procedure. DRAFT - Working Paper ASP TSGWP11-01 for review by the TSG during the meeting in June 2011 in Paris
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Msg Bit # “ME” Bit # Appendix C
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Appendix CD CD-3 ACTIONS EVENTS DRA
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Technical Provisions for Mode S Services and Extended Squitter

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