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BazermanMoore

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Creating Value in Negotiation 157

In contrast to this pessimistic and false prediction, the existence of multiple issues

and the development of a creative trade explains the resolution that eventually developed

at Camp David.

As the Camp David negotiations continued, it became clear that while the positions of

Egypt and Israel were incompatible, the interests of the two countries were compatible.

Israel’s underlying interest was security from land or air attack. Egypt was primarily interested

in sovereignty over land that was part of Egypt for thousands of years. What emerged

was the existence of two real issues, instead of one, with differential importance to the two

parties: sovereignty and military protection. The solution that emerged traded off these

issues. The agreement called for Israel to return the Sinai in exchange for assurances of a

demilitarized zone and new Israeli air bases.

To analyze this agreement, examine the more complex diagram presented in

Figure 9.1. The utility of an agreement to Israel is represented on the horizontal axis,

and the utility of an agreement to Egypt is represented on the vertical axis. Point A

represents the solution of giving the land and total control of it to Egypt. Notice that

this solution would have been completely acceptable to Egypt and completely unacceptable

to Israel. Point B represents the solution of Israel keeping the land and maintaining

total control over it. This solution would have been completely acceptable to

Israel and completely unacceptable to Egypt. Point C represents a straight compromise—giving

each party control over half of the land. As illustrated in the bargaining

zone diagram, this solution fails to meet the reservation points of either Israel or Egypt.

It does not give Egypt sovereignty over the Sinai, and it does not give Israel sufficient

A

Utility to Egypt

Er

C

D

Utility to Israel

Ir

B

Figure 9.1

Integrating Interests in the Israel–Egypt Dispute

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