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Technical Provisions for Mode S Services and Extended Squitter

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DRAFT - Working Paper ASP TSGWP11-01 <strong>for</strong> review by the TSG during the meeting in June 2011 in Paris<br />

Appendix C C-37<br />

The “System Design Assurance” (SDA) subfield is a 2-bit (“ME” bits 31 – 32, Message bits 63 – 64) field that<br />

shall define the failure condition that the position transmission chain is designed to support as defined in<br />

Table C-32.<br />

The supported failure condition shall indicate the probability of a position transmission chain fault causing<br />

false or misleading in<strong>for</strong>mation to be transmitted. The definitions <strong>and</strong> probabilities associated with the<br />

supported failure effect are defined in AC 25.1309-1A, AC 23-1309-1C, <strong>and</strong> AC 29-2C. All relevant systems<br />

attributes should be considered including software <strong>and</strong> complex hardware in accordance with RTCA DO-<br />

178B (EUROCAE ED-12B) or RTCA DO-254 (EUROCAE ED-80).<br />

Table A-32. “System Design Assurance” OM Subfield in Aircraft Operational Status<br />

Messages<br />

SDA Value Supported Probability of Undetected Fault Software & Hardware<br />

(decimal<br />

)<br />

(binary)<br />

Failure<br />

Note 2<br />

Condition<br />

causing transmission of False or<br />

Note 3,4<br />

Misleading In<strong>for</strong>mation<br />

Design Assurance<br />

Note 1,3<br />

Level<br />

0 00<br />

Unknown/ No<br />

safety effect<br />

> 1x10 -3 per flight hour<br />

or Unknown<br />

N/A<br />

1 01 Minor ≤ 1x10 -3 per flight hour D<br />

2 10 Major ≤ 1x10 -5 per flight hour C<br />

3 11 Hazardous ≤ 1x10 -7 per flight hour B<br />

Notes.—<br />

1. Software Design Assurance per RTCA DO-178B (EUROCAE ED-12B). Airborne Electronic Hardware<br />

Design Assurance per RTCA DO-254 (EUROCAE ED-80).<br />

2. Supported Failure Classification defined in AC-23.1309-1D, AC-25.1309-1A, AC-27-1B <strong>and</strong> AC 29-2C.<br />

3. Because the broadcast position can be used by any other ADS-B equipped aircraft or by ATC, the<br />

provisions in AC 23-1309-1D that allow reduction in failure probabilities <strong>and</strong> design assurance level <strong>for</strong><br />

aircraft under 6000 pounds do not apply.<br />

4. Includes probability of transmitting false or misleading latitude, longitude, or associated accuracy <strong>and</strong><br />

integrity metrics.<br />

C.2.3.10.15 SIL Supplement<br />

The “SIL Supplement” (Source Integrity Level Supplement) subfield is a 1-bit (“ME” bit 8, Message bit 40)<br />

field that shall define whether the reported SIL probability is based on a “per hour” probability or a “per<br />

sample” probability as defined in §C.2.3.9.2 <strong>and</strong> Table C-6.<br />

Draft<br />

C.2.3.10.16 TCAS/ACAS Operational<br />

The “TCAS/ACAS Operational” subfield (“ME” bit 11, Message bit 43) of the CC Codes subfield in ADS-B<br />

Aircraft Operational Status Messages (TYPE=31, SUBTYPE=0, <strong>for</strong> airborne participants) is used to indicate<br />

whether the TCAS/ACAS System is Operational or not, <strong>and</strong> remains as defined <strong>for</strong> use in the Target State<br />

<strong>and</strong> Status Message (§C.2.3.9.18), with the encoding as specified in Table C-21.<br />

C.2.3.10.17 1090ES IN<br />

The CC Code subfield <strong>for</strong> “1090ES IN” in Aircraft Operational Status Messages (TYPE=31, Subtype=0 or 1)<br />

is a 1-bit field (“ME” bit 12, Message bit 44) that is set to ONE (1) if the transmitting aircraft has the capability<br />

to receive ADS-B 1090ES Messages. Otherwise, this CC code subfield is set to ZERO (0).<br />

DRAFT - Working Paper ASP TSGWP11-01 <strong>for</strong> review by the TSG during the meeting in June 2011 in Paris

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