BazermanMoore

When Emotion and Cognition Collide 89
decision makers have coherent and internally consistent preferences. Howard Raiffa’s
(1968) approach to the problem is particularly intriguing. He advocates acknowledging
such internal inconsistencies, as well as the fact that two competing preferences cannot
both be in an individual’s interest. Specifically, Raiffa recommends questioning each
self to find out which one is making the error. Perhaps the ‘‘should’’ self can confront
the ‘‘want’’ self with its limited perspective—for example, the danger of ignoring longterm
implications of a decision. Alternatively, it could be that the ‘‘want’’ self can elucidate
for the ‘‘should’’ self some of the more elusive feelings that the ‘‘should’’ self has
neglected by its formal analysis. Raiffa suggests that this communication should take
place until reconciliation occurs.
Raiffa’s approach recognizes the importance of giving voice, opportunity, and
input to the emotional and visceral needs of the ‘‘want’’ self. As Loewenstein (1996)
notes, the ‘‘want’’ self can provide valuable input: ‘‘Hunger signals the need for nutritional
input, pain indicates the impingement of some type of potentially harmful
environmental factors, and emotions serve a range of interrupting, prioritizing, and
energizing functions.’’
Advice from Negotiation Researchers Raiffa’s approach assumes that the two
parts of the self can negotiate a settlement to their differences, given their mutual dependence
on each other. Yet we can all think of instances in which the ‘‘should’’ self
made a decision with the logic of self-interest, only to be later overruled by the impulsive
behavior of the ‘‘want’’ self. For example, a diet or exercise regime could be sabotaged
by an individual’s failure to reconcile the ‘‘want’’ self to the ‘‘should’’ self’s new
agenda.
For this reason, we recommend the development of a rational negotiation strategy
for dealing with the ‘‘want’’ self. Our modification of Raiffa’s advice grants the ‘‘want’’
self more autonomy and a stronger voice in the decision-making and negotiation process.
By treating the ‘‘want’’ self as a negotiator who has the power to declare an impasse,
we aim to bypass both the domination of the ‘‘should’’ self in the decisionmaking
stage and the domination of the ‘‘want’’ self in the implementation stage.
We suggest that you impose several criteria on your negotiation between the
‘‘want’’ and ‘‘should’’ selves. First, require the two sides to reach an agreement, as ongoing
conflict would lead the ‘‘should’’ self to continue to make a variety of decisions
that the ‘‘want’’ self sabotages. Second, the agreement should be Pareto efficient (see
Chapter 9); that is, there should be no other agreement that the ‘‘want’’ self and the
‘‘should’’ self both prefer over the created agreement. This agreement might be
reached through ‘‘discussions’’ and compromises between the two selves about key
issues—for example, how often the ‘‘want’’ self will get to eat ice cream, how many
days a week the ‘‘should’’ self will exercise, and so on. By both selves agreeing to reasonable
times and limits, the ‘‘want’’ self is likely to be more willing to follow the
agreement. Third, the ‘‘should’’ self must not push for an agreement that is outside
the bargaining zone; that is, the terms must not be unacceptable to the ‘‘want’’ self,
either currently or in the future. The ‘‘should’’ self must remember that there is no
court of law for suing yourself for a contract violation—the ‘‘want’’ self can void the
contract at any time.